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TNTRO)T)UrTTON
The analysis of the problem of the economic development of
the so-called "underdeveloped" countries is hampered by t he lack
of concrete and detailed case materialdealing simultaneously with
both the economic and noneconomic factors in social change over a
given period of time in specific localities within these countries
If realistic plans for development are to be devised, such case
material would seem to be of first importance. Without it, aggre-
gative and statistical approaches are likely to lack meaning, and
paper planning unrela ted to the exigencies of local conditions likely
to proliferate. A study maeie by the author, in company with six
other anthropologists and sociologists, of a Central Javanese town-
villa ge complex in 1953-54 has provided some useful case material
of this sort0 1  As the town, which I shall call Modjokuto, was
founded only around the turn of the century, and the generalaren
settled only fifty years before that, and as it was for about
IThe field work period ran from May 1953 until September 1954,
with a two month gap in July and August of 1953, The project was
under the sponsorship of the Center for International Studies of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A full description of the town,
prepared by the entire project, is in the process of publication, As
will be obvious from the following, I am deeply indebted to my fellow
members of the project both for much of my data and many of my inter.
pretations, though they, of course, may not agree with all of the
latter0 Particularly, Mr. Robert Jay and Mr. Donald Fagg have contri.
buted both informally, through personal conversations, and formally,
through their as yet unpublished reports, to the lines- of thought
developed in this paper, A much abbreviated version of this paper was
presented at the meetings of the Society for Applied Anthropology
in Cambridge, May 1956.
2twenty years a kind of arena of contact between Dutch managed
plantation agriculture and Javanese run peasant agriculture, small
trade, and small manufacture, it provides a fairly self-contained
unit for study which yet has implications beyond itself.
In the following, I shall try first to describe this region
as it now exists in both its rural and urban aspects. Then I shall
trace the development of the rural sector, where attention will be
focused on the special nature of the interaction of plantation and
peasant agriculture in the area and on the results of this inter-
action so far as the Javanese social structure and economy is
concerned. A similar trr cing will then be presented for the urban
sector. In this connection, I shall discuss the economic and social
development of three originally somewhat distinctive subgroups-civil
servants, traders, and proletorianized or semi-proletarianized
"workers"--and conclude with a discussion of contemporary, post-
revolutionary social and economic patterns. In a final section
I shall discuss some implications of the case material for future
economic growth in Indonesia, especially in respect to the possible
role of commercial agriculture in such growth. As a whole, the
paper is an attempt to present the problem of economic development
in broadly social and cultural terms, to deal with economic and
noneconomic factors within the same general frame of reference.
THE SETTING
M4odjokuto is the name of a town, a subdistrict and a district.
The town is the seat of government for both the subdistrict and the
district, and is an important commercial center for the whole area.
The subdistrict is about thirty square miles in extent and includes
within it eighteen "village clusters," while the district is about
seventy-five square miles and consists .of f ive subdistricts, inclu-
ding that of Modjokuto itself. The regional capital for Modjokuto
in located in a small city some fifteen miles to the west and the
provincial capital at Surabaja, the large eastern Java seaport, about
one hundred miles to the north and slightly east. I shall, in the
following analysis, be concerned primarily with the town and the
subdistrict; only secondarily and r ther generally with the district
as a whole.
As the town lies at the southeastern edge of the Brantas River
valley-.the river itself passing through the regional capital--
there is within the district a good deal of var-iation in landscape
type and, consequently, of modes of land use. To the east of town
the land breaks rather quickly into f oothills which lead, ultimately,
to a group of large, active volcanoes (the last serious eruption was
in 1951; earlier ones occurred in 1901 and 1919). Southward, the
country, though only somewhat broken, is either forested or in-
creasingly dry and unirrigable. Thus, although there are some rice
fields on all sides of the town, it is to the northwest that the -
3
bmost highly fertile (fertilized both by the river and the volcanoes),
irrigable, rice bowl land lies.
In the high mountain areas there is some rice, grown in narrowed
terraces built on remarkably steep slopes, but the most characteristic
crops are the more cool c3limate vegetables--cabbages, squashes, even
some potatoes, Though some of these vegetable crops flow through
Modjokuto on their way elsewhere, the bulk of them do not, so that
the importance of this area for the town is, relatively speaking,
small, On the drier, slightly elevated land to the south, Dutch
private enterprise had a quite extensive p1antation system--sugar,
coffee, rubber, sisal, tapioca--before the war, During the war,
squatters were invited on to the land by the Japanese occupation
government 0  The migrants, most of whom came from outside the
Modjokuto area, were given small parcels of the plantation land to
farm in the native dry-land manner (ioe., a non-rice crop in the wet
season, fallow in the dry), and have remained in place since the
war, despite some governmental attempts to remove them0  On the
rice bowl land, where -nost of the population is settled, one finds,
of course, the labor-intensive, flooded-field, double-crop agri.
culture characteristic of Java more or less generally, and of Central
Java particularly0
A land use map of the subdistrict shows very large, continuous
blocks of residential land surrounded on all sides--at least in the
rice bowl area--by terraced fields. The residential blocks do not,
with one or two exceptions in the case of small blocks, represent
single villages but as many as six or seven (more commonly three or four)
contiguous ones- Each residential village has at least one border
openig on to terraced an wi-ch lond belongs to that village out
to the point where , mots ronging to a village in
either its own or another settlement block, An individual village
is, therefore, composed of part of a residential block and an
immediately contiguous block of rice fields; boundaries within both
the residential and rice field blocks are almost always conceptual
rather than natural, though they are usually marked with a road or
a small irrigation ditch. This system, as we 11 as some other promi-
nent features of the general socio-ecological pattern2 shortly to be
discussed, is diagrammed in the following idealised sketch (it is
not a true map) of the subdistrict areas (See Diagram 1, page 6.)
The town of Modjokuto is, so to speak, wedged into this village
pattern. There is no political unit which may be called the town
and so the distinctly urban pattern is centered in one village
(also called Modjokuto), but spills over at the edges into the
immediately contiguous villages--much as, say, New York City spills
over into Connecticut and New Jersey--making them consequently,
half urban and half rural0 The over-all pattern is, then, one of
a small, agglomerate urban nucleus (inner circle on Diagram 1)
consisting of government administrative offices, a commercial g roup
made up of Chinese and Javanese traders, artisans and small manu-
facturers, and an urban proletariat; a band of semi-urban villages
2
"Ecology" here in the somewhat broad and inexact se nse of the
distribution of social units in space, as studies by the so-called
"social ecolorists." See Firev, W,., Land Use in Central Boston,
Cambridge (Masso), 1947,
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7immediately surrounding this nucleus, part of their territory
actually falling within it (outer circle on Diagram 1); and
surrounding them a more clearly rural-though in no way genuinely
independent or self-sufficient--band of villages or village clusters,
Bevond these, one begins to move into the sphere of influence of
another town in which the pattern is repeated in reverse order.
The pure circularity of the pattern is, of course, somewhat dis-
rupted by Modjokuto's position at the edge of the rice plain: to
the south and east, se'ttlements are both smaller and less regularly
distributed.
There is, however, another complicating factor in the relation
between political organization and ecological patte n. Dutch interest
in administrative simplicity succeeded, in the years before the war,
in reducing the number of village officials by joining several
contiguous villages into one administrative unit--which may be
called a "village cluster"-under a single locally chosen headman
(these units may be seen on Diagram 2, below). 3 Thus four or five
villages are usually politically fused, following a common headman,
clerk, religious official, and so forth, A special "village head"
still remains, however, land ownership is still organised on a
village basis, and each village maintains a separate shrine, so that
the sense of village solidarity--as opposed to village-cluster
solidarity--remains strong, the more so the greater the distance from
3 For a full description of village organization in the Modjokuto
area, see Jay, R. "Local Government in Rural Central Java," The Far
Eastern Quarterly, Vol0 XV, No. 2, February 1956, pp. 215-227
8town. As noted a'ove there are eiphteen villape clusters in the
subdistrict, and these comprise seventy-nine separate villages.
These various ecological comvunities--villages, village-
clusters, town--are tied together by a transport network consisting
of three elements: paved highways, a small steam-tram railroad line,
and unpaved country roads (the latter do not appear on the diagram).
The town itself is focused around a fork in the hiphway: from
Modjokuto one pavied road runs off westward to the regional capital,
one proceeds toward the mountains to the east, and one cuts directly
northward through the center of the rice bowl area to join the main
central Java trunk highway (Djokdjakarta to Surabaja) at the next
district capital some twenty-five miles northward. The train runs
from the regional capital through Mod jokuto town (where its main
station and repair shop is located) to the main railroad line which
parallels the above mentioned trunk highway. The dirt roads spread
out perpendicularly from the three highways in long and, for the
most part, straight lines. The transport grid is, thus,a fairly
regular and quite extensive one: any point in the subdistrict
is reachable from the town by bicycle at any time of the year in
an hour or two.
l The Rural Pattern
The village residential land is more or less evenly squared off
by this generally rectangular, unpaved stfeet grid. (As can be
seen from Diagram 1, the larger settlement bloc~ks show a mwrked
tendency to cluster near the arterial highways.) Small, single
family houses--mostly of bamboo, sometimes of concrete--are arranged
side by side one-deep along these streets, surrounded on three sides
by a garden and on the forth by a cleared front yard. The settlement
pattern is, thus, also rectangular and linear within the residential
blocks--a pattern emphasized by the wide-anread custom of erecting
continuous whitewashed brick wills on either side of the arrow-straight
streets, broken only by open gateways to each house-yard--rather
than organized around any kind of center: political (the village
headman lives wherever his house happens to be), religious (the
village shrines are accidently distributed), or economic (with a few
unimportant exceptions, there are no village markets). Population
is very heavy: the more or less clearly rural population is about
65,000 within an area (the subdistrict, excluding the town) of about
twenty-nine square miles, giving an over-all density of over 2,000
per square mile and, as about 40 per cent of the land is residential,
settlement concentrations run upwards of 5,000 per square mile, Thus,
the wet-rice village or village cluster presdnts a picture of a
series of nuclear family residential units4 crowded closely together
in parallel double rows (i.e., on either side of the streets),
running sometimes as much as two -niles in length. In such a context,
effective primary group, personal relationship are commonly confined
among neighbors a half-dozen or so houses apart--such neighborhood
41n a sampling of 153 households from four separate villages,
Jay found 75 per cent of the households consisted either of father,
mother, and children, or a single parent and children. See Jay,
"Village Life in Modjokuto," (forth coming joint report of Java
field team, Center for International Studies, MIT).
10
groupings often focusing around small coffee shops--or to kin
living in the general area.5
The checkerboard appearance of the landscape is further strengthened
by the hundreds of s traight shot irrigation canals and by the rice
terraces themselves, most of which are only about six or seven hundred
square yards in area and which a re bordered by foot-wide mud dams*
In the terraces the peasants plant rice in the wet season (November
through April) and either corn, soya beans, onions, peppers, peanuts,
or sweet potatoes in the dry, usually a combination of several of
these. Land is owned on a nuclear family basis and is quite fractionated,
average holdings running slightly under two acres and larger holdings
being extremely rare. 6 The fields are worked either by the owner or
by a tenant, either cash or share crop, commonly the latter, the
tenant's share ranging from 1/3 to 1/2 of the harvest depending on
the quality of the land, the nature of the social relationships
between tenant and owner, and the amount of capital contributed by
each. The method of cultivation is very labor intensive and is
carried on by both men and women (men plough and hoe, women plant
and harvest). The combination of high labor inputs, low capitalization
5 Xinship is reckoned bilaterally and there are no supra-failial
corporate kin groups. Relations further out than second cousin rarely
have any real importance in an individual's life, and even within this
range physical distance or urbanization may reduce the significance of
kin ties.
6The largest holding in the subdistrict is about 85 acres, the
second largest is half that. These larger holdings are themselves
fragmented into two and three acre parcels, each parcel worked separately
by share tenants.
11
(aside from irripation systems), and great land fractionation has
led to a relatively rigidified productive pattern with limited
flexibility in adapting to market condi tions. Most of the crop is
sold, even a large share of the paddy crop, idlled rice often
having to be bought back in the market when stores run short. Dry
crops are commonly bought up by Javanese agents of Chinese dealers
(or sometimes by the dealers themselves), while rice is sold either
to the Government in large amounts or in small ones to local food
stores.
A labor-intensive agriculture plus a high and growing popu-
lation means that the primary economic problem for the peasant is to
get 3and and labor together in the right amounts at the right time.
As a result, village social structure typically consists of an
integration of political, relipious, and economic activities within
a traditionalized distribution of land rights on the one hand and
rig'hts over labor on the other. The land side of the equation is
expressed in the o system of land tenure. In this system, a
set of villagers--the so-called "kernel" villagers--are seen as
descendants of the man or men who originally cleared and settled the
village. Each of these villager--more properly, each of these
familiea, for the basic social unit is the nuclear family, not the
individual--has a small unit of land (usually under two acres) over
which he has life-long use rights. *hese rithts are inalienable,
though they are inheritable by one's own children, and they cannot
be subdivided. If a nuclear villager dies without heirs, commits a
crime, or leaves the village, the land is redistributed to a waiting
12
candidate by a meting of all the nuclear land holders. The
candidates are men who own house land but do not own shares in the
nuclear rice land (no person may own two shares), and the man who
has been candidate the longest is given the land, As the village
leaders have extra land ri hts, called bengkok, as perquisites of
their offices, a "natural" class ranking tends to form around the
&o ltenure system, At the top are the village leaders; after them
the nuclear villagers, or "full citizens," who have shares in the
village rice land; beneath them the candidates (called "half citizens")
who own only house land; and at the bottom are those who own nothing
and board with others.
The labor exchange system is also an explicit one, involving
different sorts of patterns appropriate to different economic and
social contexts. Share tenancies and subtenancies of various sorts;
reciprocal labor exchange patterns; share work in particular tasks
(e.g., harvesting); dependent laborers supported within a household;
group work in which a set of households "pitch in" to help one
particular household (e.g., in house building)--all these play a
part. And, further, there is a close integration between these
labor patterns and the land tenure-political status patterns just
describeds
The next step for each household is to organize its labor
resources. A variety of form of labor relations are in use,
each having particular characteristics of expense and entailed
obligation, The household must decide what forms to exploit
in terms of its cash and social resources., Other factors are
included in the decision, especially the factor of social
prestige. Each labor relationship has its aspect of social
13
status which each family must take into account, depending
upon its social position and social ambitions. The factor
of labor availability is also involved in the decisions
connected with acquiring and exploiting land rights, so that
these two problems become somewhat circular in their solutionst 7
The village religious system reflects this social s tructure
fairly precisely., The central ritual form is a ascred meal given
by one household in their home for the male heads of anywhere from
five to fifteen households in the immediate neighborhood, no nearer
household being ignored in favor of one farther away, These sacred
meals are given on various calendrical holidays, at the main
transition points in the life cycle, at different stages in the crop
round, and for various special purposes such as illness, bad dreams,
and so forth, and they symbolise the solidarity of the neighborhood
group as a territorial unification of a set of otherwise independent
and distinct households, Once a year a village-wide feast of this
sort is held, to which each household contributes a packet of cooked
food and receives a similar packet from the general accumulation,
symbolizing for the village the same sort of particular integration
There are no village cluster rituals.
This picture of village social structure is an ideal-typical
model stressing the more traditional aspects of rural life and as
such is, to a certain degree, false to the facts in Modjokuto.
The growth of private property, monetizatIon, and urbanization,
to say nothing of the increased landlessness resulting from the
rising population, has significantly blurred the edges of the
7Jay, "Village Life " cit., (preliminary draft), Jay
presents a thorough description of ural labor relations and land
right patterns in the Modjokuto area;
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underlying pattern, For example, in the Modjokuto subdistrict,
76 per cent of the wet rice land is owned as simple, freely
alienable private property, 15 per cent is in gogo, and 9 per cent
is in bengkok, so that only about a quarter of the wet Ja nd is,
strictly speaking, "communal." 8 Yet these figures also give a
somewhat false view of the situstion, for there is a strong feeling
against alienation of even privately-owned land to people not
resident in the village. Even in what was perhaps the most suburban
village the amount of wet rice land held by outsiders was only about
10 per cent of the total, and most of that was owned in very small
lots by townspeople rather than by really distant absentee landlords.
Thus the gogol-beng~ok system is only the most explicit and most
concretely specified expression of a general attitude toward. land
tenure (and, more broadly, toward the proper character of community
life as a whole), an attitude which plays an important, if partially
attenuated, role in the peasant ?s treatment of even nominally
"private property." A similar line of argument could be developed
for the relation between traditional labor patterns and wage work,
8 with the exception of a small amount of dry land set aside
as bengkok, all residential and unirrigated cultivable land is
privately owned and seems always to have been so. The Modjokuto
"communal land" percentages are somewhat lower than those for all
Java where 76 per cent of all Javanese landholdings (dry or irrigated)
is individual, 18 per cent o -1, 5 per cent bRnkok. Hollinger,
W. 'The Indonesian Economy:Te Food Crops Sector," Quantitative
Studies 2, Indonesia; unpublished manuscript, Center for International
Studies, MIT.
the latter being by now widespread in the area.
Thus, though the traditional village social structure has been
strained and weakened by the kinds of developments we usually
associate with increasing urbanization, it has far from been destroyed
by them, It has, in fact, proved remarkable capable of absorbing
a very dense population without developing a sharp class segregation
of haves and have-nots. Rather than a concentration of land holdings
and a disenfranchized proletariat, there has occurred a fractioni.
sation of both the land tenure and labor rights side of the equation
so that the structure can contain more people: thus several villages in the
Modjokuto area recently doubled their number of nuclear citizens
by halving the holdings of each citizen; thus complicated tenancy,
subtenancy, renting and subrenting patterns have developed which
allow a greater numboer of people to claim a small portion of agri-
cultural output from a single piece of land. 9 Such a social structure,
its agricultural base growing nore and more labor intensive, holds
an increasing number of people on the land through a pattern I have
called elsewhere "shared poverty," a kind of supersaturated solution
of land and people sustained at a level of living only slightly above
subsistence.10
9 The pattern of equal inheritance of private property is also,
of course, a structural factor of major importance in this connection,
The absence of a primogeniture pattern, or even of male inheritance,
allows a very great number of people to find some sort of a landed
base within the rural society.,
1 0 See Geerts, C., "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Cen-
tral Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Considerations," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, Vol, IV, No. 2, 1956, pp., 13-18.
Hollinger eFood Crops . a , , ,op. _ci.) notes that this pattern seems
to have held for the whole of the modern period: "Has Indonesia's
16
Equally interesting is the spatial variation in the g2gol-
blngkok tenure pattern, which we may take as the most readily
observable invex of the traditional village social structure,
throuphout the subdistrict. Not only does the per cent of land
under Molgg-bAngkok tenure vary from 62 per cent in one village
cluster to 7 per cent in another, but the- strength of the tenure
pattern within any village cluster is directly correlated with the
per cent of the total cultivated land in that cluster which is
irrigated. That is to say, village clusters in which wet rice
cultivation plays a proportionately larger role are those in
which the traditional gogol-bangkok land pattern also plays a
proportionately larger role. Diagram 2 shows this general dis-
tribution, with the clusters ranked in these terms. The heavily
shaded clusters (1 to 6) are areas having a relatively high pro-
econon been unable to get its development program "off the run-
way" by a constant pressure of population upon available food pro-
ducing resources? Hns there been a secular reduction in per capita
consumption of food? In reviewing the historical record jor Java
and Madura only one is struck equally by the rapid increase in
population and ari ssu, the expansion of food output. . . In his
basic study: The ood nsurmtion of the Native Inhabitants of Java
and Madura, Dr0 T1. P. A. Scheltema comes to the conclusion that 'if,
now, the average amounts that (without deducting seed) were available
for use per head of the people are passed in review, it will be
obvious at once that there is no question involved of a continuous
rise or fall in the amount IScheltema's italicsf'. . . Taking all
e historical evidence ito consideration, we conclude that per
capita food consumption has been maintained throughout the period
of rapid population increase, hut it has never risen above a
minimal level. This is succinctly put by the Dutch economist,
J. B. D. Derksen: "Irrigation projects, government controls of food
supplies and other measures have succeeded in combpting famines,
but not in raising the rreal fdod consumption per capita over the.
last century."
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portion of their fields in .oo1-b~ngkok tenure, and a relatively low
percentage of unirrigated fields. In the unshaded clusters (15-18), the
reverse is true: low percentages of Ja nd in gogol-bngkok tenure,
high percentages of cultivated land unirrigated. The other, dotted,
clusters (7-14) lie in between: less of their land is in -bgol-kok
than in the rice bowl area, but less of their land is dry than in the
dry areas.
This distribution of land use and social structure is an outcose
of the interaction of three separable factors over the whole period
of Modjokuto's history since its settlement in the mid-nineteenth
century: the geography of the area, the temporal order in which it
was settled, and the specific historical events which have occurred
there. From the point of view of geography, the distrubution reflects
the position of Modjokuto at the edge of the rice plain, the rice
culture thinning out as you move toward the high mountains eastward
and the old plantation areas southward, the Brantas River rice basin
thrusting into the area from the northwest. differences in land use
are then in part simple reflections in differences in the adequacy of the
water supply. From the point of vtew of migration, the distribution
llThe map was drawn by ranking the clusters, first in terms of the
per cent of field land privately owned (i.e., not in Cgo-blngkok
tenure), second in terms of the per cent of unirrigated field land (the
rank order correlation between the two rankings, ( , is 477), The
heavily shaded areas, then represent clusters in .which less than 75 per
cent of the land is privately owned (1,e4, more than a quarter is in
gogol--bangkok) and less than 10 per cent is unirrigated, The unshaded
areas represent clusters in which mowe than 80 per cent of the lnd is
privately owned, but more than 35 per cent is unirrigated. The inter-
mediate areas show more variation, but in them more than 75 per cent of
the land is privately owned, while less than 35 per cent is dry,
sugar
plantation
I
I
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reflects the order in which the area was settled, the rice areas
generally being cleared and cultivated earlier than the drier ones.
Fairly large groups of people settled the rice bowl villages more
or less at one fell swoop, each such group thus being the original
gogols, or nuclear villagers, while the later settlement of the
drier areas came as population pressure forced people individually,
or family by family, f£rther and farther away from the river, intra-
regional migration in this direction conti.nuing up until fairly recently.
But that these factors have not in themselves been more than partially
determining is apparent from the fact that prior to the first decades
of this century, the heavily shaded clusters were rather more like the
dry areas are today, at least insofar as the land use is concerned,
than like the heavy rice areas they have since become. The contemporary
predominance of wet rice in these clusters is, therefore, in part a
result of the concrete history of the area, of the cultural, social,
and economic contact betwepn the Javanese peasant and Dutch planta-
tion manager,
2. The Urban Pattern
The town is another problem altogether. In the first place it is
not, as is the village, a single more or less homogeneous social
structure, the elements of which tend to repent themselves, like a
wallpaper design (frayin off at the eriges) throughout the whole
countryside, Rather, it is a social composite, an only partially
orpanized coincidence of separate social structures, the most important
of which are the government bureaucracy, the market network, and a
20
somewhat revised version of the village system. These elements have
shaped the growth of the town since its beginning (it was founded in
the latter half of the 19th century): the placing of a branch office
of the colonial bureaucracy there turned the village into an embryonic
town in the first Dlace; the booming olantations and the secondary
stimulus from them to native and Chinese t rode turned it into a pro-
sperous co'mnerical cross-roads; and the transformation of village
people living there into townsmen--a transformation wh4 ch is still
going on--provided it with the final element of urbanization, a
reserve army of underemployed. The town has thus been the meeting
ground of peasant, trader, and bureaucrat for over seventy-five years,
but even today the relations between the- three are complex and only
partially defined, and Modjokuto, though in area (about two square
miles) the size of a New England town, a Southern country seat, or
a Midwestern Main Street town, has more the social formlessness and
heteropeneity of a small American city. It also has something of
the population: about 22,000, of whom 1,900 are Chinese, a handful
Arabs, Indians, Eurasians, or natives of other islands of Indonesia.
There are two business districts in the town, one at the north
end and one at the south, with the Government offices in between them,
strung out from the cross-roads along the road which runs to the regency
capitalo The southern busine se section is both more Chinesedominated
and more town oriented, while the northern, though still containing
many Chinese stores, has a greater Javanese element, and it is here
that the market is located. For the most part the Chinese stores sell
general hardware, clothing, furniture, jewelery, certain "luxury"
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foods and other goods not produced locally (as well, of course, as
some which are); and, as mentioned, the Chinese also play the major
middleman role in the dry season cash crop econoyry, transporting the
bulk of them to Surabaja by truck, They also mill the local rice
under Government contract, engage in some manufacture, and even in
a certain amount of service trade. So far as possible, they remain
aloof from the Javanese community in other than commercial matters.
Internally they are tightly organized in terms of the distinction
between those Chinese born in Indonesia and those who were born in
China and immigrated to Indonesia (the latter being more aggressive
economically and generally dominant), in terms of their dialect
group (Hakka, Hokkien, etc.), in terms of extended kinship reckonings,
and, to some extent, in terms of the Kuomintang-Communist distinction.
Relations with the Javanese--particularly with urbanized Javanese who
regard the Chinese as having a stranglehold on the economy--tend to
be tense, and severl Chinese were murdered in Modjokuto during the
Revolution.
As for the market (which in a physical sense, is a set of sheds
and platforms, spaces being rented out to sellers by the Government),
almost every sort of consumption good is sold there, usually on a
very small scale and on a very thin profit margin. The trading
pattern is a very indivicuated one, the tra 'ers--all of whom are
Javanese and almost all of whom are full professionals--only rarely
combining into super-individual commercial enterprises. Many tr-ders
sell outside of the physical market, travelling to the villages,
the aqua ter areas, or the mountains, or setting up small shops
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around town. Tlhere are a few fairly developed stores owned by
Javanese in both the northern and southern business sections, but
their volume and range of activities, in the face of Chinese com-
petition and a shortage of capital, in not great. There are also
some Javanese manufacturing enterprises--both of the putting-out and
small factory type--in cigarettes, lumbermaking, food processing,
garment making, and so forth, but they tend to be rather small and
more or less unmechanized. And there are also a great many inde-.
pendent small craftsmen--carpenters, tailors, etc.--scattered around
town, In general, one can say that the Javanese sector of Modjokuto
business life is centered on intra-local trade, the Chinese around
inter-local. There is, of c6urse, some overlap, but, as we shall
see, rather less than there once was.
The government offices and the schools form the "bureaucracy"
element in the urban social structure. 1 2  The white-collar, salaried
employees of these institutions--clerks, draughtsmen, administrators,
nurses, teachers, and so forth--comprise the social elite of the town.
They tend to dominate the private economic, political, charitable,
and educational organizations which have particularly proliferated
1 2 In addition to the district and subdistrict headquarters, the
Government offices included an irrigation service, an agricultural
extension station and experimental farm, a pawnshop, a fishery, an
office of religious affairs, a public works bureau, a poorhouse, a post
office, a slaughter houOse, a telephone service, an electric power com-
pany, a state police headquarters, a market administration office,
a public schools office, an army school, a hospital, and the haad ,
offices of the railroad. There are Government schools in the town
(there are usually two or three in each village cluster, too), as
well as several private ones. There is also a large brivate hospital
built by a Dutch plantation comtany before the war.
23
since the war. They set the style-of-life moddle for the society
generally. And they are, as a group, moreewstatus conscious, more
educated, more concerned with a Javanese variety of Hindu-Buddhist
mysticism (though, as almost all Javanese, theyare professed oslems),
as well as more Dutchminfluenced than the mass of the people. As
for the third element, the displaced peasants (or descendants of
peasants displaced earlier), they fit into the general urban
structure as best they can--they may become independent craftsmen,
marginal traders, or manual workers either for the Chinese or in the
Government serviceb, or they may merely remain more or 3ss unemployed,
living off relatives or output from a small share in village land
to which they still have rights,
The settlement pattern of the town tends to reflect the general
looseness of the relations between these major groups. The Chinese
live in their stores, almost all of which are along the two main
streets The more successful urbanites--mostly officials and traders--
live along the other streets in stone houses, more or es at random,
though there are at least two somewhat distinctive neighborhoods:
the most desirable location for a teacher or Government official
is along the main road to the regency capital beyond the point where
the Government offices end; and mary of the richer traders who are
also pious Moslems tend to live along the street which runs from the
13
market past the mosque. As for the lower classes, they tend to
1 3 The tendency, rather less marked t oday than before the war, for
the more puristic Moslem element in the population to dominate the native
trading sector is in part a result of the central role Islam played in
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live not along the streets at all, but within the blocks the grid
outlines in enclosed settlements the Indonesians call kaMUpongs
The k type of settlement is characteristic of town and city
life everywhere in Java and is, in fact, somethirg of a reinterpretation
of the village pattern in terms of the denser, more heterogeneous, less
organically integrated urban environmento In the kampong pattern the
whole block is owned by one or two people-quite commonly, but not
necessarily, one of the people in the stone houses facing the streeto
The small bamboo houses,, of the same sort common in villages, are placed
about haphasardly in crowded profusion on this block, often with very
little space between them, there being no gardens in the town, except
around a few of the larger stone houses. These bamboo houses are usually
owned by the occupants, though they are sometimes rented, also. Figures
for people who own but the house or who rent both house and land are,
consequently, an excellent index of urbanisation, as can be seen from the
following totals for four kaMons in the center of town, for a "neighbor-
hood" in a sub-urban village, and for a "neighbarhood" in a rural village:1
own house and land own house, rent land rent both
no* per cent no. per cen no per cent
urban (four
kamponS) 27 100.5 120 60. 100 39A
sub-urban 22 68.9 7 21.9 3 9o2
rural 58 95o8 3 .2 0 0
the expansion of trade along Javats north coast in the 15th and 16th
centuries See Geerts, C,, "The Development of the Javanese Econoug:
A Socio-Cultural Approach," unpublished manuscript, Center for Inter-
national Studies, MIT,
am indebted to Mr. Robert Jay for rural figures.
Ihe kamng in part at any rate, represents an urban reinter-
pretai. on v f t a l however, in
some part of Indonesia, used to refer to rural neighborhoods ae well
as urban), It is nere that the exchange feast-giving pattern which
id the center of village religious life remains the strongest,, -4hough.
in the absence of the demands for economic cooperation enforced ty
village agriculture such feasts tend to be more symbols of vague
k n solidarity or lack thereof-of a relatively (but not,
absolutely) substanceless "neighborliness."15 The atomization of
ecial life has often gone further there, It is in the kampong
areas especially that you find the usual signs of social disorgani-
zation: thieverv, prostitution, gambling, and drinking (though due
to the peneral Javanese sobriety, and the high cost of liquor, there
is suprisingly little of this latter). But it is also in the kampongs
that you find attempts to rework rural patterns into more flexible
modes of livingq and the growth of a distinctly urban, "lower class"
cultureo This general discussion of the socio-ecological pattern
of the town is summed up in the following sketch (which, again, is
not a true map). (See Diagram 3, page 26.)
15Around the mosque, behind the houses of the better-off
pious Moslem traders, poorer people of similar religious inten-
sity, also commonly traders or craftsmen, live in a kampong,
the so-called kauman or "Moslem quarter." Here the pattern of
life is similar to that in other kampongs except the feasting
pattern is weaker and atomization somewhat less due to the strong
in-group feeling of these people, and, perhaps, to the peculiar
adaptability of Islam to just this sort of urban living,
26.
0
0
0)
pa
~s)
c~.
09
13
R~bi;..41~n
School
Nrick &"t
Bounboo knmrns VAOI.L1LS
I ,D~~t~c. ~Suwbrstick CW#'czs
3.~ ~*~c~ 4. MoviL
10H5 t~s*"o*
Q
'94':
(4g
yal ni is A
0RURAL DEVELPMENT
After the Diponegoro War (1825-1830) and the Culture System
16(1830-1870) severely disturbed the Central Javanese agrarian economy,
migration eastward increased, a movement which vas further encouraged
by the Indies Government which was interested in developing the still
sparsely settled region south and east of Surabajao Migrants from the
north coast area (Kudus, Demak, Gresik, the so-called "Pasisir"), from
the Central Java principalities (i.e,, the Jogjkarta-Surakarta "Mataram"
region), and from the other areas of East Java alraady somewhat settled
(Madiun, Kediri, odjokagung, Telungagung) began to come into the
Modjokuto area, cle aring off the forest in the rice plain and forming
villages0 Modjokuto was thus something of a frontier area, although
settlements in maiy parts o?. East Java trace back to pre-colonial times0
As a result, it had a looser auri of socio-economic structure tnan was
common in the already heavily populated regions of Central Java, out of
which so many of the settlers had come and where the classic Javanseb
6The Culture System was an oppressive but remarkably productive
forced cultivation scheme in which peasants were obliged to grow
commercial crops for the Colonial Government on 2/5 of their land in lieu
of money taxes0  For a description of this system, see Furnivall, J0 So,
Netherlands India, Cambridge (England) and New York, 1944, pp. 108 ff.
The Diponegoro War was a fairly extensive rebellion against Dutch rule
in Central Java led by a prince of the Jogjakarta court. See van der
Kroef, J.M., "Diponegoro, Progenitor of Indoneeian Nationalism," Far
Eastern 4uarterly, August 19h9, pp. 429.450o ___
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civilisation was centered0 Wet rice cultivation took up a rather
smaller proportion of the land in Modjokuto than in Central Java,
while dry fields and grating land took up a rather larger proportion
And this ecological pattern--still characteristic of Madura and parts
of Java farther east-was a more open, flexible mode of adaptation,
seemingly capable of development in any one of several directionso
However, after a brief period of expansion when it seemed possible
that rather distinctive-for Java-social, cultural, ar4 ecological
patterns were in the proc ess of developing, patterns which might have
led to a more dynamic sort of society, the economic history of the
rural area is one of a progressive rigidification toward the typically
Central Javanese modes of land use, social organization, and cultural
outlook, a replication, with some differences, of the essentially
static village society of the principalities0
Besides the cultural traditions the settlers brought with them
when they moved into t he area, there was, a fter the turn of the
century, another force shaping the development of Modjokuto--the
plantation system. The plantation system introduced "capitalistic"
(i.eo, capital-intensive) forms of economic organization into the
area, reshaped traditional patterns of land use, and markedly altered
the distribution of income within the native society All of these,
it turned out, were but temporary effects, for, as we have seen,
28a
the plantation system has, by now, for all intents and purposes
disappeared from the area. But they were crucial nonetheless,
not only because important traces of them remain, but because they
demonstrate that the interaction between "Western" patterns of
economic activity ard "Eastern" ones is not always so simply
destructive and disruptive of indigenous social and economic organiza-
tion as it has so commonly been described as beirg, but is in some
ways often reconstructive as well; and that, in fact, the anti-
developmental elements may more often be due to the social context
within which the interaction of the two sectors takes place0 Even
under the admittedly exploitative, race-structured, export-oriented,
and, in the long run, completely unworkable colonial setup, the
plantations came close to building a new sort of rural society in
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Modjokuto, and only the great depression, the inertia of the
indigenous system, and, most crucially, the inner contradictions
of imperialism seem to have prevented them' from doing so The
"only" here may seem incongruous, but the point, as we shall see,
is that although the final effect of the plantations on the
Modjokuto area must be judgcd to have been negative from the point
of view of both welfare and material progress, the causes for this
are not primarily economic, but social and cultural,
l The Growth of the Plantations: The Boom Period
The first plantation in the area (it was in sugar) was set up
in 1879 on the basis of a seventy-five year lease of Government-
owned "waste" (i~e., unsettled) land0 By 1875, there were five
or six more under way--in coffee, cassava, tea, and sisal (ulti-
mately a little rubber was tried, too)--and, by'1925, at the height
of the expansion, there were ten sugar mills, three tapioca mills,
and two sisal mills spotted around the countryside within a twenty
mile radius of the town, Within approximately the same radius there
were about 20,000 acres of long-lease land, 2,000 acres of it
lying just at the edge of the subdistrict. 1 7
But, even more important from the point of view of its effect
1 7Actually, one company, Handels Vereeningen Amsterdam (HVA),
dominated the scene around Modjokuto and these figures are all for
its activities only and are, therefore, a shade conservative in terms
of the whole picture, for there were one or two factories and small
plantations in the area belonging to other companies. the figures
for HVA were given to me orilly by the present representative
of the company in the area.
30
on native life, the sugar mills, wh! ch could not grow their crop
very efficiently on the dry lands to the south, rented about
2,500 acres a year of the best subdistrict rice land from the
village peasants for cane growing. The system--essentially a
readaptation of the Culture System method to a system of nominally
private enuerprise--was for the mills to contract leases through
the village chiefs with whole villages for a twenty-one and one-
half year period. Each eighteen months (the growing period for
sugar plus four months) a different one.third of each village
rice land was surrendered to the company, the remainder being left
to the peasants to till as they wished.1 8 As there are about
10,000 acres of rice land in the subdistrict, the sugakr concerns
were renting, again around 1925, somewhere around 25 per cent of
the wet rice land each year. . If one compares this figure to the
19
Java-wide average of 6 per cent a year, it becomes clear that
Modjokuto before the war can properly be referred to as a "sugar
area."
Some idea of the general size of the expansion, as well as of
the collapse following it, can be gathered from the following
figures for the railroad--which by 1925 had seven branch lines
18In the Modjokuto area the mills (four of which were directly
involved so far as the subdistrict was concerned) as often rented
one-half as one-third of a village's land for a year, though
strictly speaking this was illegal. For an excellent general dis-
cription of commercial sugar cultivation in Java before the war,
see van der Kolff, G. H, "An Economic Case Study: Sugar and Welfare
In Java," in fRuopp, P., (Ed. ), Approaches to Community Development,
The Hague and Bandung, 1953, pp. 188-206.
1 9 1bid
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running off to the various mills, 28 woodburning locomotives,
and ranseven trains a day in either dirertion along the main
line and- three or four along each of the branches: 2 0
Freight (metric tons) Passengers
1900 8,000 65oooo
1915 300,000 1,600,000
1929 330,000 l,75O,000
19314 20,000 650,000
A similar picture is given by the average yearly rents per
bau (one bau equals 1,77 acres) paid by the plantations to the
peasants.21
1913 fl, 37o87 100
1920 68.13 156
1924 74.74 200
Plantation wages show the same general paLtern, but with the
peak in 1920, which, as the first year of "normalacy" after the war
was the boom year of boom years: from 1919-1928, excluding 1920,
the export sugar price fluctuated between fl.14 and flo28 a quintal,
20Encyclopaedie Van Nederlandsche-Indie (tweede druk), s'Gravenhage
and Leiden, 1921-1939, Vol. 4, pi 84, and Vol, 8, p. 1809. The 1900
figures are actually derivet. from unbroken down totals for railfoad
activity for all of Java by assuming a constant percentage of the
total for the Modjokuto line, a procedure which, if anything, would
be likely to lead to a too generous estimate and so de-emphasize the
expansion,
21Verslag van den Economischen Toestand der Inlandsche Bevolking
1924, s'Gravenhage, 1926, p. 19.Tndexes calclated. If we use the
2,500 acre a year figure given above, this comes to about fl.50,000 paid
out to landholders in the subdistrict in 1913, vs. about fl.100,000 in
1924. The totals for the whole regency (twenty-one subdistricts). are
a million and a half million. (Ibid.)
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22but in 1920 it was fl.53. The total indexes for payments to
unskilled labor in this period are as follows: 2 3
Non-Sugar
piece work day wages day wages
1913 100 100 100
1920 154 183 162
1924 119 149 143
Prices in the area rose too# of courset94
unmilled milled maise cassava peanuts
rice rice
1913 100 100 100 100 100
1919 329 276 200 225 266
1924 154 180 200 144 156
soyabean coconuts- oxen caribau
1913 100 100(1918) 100 100
1920 186 180 339 266
1924 143 130 170 118
From these last three sets of statiatica--rent, wages and prices-
the study of the regency in 1924 from which they are taken draws three
conclusions which, more or less, sum up the direct efifect on the
Javanese potpulation of this short burst of development:
22Encyclonaedie van Nerierlandsche-Indiep o Vol. 6, p. 884.
23
van den Economichen Toestand. . . , op. cit., p. 151.
2 4 1bid., p. 148 and 149. Indexed calculated from quoted prices,
Maize is both the secondary staple and an important cash crop. Cassava
is a tertiary staple and a cash crop. Peanuts, soyabeans, and coconuts
are largely cash crops. Oxen are used for transport purposes as woll
as ploughing, caravau only for the latter.
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1, Manual laborers in 1924 were in a poorer position than
they had been in 1913, and especially than they had been around
1920.
2. Small landholders who could not make a complete living
out of their land were even less well off, particularly in the
poor harvest years of 1921 and 1922,
3* The larger landholders were gaining in welfare, al-
though their g ns were tempered by the poor harvest years of
1921 and 1922.
The plantation economy stimulated a change toward larger
holdings and toward the proletarianization of marginal peasants,
As the Dutch sugar managers contracted both Ja nd for renting and
seasonal labor throgh the 1rl1?ge chiefs,26 this group tended to
benofit differentially from the expansion of commercial agriculture
and t o have their political position strengthened as well. Otler
individuals, somewhat well off to begin with, benefited in similar
ways, for the mills often lent money to favored Javanese to buy up
land on the condition that it gOuld then be rented to the mill on
the mils tiers, Tn some cases, they actually bought the land
outright- nd il.egally, for there was a law against the alienation
of Javanese lad Through Javanece front-men, mort cornonly, members
of their cwn pemaent staf'f- clorks, drht n etc.--or Javanese
Government officials. Also, although pting carried out by a
seasonal work force organiscd under permaont foremen, sugar grown
25
26 And later through village-cluster chiefs. The Government a
administrative reform of village organization was, apparently, in
part stimulated by the interests of the mills in having fewer
Javanese with whom they must treat.
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on peasant land was often harvested under contract by somewhat
more prosperous peasants, These peasants were given oxen by the
mills as an advance and hired their own day laborers, transporting
the cane to the railroad either by oxcart or along the small
trolleys--also pulled by the oxen--the mills laid out every few
miles or so among the villa-e rice fields, Such contracting was
evidently quite profitable for these acrarian entrepreneurs and,
as village chiefs usually gave out these contracts, it was quite
profitable for them too.
There grew up, consequently, something of a lar ger landholders
class,27 made up of village chiefs and other well-to-do peasants.
Both of these had a tendency, as a matter of fact, to be members
of the puristic Mos.lem element of the rural population, their
increasing economic strength being supported by Islamic consecration
of thrift, by rural religious schools vaguely reminiscent of
European monasteries in their emphasis on the spiritual virtues
of agricultural labor, and by the motivation to save enough money
28
to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. These large land-
27 The largest landholdings in the subdistrict seem to have been
about 120 acres and there were several of these as well as many only
somewhat smaller ones0  In the next district northwest--i e,, toward
the Brantas River.-a few men seem tohave had holdings as large as 200
acres or so. Holdings were also, informants claim, rather more con-
tinuous in extension than they are today.
2 8 For the prewar dominance in this area of more orthodox Moslem
village chiefs, see Jay, "Local Government . . . ," op. cit. kor a
general discussion of religious variation and economic factors in
Modjokuto, see Geertz, C., "Religious Belief . . .," op, cit. As for
the pilgrimage, its immediate effect was, of course, as a drain on
capital into comsumption expenditure; but its most important effect
holders--often intermarried--in addition to being labor hirers and
harvest contractors were, commonly, "money lenders" as well, though
they most often lent in the form of consumption goods--sugar, rice,
textiles--at, of course, increasingly exorbitant interest rates.2
With factory crecdit or personal savings some of them bought agri-
cultural equipment--oxen, ploughas, hoes--which they resold, lent,
or rented to small peasants or their tenants, and a few traded in the
dry land eaabcrops which were coiing increasingly to be cultivated
at this time, selling them to the town Chinese. They even tended,
in several cases, to develop a new scttlement pattern, moving out
from the solidly settled village block to live in isolated and
(relatitrely speaking) palatial splendor in the middle of their fields.
Here we would seem to have.-ignoring for the moment the racial
caste and "plural economy" elements involved in the colonial nature
of the organization of this whole pattern--a collection of some
of the same elements which accompanied developmeant in England in
the 16th and 17th centuries: rising prices, a moderate decline in
seems to have been to give certain ag,:rassive peasants a religio-
economic goal toward which they could direct their lives and so build
up more complex and systematic patterns of economic behavior. The
large consumption expenditure wes offset, in development terms, by the
growth of more "rational" forms of economic organization and ethic
which that expenditure slowed but did not reverse, Not all large
landholders were, however, pious Moslems, in any case.
2 9 The' fact that rents and wnges were, for the most part, in
money, mennt that the sector of the population most able to handle
money effectively gained at the expense of the less able0 Though
sometimes this meant the small peasant falling into the hands of the
Chinese or Arab money lenders, if often meant, at this period, his
falling into those of the Javanese money lender0 It was only af &er
the depression that the Chinese lenders were largely without important
Javanese competitiono
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real wages, higher rents, increasing technical efficiency,
consolidation of landholdings and enclosures (i.e., of the so-called
waste-land), and at least the beginning of a genuine rural "middle
31
class" of slightly larger landholders.
As in England, the structure of the econonr was changing so as to
bring the size of the agricultural productive unit more into line with
the abilities of the rural farmer to manage resources, to come to terms
with the limited divisi.bilities of capital and organization as factors
of production, and so make freehold agriculture more a "businesslike" and
less a "subsistence" proposition. There are vltogether crucial'differ-
32
encea between the two developments; but the p.int is that, for- a brief
30Iostly (but not entirely) on the plantation side. The pre-war
sugar industry in Java was probably the most efficient in the world,
In 1834 mean sugar output was 13 quintal per hectare; in 1857 it was
40 quintal per hectare; in 1923, 111; in 1924, 118 (Cuba in 1924: 52
quintal per hectare, and supposedly Javanese sugar was much superior
in quality)0 This increase was mainly due to the great amount of
scientific research--most particularly in the expdrimental stati.on .t
Pasuruan--improved irrigation system, less waste in -illing (from 1917
to 1930 wastage dropped from 9 per cent to 5.3 per cent; pac lgct i4
van Nederlands Indie, op. cit., Vol,, 6, p. 884), and progrese in
labor supervision. Gerritzen, J., De Welvaart van ie, Haarlem,
1926, pp. 22-47. The same author--adeAttedly something of en apol, ist
for the sugar industry--calculatcd on the average in 1923-2b the
cash output of a hectare of wet-rice land in "native" crope
dry season planting) was aout fl. 170, in sugar fl. 1860.
313ea Nef, J.U., "The Progress of Technology and the Growth of
Large Scale InduStry in Great 3ritain, 1540-1661"; Nef, J.U., "rce
and Industrial Coit alisrn in Frnce and Enland, 15hC-16hO"; andT
R.H., "The Pise of te entry, 1558-160," all in Carus-wil:son, E.M.,
(Ed.), Essays in Econonic History, Tondon, 191h, pp. 88-107; 108-13b; 172-2140
32Not the least notable of which is that the growth of medium sized
land holdings in England took place both from -process of leveling down
the large nobility holdings and "levelig up" egall, intensively worked
peasant holdings, so that "the upper ranges of Eng.Ish society came to
resemble less a chain of high peaks than an undulating table la;.nd" (Tawney,
op. cit.); while, due to the virtual aee of a Lnnded ariStocracy in
the Modjokuto area, only the second, 'leveling up, procces was of importance.
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period, the plantationsystem threatened to force a couplete re-
organization of the Javanese peasant econory (and, beyond it,
the Javanese social siructure) in the Modjokuto area, That it did
not succeed in doing so was primarily due to three facts: (1) the
boom was short lived and collapsed almost entirely; (2) the form
in which the nlantation pattern impinged on the indigenous subsistence
pattern tended to mitigate its transformative effects; and (3) the
indigenous pattern was deeply rooted and had been further strengthened
by colonial agricultural and administrative policies in the 19th
33
century, most particularly by the culture system
2, Plantation Policy and the Peasant Econo
The depression was as severe in the East Indies as anywhere
else in the world, and the collapse of the international sugar
market sent the plantations skidding down an incline from which--
despite some desperate efforts in the late thirties--they never
really recovered, The first reaction to falling prices by the
industry was to maintain production almost constant so that by 1933
on-hand sugar stocks were about seventeen times as large as they had
been in 1930, while exports had fallen about a half by volume,
3 3 For a review of this period in terms of economic development,
see Geertz, "The Development of the Javanese Economy .0 0 , _op2- cito
3 4The main cause of the sugar collapse was the disintegration of
the international "free" market: "The free sugar market has become
continually smaller, as one country after another--the' United States,
Great Britain, British India, 'Japan--closed their frontiers or made
competition inpossible through measures of imperial preference. . .
The so-called free market for sugar could be estimr ted at only two and
a half million tons per year in 1935; and on this market Java, Cuba,
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three quarters by value.35 After this date, radical cutbacks in
production occurjred, the 1934 production being about a fifth of that
in 1930-1931. Just before' the war a small recovery took place,
production returning to abodt half the 1930-1931 level by volume,
a third by value, but this had only a very marginal effect in the
36Modjokuto area. Since the war, the role of sugar in Indonesian
exports has remained very low, though it shows signs of improving,
while internal consumption has risen sharply. 3 7
But the other, less purely economic, aspects of the problom,
those concerned with the special nature of the interaction between
Peru, San Domingo, Czechoslovaklia, Po and, Hungary, and other countries
competed with a collective offeIr of 3.2 million tons. Moreover, among
them were competitors who had a protected and extremely remunerative
home market for a large part of their output an, could therefore offer
their surplus product on the free market at a loss." Boeke, J. H.,
Economiics and Economic Policy of Dual Socie as Exemplified by
InTonesia, New Tbrk, 1953, p. 2Z .
35Furnivall, . cit0, p. 437; Boeke, 2. cit4, p, 247,
36Boeke, 2p. cit, p. 247.
Up until the late thirties o-.er 80 per cent of. sugar produti;ion
was exported vs. only about 25 per cent in 1953. iKraal, Al, "Indo'&ia
and Sugar," Berita Mie, Vol. III, 4 , 1954, pp. 20-23. The cnange
by value of Indonesia's three leading exports from 19J0 to 19.1 0 (rugur
no longer being a leading export by the latter date) vac a, ollos:
1900 1925 1932 1937 1940
Sugar 29% 22% 18% 5% 6%
Rubber 6 32 18 33 38
Oil 1 11 8 16 19
Ibid
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commercial and subsistence agriculture in the Modjokuto area, are even
more interesting from a theoretical point of view, for they suggest
that certain social and cultural factors were confining the impact
of "capitalist" organization of arriculture on the traditional
village economy along very circumscribed lines and might (or might
not) have cnntinued to do so even had world commodity prices remained
stable, They suggest, also that theories which impute an intrinsic
economic antagonism between "capitalist" and "pre-capitalist" forms
of productive organization tending to drive the two further apart and
to lead to exploitation of the second by the first (unless benevolent
government intervenes to isolate the two sectors from one another) may
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be in need of revision.
From both sides, the Javanese and the Dutch, there were strong
social and cultural forces acting against the changes "capitalistic"
organization of production was tending to stimulate. On the Javanese
side, the main conservative force was, of course, the village tradition
of Central Java which the peaswts would naturally tend to replicate
in Modjokuto if the social and ecological conditions within which
they found themselves were capable of supporting it, On the Dutch
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For this kind of theory, see Boeke, o. cit, Admittedly, it is
not always clear whether Boeke regards the clash between "East" and
"West" as primarily cultural or economic (or even racial), and as he
takes the relativistic view that "every social system has its own
economic theory," to that there is a "primitive economics" for pre..
capitalist societies, a "capitalist economics" for a capitalist society
and a "dualistic economics" for the interaction of the two (Ibid., p4),
perhaps for him economic and cultu-al contact are the same thing. The
argument here is that they are not; that capitalism and pre-capitalism
as economic forms may meet under a wide range of cultural contexts with
an equally wide range of outcomes,
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side, the conservative force--aside from predudices about the
inherent laziness, stupidity, and childishness of the Javanese--
was the central desire of all Pitperialist enterprises: the wish
to bring a people's products into the world economy, but not the
people themselves, to have one's economic cake and eat it too by
producing "capitalist" goods with "pre-capitalist" workers on
"pre-capitalist" land, As a result, the sugar plantations aimed
at an inherently self-contradictory goal: they needed to keep
Javanese society flexible enough so that its land and labor could
be employed toward the production of goods saleable on international
markets, and- yet they needed also to keep it rigid enough to prevent
it changing in a "capitalist" direction, which would raise their wage
and rent costs. Thus at the same time their more purely economic
activities were producing the structural changes I describe above,
their political and social policies were tending to recreate in
Modjokuto the conditions under which the traditional Central Javanese
village sys tem would persist and grow stronger,
The plantations' re-enforcement of the traditional village way
of life took three forms: (1) by restricting their interests, so far
3 9
"To sum up, it is pretty clear that imperialism is above all
a process--and, to some degree, a policy--which aims at developing
complem tary relations between high industrial teel'nique in one land
and fertile soils in another, These relations are pre-capitalist
relations; theyare also capitalist relations, Not all the Marxist
teachings apoly to all the facts, but many of them open the eyes of
colonial historians to things which they ought to have seen before."
Pares, Richard, "The Economic Factors in the History of the Empire,"
Carus-Wilson, _.o cite, pp. 416-438. It should be clear that I use
"capitalist" merely in the narrowly economic (and perhaps somewhat
Pickwickian) sense of a form of productive organization which tends
to be increasingly capital intensive, not in any political or broadly
social sense-the Soviet Union is capitalist in these terms.
as peasant owned 3and was concerned, to sugar, which demands a
highly irrigated environment similar to that of rice, and confining
other sorts of commercial cultivation to unsettled "waste area,"
they reproduced in Modjokuto the sort of ecological setting character-
istic of Central Java where the traditional village pattcorns of
adaptation were centered; (2) by attempting to control the processes
of production all the way down to the raw material level, the
plantations hindered the development of a class of a class of
independent agricultural entrepreneurs with a predominately "develop-
mental" rather than a "circular flow" orientation;40 and (3) by
by keeping their labor force maximally seasonal, their wages low, and
"40It is then not that habit or custom or non-economic ways of
thinking cause a hopeless difference between individuals of different
classes, times or cultures, and that for examole the -economica' of
the stock exchange would be inapolicable say to the peasants of today
or the craftsmen of the middle ages. Un the contrary the same
theoretical picture in its broadest contour lines fits the individuals
of quite different cultures, whatever their degree of intelligence
and of economic rationality and we can depend on it that the peasant
sells his calf as cunningly and egotistically as the stock exchange
member his portfolio of shares. But this holds good only where
precedents without .udber have formed conduct through decades and,
in fundamentals, through hundreds and t housands of years, and have
eliminated unadaptive behavior 0 Therefore in describing the
circular flow one must treat combinations of means bf productions
(the production-functions) as data, like natural possibilities and
admit only small variations at the margins, such as every individual
can accomolish by adapting himself to changes in his econoric environ-
ment, without materially deviating from familiar lines. Therefore,
too, the carrying out of new combinations is a special function and the
privilege of a type of people who are much less numerous than all those
who have the Bobjectives possibility of doing it, Therefore, finally,
entrepreneurs are of a special type, and their behavior a special
problem the motive power of a great number of significant phenomena."
Schumpeter, J., The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into
Profits Captal, Interest and the business Cycle, Cambridge (4as.),
1949, pp. 8061
k&2
preventing mobility for Javanese upward through th~e r anks of t heir
organisation, the plantations encouraged the formation of a very
large partial proletariat composed of worker-peasants who were neither
wholly on the "pre-capitalist" nor wholly on the "capitalist" side
of the dual economy, but who moved uneasily back and forth between
the two in response to the movement of sugar prices. All three of
these factors, as a matter of fact, are commonly cited by admiArers
of the Dutch colonial system in Java as humane policies in defense
of native welfare in the face of capitalist exploitation. But I
think further consideration will show their welfare effects to be
in any case rzther short-run ones, while their longer run effects
are (or were) to maintain--or, considering the relatively low pre-
plantation populc tion of the Modjokuto area, one iiight even say
"create"--the status quo: Western capitalist enterprise with
Eastern pre-capitalist land and labor, the latter largely enclosed
in a traditional structure0
Sugar is, in a tropical wet-rice country, an almost ideal
commercial crop because its environmental demands so closely
approximate those of rice, particularly in the fact that an increase
in the intensitivity of irrigation is in both cases a paramount
technical prerequisite to increased productivit. This being the
case, the plantations' decision to grow sugar on peasant land, and
so make a large investment in improved irriation facilities,
was aliost necessarily a&cision to increase the native production
of rice, As I indicated earlier, the whole of the Modlokuto area
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up until shortly cfter the turn of the century was characterized both
by a relatively low popuL tion density and a low "rice terrace density":
i.e., terrt ces were interspersed with large expanses of unirrigated
(and, in this early period, for the most part uncultivated) land,
rather like the more southern and eastern villages in the area today.
With the rather sudden increase in capital invest..ient in improved
irrigation f£cilities after 1900, that part of the subdistrict toward
the river closed up into the hi. hly populcted, thickly terraced,
intensively worked country-side it has since become:
The initial units of settlement -n the Modjokuto rice basi7
were hamlets, scattered about wi2 h considerable areas of
uncultivated land lying between. This land was drawn upon for
grazing land and for new fields and home sites. The growth
of a centralized interconnected irrigation system more than
anything else served to crystallize the boundaries between field
and residential land. As population rhise, .ore and more land
was converted to irritated land, grazing land was eliminated,
and the local hamlets expanded into the lands left open by
the irri-ation systems. . . . By at least 1920, and probably a
good deal earlier, these boundaries had become stabilized and
the expanding populhjon became restricted to non-irrigable land
for new house sites.
The heavy emphasis on irrigation at the expense of other kinds
of ca ital improvement in agriculture--e.g., those concerned with
stimulating a medium scale .ixed farming pattern of wet and dry
crop cultivation plus animal husbandry--encouraged the development
in Modjokuto of the classical Central Javanese pat-ern by recreating
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Jay, "Village Life p. . ," o. cit. Of the seven village
clusters which lie predominz ntly to theorthwest of the railroad
(see Diagram 2), two now have about three acres ofunirrigated
field land, the other five have none. From 1905 to 1930 the popu-.
lation in the Modjokuto District ;rew slightly less than half again
as fast as the Javanese population generally, duhe mainly to immi.
gration into the area (see below, p. 78).
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the environment to which it is adaptive. Dy utilizing native-owned
land in a monocultural manner and rcserving diversification of
capital intensive coimaercial agriculture to "waste" land where
peasant living patterns were not directly involved,L2 the plan-
tation companies encouraged an essentially anti-developmental,
self-;deieating form of land use on the part of the Javanese. It
was (and is) anti-developmental despite--particularly after the
disappearance of the plantations.-the great diversification of native
crops' because it i:plied a steady increase in labor intensification (and
so f population density) up to some high and probably still
unroached limit and a maintenance of the largely uncapitalized
(except for irrigation), two and a half to five acre "Li3Liputian"
farm characteristic of so much of Java. Like the Culture System
before them, which they so much resembled, the sugar plantations
brought on a rise in population and in food production which so nearly
42Such diversification, in contrast to colonial enterprises in
many other countries, was hiihly developed on the Dutch plantations
around Modjokuto, not a single one of which was sinp.ly monocultural.
4The apt term "L:liputian" is from Tergast, G., "Improving the
Economic Foundation of Peasant Agriculture on Java and Madoera
(Indonesia)," unpublished manuscript on file at Center for Inter-
national Studies, MIT: "Study of the Bases of the Indonesian farm as
it now appears to us and of the possibility of improvement of its
production leads to the conclusion that increase of the area of these
farms is the primary requiremaent if this agriculture is to remain in
a position to completely fulfull the food necds of Indonesia for a
long time to come. In that case the improved production of the farms
will perceptibly strengthen the economic preparedness of the peasantry
and especially create the possibility for a substantial improvement
of the average diet." In an interesting, if somewhat academiic,
calculation Tergast claims that about doubling the size of the average
present farm (1.5 hectares to 3 hectares) could lead to a gross value
increase in per hectpre output from about 20 to 65 per cent depending
on the quality of the land.
matched one another that pre-capital income was probably virtually
constant0 In the long run, such a pattern is obviously self-defeating:
On densely populated Java the rice roduction could not keep
step Cfter the turn of the centurY with the increase in
population. Increasing cultivation of other foodstuffs in
rotation with rice and on dry lands has met the rising need
for food. Around 1900 the amount of annual per capita quantity
available was about 110 kg rice, 20 kg tubers and 3 kg pulses.
Around 1940 this had changed to 85 kg rice, 40 kg maize, 180
kg tubers and about 10 kF pulses. Expressed in calories there was
little change between 1900 and 1940; the daily menu per capita
has been kept on a level somewhat lower than 2,000 calories.
That Java, in spite of the heavy population increase and the
small possibility of expanding the cultivated area, has been
in a position to maintain the calorie level of the diet is
due pi-incipally to the intensification of rotation on rice
fields an4 more intensive use of the dry lands. Use of the
rice fields was about 105% in 1950 . . . Chile7 around 1940
this double use amounted to approximately 140%. (The drop,
due to the war, was only temporary; double cropping now is
probably higher than prewar. Study of further possibilities
in this direction in the years just before the war showed
a further increase to nearly 185% can take place through
the most effective utilization of all available irrigation
potentialities, the use of fertilizer where possible, and
through accurately worked out crop rotation schemes. On the
basis of this it was further theoretically calculated that the
total food production could be sufficient to support a Java
population of about 60 million at nearly the norm of the
present low menu. Had disturbing factors not intervened
(war, Japanese occupation, political turbulence, starvation,
dwindling medical care) the population would have reached
that size around 1958. Presumably tp "food-ceiling" will
now be reached 10 to 15 years later.44
4Ibid. Actually, of course, the fact that sugar occupied nearly
one-half the land meant that fooI had to be imported during the boom
period: husked rice imnorts from 1915 to 1930 tended to center around
.55 million metric tons, dropped to .36 million in 1935 and to .06
million in 1940 (robbv, E., Southeast Asia, London, 1950, p. 356).
It also oupht to be noted that Tergast's dietary calculations ignore
the role of fruits which, mostly grown in house gardens, are an important
element in the Javanese diet; though it is doubtful that production
of them has done more than keep pace with the population growth either.
A similar comment might be made in respect to chickens, goats, and,
to a lesser extent, cattle Thus, though Tergast is certainly correct
about the direction in which things are moving, his estimate of daily
caloric intake is probably somewhat low0
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The close and careful control over the actual growing of cane
upon which the mills insisted also had a stultifying effect on the
peasant economy. Up until the latter half of the nineteenth century,
the sugar mills in dava bought a large percentage of their cane
from independent peasant cultivators. But with the increasing yields
per acre made possible by more scientific methods, they introduced
the system of land renting and direct supervision of the culttration
of the primary crop alreatr described, a system fully developed by
the time Modjokuto appeared on the scene, The umrleniably improved
efficiency of this sort of vertical integration (at least in narrowly
technical terms) was gained at the cost of a tendency to reduce the
landowning peasants' role to that of a passive rentier living mind=
lessly off the proceeds of his sugar rents. The planning of land
utilization becane the business of the plantations, destroying peasant
initiative: "in place of peasant ingeniousness came a new coolie
submissiveness."45 Even the peasant's initiative in planning that
third or half of his land not at the moment in sugar was interfered
with, far the companies often paid premiums to peasants who would keep
the land, or some part of it, fallow in the off period. Such a sys.
tem is not likely to produce what Van der Kolff rightly regards as one
of Java's greatest needs: a fvirile yeomanry.nh6 Rather, it would seem
4Van der Kolff, op. cit., p. 195. Van der Kolff, of course, is
speaking about the effects~of the sugar industry generally in Java,
not Modjokuto particularly,
4Ibid.
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likely to produce an effete gentry whose increased incomes were drained
off into luxury consumptions. And from reports of the fine furnish-
ings, fancy clothes and elaborate houses some of the sugar parvenus
provided themselves with, this is what, in part, occurred*
Only in part,,. however, That the rentier reaction was not the only
one, not even--perhaps=-the dominant one, is indicated not only by
the growing cultivation, despite preniums and all, of non-rice crops
on the terraces in the dry monsoon, but also by the increasing in-
terest of peasants in growing their own cane, an interest which, in
time, became a nationalist rallying point. Plantation and Government
policy opposed this development strenuously and in 1920 a law was
enacted forbidding the purchase of free-hold cane by the mille 4 7
Even so, the spontaneous Javanese interest in independent sugar cul.
tivation nearly doubled the value of free-hold cane from 1926 to 1928,.48
most of the output going to Javanese-run mills producing crude sugar
on a small scale for Javanese cansumption. Thus, there is evidence
that, given a free hand, a certain sector of the new landholding
"middle class" would have reacted to the stimulus provided by the sugar
mills with an entrepreneurial rather than a rentier pattern of economic
behavior0 In fact, a more open system would have tended to select the
47Iid., p. 1990
4 8 cyclopedie Van Nederlands Indie, 22 cito, Vol, 6, P. 985.
The -per cent of total Indies cane output this change involved was
.66 per cent in 1926, 103 per' cent in 1928, so the small holders were
gaining not only absolutely but relatively too. The average yields for
peasant cane per hectare ir the Lodjokuto area in 1929 was almost
exactly half that of cane grown by the factories Ibd., pp. 884-885.
frugal, shrewdly calculating and economically imaginative sort of
"yeoman" out for success rather than the coupon clipping sort of
"country gentleman" the renting system favored.h9
The mills' defense of their vertical integration policy was, of
course, the necessity for minimum costs. But, in light of the statis-
tics quoted above on the comparative efficiency of the Javanese and Cuban
sugar industries before the war, this was, no doubt, an excessively
cautious approach; markedly increased buying of natLve cane b.: the
plantations without serious loss of market position was clearly
possible, especially.if it were coupled with some investment in
Javanese training in cane cultivation. The Government also defended
the lease system as being protective of Javanese interests, on the basis
of a "dualistic" policy segregating the Western and Javanese sectors
of the economy, but, as Van der Kolff has prgued, this hyper-conservative
49The more extensive cultivation of land not at the moment in the
hands of the mills either in "private sugar" or in dry crops seems to
have been especially prominent in connection with the rural monastery-
like ioslem schools I mentioned earlier, .where, though capitalization
was not much increased, a more flexible use of labor--ioe., the young
students at the schools who commonly worked for their board in the
fields of their teachers or of rich local supporters of the local
school--was often possible. On the other hand, members of the less
Moslem element of the populati on tended to imitate the style-of-life
of the aristocratic civil servants of the towns when they became pros-
perous, a more gracious but less dynamic pattern. For changes in tra-
ditional labor relations patterns introduced by Moslem schools in a much
more rural area of Java, see Van der Kolff, G. H., The Historical
Development of the Labor Relationship in a Remote Corner of avaas
Thy Apply to the Cultivation of Rice, New York, 1937. For the role
of student labor in such Schools in the early part of this century, see
Hugronje, C. Snouck, "Brieven van een Jedono-Pensioen," in his
Verspreide Geschriften, Bonn and Leipzig, 1924, esp. pp. 177-18L
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policy prevented the npassive" and "Eastern" Javanese from seizing
the opportunities for economic change (and thus disproving the theory
on which the policy was grounded) without really offering the:: any
more effective .rotection against the dangers of the "dynamic West":
To some people it may seem best that peasant cane cultivation
was not stimulated, as that would have meant involving the pea-
sants in the risk of :alling prices, But the plantation system
and its method of response to the world depression of the thirties
did not by any means leave the peasants unaffected. The total
wages naid by the sugar industry to peasants fell drastically,
and many long term leases of peasant-owned land were cancelled,
so that actually the people were affected very directly. On the
other hand, a middle class of Javanese farmers, a yeomanry
accustomed to looking arter itself and taking its own risks,
would have been able to withstand the shock of the orld depres-
sion far better than the people as they were, actually an impover-
ished, dependent proletariat. . a The standard system of land
lease, accepted as the only basis for the sugar industr was no
less open to abuse (than the free-holding alternativef . . But
the Gcolonial7 administration did not wan t to take upon itself
the task of suprvising the buying of peasant cane; it did not
want any such close relationship between the Javanese and Outch
branches of the industry. And so, by outlawing all bujing of
peasant cane, it also sacrificed those special cases in which
the relationship that had been built up was more satisfactory
than in other areas, because the peasants were economical?
stronger and the two parties therefore more nearly equal
Having hampered the growth both of a larger scale,more efficient
farm unit as well as of a more self-reliant, aggressive farm manager
to run it, both of which their economic activities were in fact tend-
ing to stimulate in spite of their policies, the plantations also
followed a labor policy which hampered the growth of a permanent pro-
letariat. By keeping their work force maximally seasonal,51 the Dutch
5Ibtd, p. 199,
51Furnivall (or) cit., p. 317) reoorts that 'before the crisis
of 1929," the overall ratio of seasona:l workers to permanent employees
in the East Indian sugar industry was about 12 to I, the permanent
employees, including, evidently, thI Dutch and Eurasian managerial
prevented the formation of a "professional" working class wholly within
the "capitalist" sector of the dual economy, avoiding, only in part,
agitation by such workers for better treatment as workers rather than
as colonial dependents. Further, the "snectroscopic" organization of
the sugar industry (pure caucasoids in the managerial roles, pure
mongoloids in the unskilled roles and mixed Eurasians in between)
prevented the cleverer and more energetic Javanese from important ad-
vances upward through the industry, so dampening permanent motivations
to activities outside of subsistence africulture.52 The pattern of
shifting the land rented, so as to rent only one-third or one-half of
any single peasant's land in any. one year had a similar effect, for it
allowed marginal peasants to hang on much longer as part-time culti-
vators, thus weakening the pressures on the mills to raise wages, to
stabilize their labor force or to finance relief measures for unemployed
workers, who, it was argued, could always go back to the land. By
keeping the marginal peasant with one foot in the rice terrace and one
in the sugar mill, the Dutch managers were able to keep the Javanese
worker's share of the returns from the increasing productivity of the
staff. a. certain amount of seasonality is, of course, inherent in the
sugar industry, especially in relation to harvesting, yet that this
seasonal element was stressed beyond the inherent economic necessity
for it seems almost certain when it is considered that since the war
seasonality has been radically reduced--actually, probably too much
reduced, leading to a sharp increase in the mills' fixed costs--wages
raised, and cap ital costs increased, and at least some of the milUs
have still been able to operate, Krall, o. p cit
S2There was some mobility, of coirse: a few Javanese became-
permanently employed foremen of work groups, a few others factory
technicians, draughtsmen, and so forth, and their anti-tradItional
impact upon JavAnese society has been significant. But as they are
mostly urban types, they are more properly treated below in the section
on town development,
sugar industry minimal and their own profits maximal, profits which,
of course, were--except fo a few small Government programs-not re-
i nvested in Javanese industry, not even very much in Dutch-owned East-
Indian industry, and only marginally provided any effective demand for
Javanese production. Again, one can point to the depression as proof
of the wisdom of the half-peasant half-worker policy, but Van der
Kolff's argument can be applied here too: a "professional" worker
with som; self-confidence would probably have been able to face the
depression more resourcefully, if only by agitation against the Colonial
Government for relief (as thz rail wrkers, who were fully proletarian-
ized, actually did), than a peasant returning meekly to a marginal
living on the land.53
In sum, the policies of the plantation companies had an anti-
developmental effect upon the Javanese agrarian econoiy in the Liodjokuto
area, and these policies were not implicit in the capital intensive
form of operation the companies followed, but were, in fact, rather in
opposition to the more stimulating effect that form of operation was
tending to have on the peasant economy-4hey were intended to danpen
rather than enhance the intrinsically transformative effects of cp ital-
ist economic organization on a traditional structure, hono-culture,
5For an interesting discussion of the contrast in Dutch plan-
tation policies in Sumatra where labor was short and in Java where land
was, see Van Gelderen, J0 , "Western Enterprises and the Density of
Population in the Netherlands Indies," in Schrieke, B. (ed.), The
Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilizations in the Malay Archi-
el o Batavia, 1929, pp. 85-102. For an excellent analysis of the
relation between low wages, seasonality, racial discrimination, and
semi-trditionalization of the labor force in colonial countries, see
Mloore, W, E., Industrialism and Labor, Social Aspects of Economic
Developent, esp. Chap, VO
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vertical integration and a prodigal labor policy are not simply logi-
cal correlates of ca ital intensive agriculture, but are the results
of a peculiar form of socio-cultural contact which may legitimately,
and without name-calling, be termed "imperialist," or "colonial," for
it so organizes production as to maximize shares in the returns to
increasing productivity to one segment of the industry--in this case,
the foreign managers.54 These policies were not simply "economically
rational"-except from the point of view of the managers, and then
only, as the event proved, in the short run--but were a rcsult of
viewing the economy from the vantage point of one small sub-class
within the whole society rather than from the point of view of the
entire ecological community. lore explicitly, by considering their
enterprise as essentL ally parts of the Dutch economy rather than of
the Indonesian, the plantation managers distorted the whole pattern of
economic growth in the Modjokuto area, and turned plantation agricul-
ture away from its more fitting role as a way-station on the road to
full industrialization to one of enforced economic cons ervatism,
The "dualistic policy" of segregating the Javanese social structure
from the effects of Western enterprise was, then, not so much a result
eThe share in (all-Indonesia) domestic personal income (i.e.,
ignoring Government export income and corporate income accruing abroad)
of the Dutch rose from 11.1 per cent in 1922 to 15.1 per cent in
1933, while the Javanese share fell from 82 per cent to 73.8 per cent.
Meek, P., Unpublished Ph.D. thesis on postwar economic policy in
Indonesia. Meek also reports that prewar per capita incame of the Dutch
population in Indonesia was four times that of aerican per capita in-
come, and that Indonesian per capita income rose 4 per cent from 1922
to 1923, despite their worsening relative position.
of the obstacles presented to social change by a high and growing
population, great labor intensification, and a lack of "capitalist
spirit," as it was one of the nrimary factors involved in the progres-
sive strengthening of these admittedly formidable obstacles. It has
been a combination of a traditional social structure able to distend
so as to absorb a much increased personnel without unmanageable in-
ternal strain; a form of int ensive, near horticultural agriculture on
excellent, well-irrigated soils which could almost indefinitely pro-
vide at least a slight marginal return for an added unit of labor; and
a form of commercial agriculture which shoved a larger percentage of
its costs off on to the village economy without allowing that economy
to share .aore tha minimally in the increased returns, wich has pro-
duced the present rigid, overcrowded, undynamic situation. Not, of
course, that the sugar plantatLorn caused the population rise--forms
of economic production and pooulation are, at least in the short run,
fairly independent of one another and resu.t from constellations of
different variables:. the former from narket ccnditions, technological
change and the like; the latter from changes in reproductive behavior,
hygiene and the like.55 It is merely that, given the rising population
(which has in fact, been partly caused by Dutch-introduced health
measures, more rapid inter-regional adjustments to famine due to Dutch..
improved communications and transportation, and to the piaa Hederlandica),
55see Davis, N., The Population of India and Pakistan, Princeton,
1951, p. 205. Of course, in the long run, economic trends have a
crucial effect on population and vice versa.
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the sugar plaitations, which were the chief dynamic factors in the
situation, followed a mode of operation which led not to a turn toward
self-sustaining development, but to stasis on a "higher" level. Before
the development of the sugar industry in the 11odjokuto area, a fairly
stable equilibrium between a relatively low (for Java) though growing
population, and a relatively low (also for Java) level of agricultural
production in the absence of irrigation improvements, and a very high
labor intensitivity seems to have existed The sugar industries with
their "native welfare" nolicy made possible, in about thirty years, the
establishment of a new equilibrium with a much higher population,
probably the same per capita iricome, and little increase in peasant
capital (aside from irrigation facilities), a pattern of socio-ecornomic
change, Boke, himself the chief apologist for "dualism," has aptly
called "static or stationary expansion."56
56a. cit., P. 174. Similar considerations apply to what is
clearly one o? the most admirable welfare measures of the Dutch period:
the Agrarian Law of 1870 which forbade the alienation of Indonesian
lards to non-Indonesians; for this measure was perhaps the keystone in
perpetuating the traditional village structure more or less unchanged.
The undeniable welfare effects of the tradition-conserving Dutch
colonial policies ought not to be denied, nor the genuine idealism of
many of the Colonial -officia3l who fought for them overlooked; but it
is somewhat disingenuous not to note the role they served in the less
attractive elements of imperialism or to justify the Dutch pattern by
comparison to even more exploitative practices elsewhere. One can
imagine (or, in other colonies, see in being) much worse results from
Western impact than th6se which occurred in Java: complete and sudden
disorganization of rural life; a great growth of large-scale absentee;
even foreign, landlordism; overwhelming rural indebtedness; slave labor
practices, and so forth0 But though "static" expansion of the rural
social structure is no doubt preferable Lo a complete disorganization
of it which destroys the peasant's ability and will to do other than
resign himself to his fate, this does not gainsay the fact that a pro-
gressive structural evolution of Javanese peasant society toward a more
effective pattern of living would have been nreferable to both of them.
The argument here is not against a "native welfare" policy as such, not
True, the Javanese population was already high and growing in
Central Java (where the Culture Systera, which in the mid-nineteenth
century turned most of cultivated Java into one great plantation, had
already raised the equilibrium point without changing the essential
structure of the economy),57 but had the plantations chosen to ew-
phasize in their policies the transformative, anti-traditional element
implicit in their more capital intensive form of operation--the tenden-
cy to s.rengthen larger landholders, more aggressive and creative
farmers, and more self-reliant wrkers--the rising population might
have led to a situation ofC steadily rising per capita income, of sus-
even against many of the measures which were introduced--without them
the situation would have deteriorated entirely-but against a failure
to recognize that, since these measures were combined with a certain
pattern of relationship between the capitalist and pre-capitalist
sectors of the economy, they were, as welfare measures, self-defeat-
ing, or, at best, t merely" ameliorative in the pejorative sense of
the word: they enabled. an ultimately unworkable situation to persist
and grow basically worse for a longer time.
57"The reasons for this concentration of people fin the Central
Javanese Principalitiesj are complicated and manifold. No one
reason is significant on its own. Propitious climate, constantly
rejuvenated basic volcanic soils and extensive irrigable lowlands
suiting rice, provide the physical basis. Long association with
estern methods and interest has led to a remarkable interlocking of
subsistence and cash crops, combining Oriental and Western techniques
which have here achieved some sort of balance. Java has had an
exceptionally prolonged period of social security coupled with in-
creasing communal assurances of major irrigation and drainage systems.
The Culture System, short-lived though it was, proved to be an in-
centive to population increase, because it placed on the community
a pressure to obtain extra hands, so that towards the end of the Culture
System period population was increasing at the fantastic rate of
33 per cent per decade." Dobby, op. cit.
tained urowth.5 8 A set of policies--including welfare policies to
aid and protect the inevitable victims of social change--which viewed
the Modjokuto region as an ecological whole and which had attempted
to diversify production, stimulate a peasant "middle class" of "yeomen"
owning ten to fifty acres apiece, and to build a much smaller, more
stable, more highly trained labor force, and which had re-invested
some of the profits from commercial agriculture in local industry to
absorb the natural increase in population, might have brought into
existence patterns of land use, social structure and cultural out-
look much more hopeful for future growth than those it did. As it
was, the rural economy neither reformed nor grew--unless one can
say that a balloon grows when it is filled with air.
Again, it might be argied that without a stable international
commodity market an export sugar industry is perhaps a rather frail
base on which to attempt to r aise a new econory, and, as long as the
development was more or less doomed from the beginning, it was just
as well that the Javanese were isolated from it, for a little develop-
ment, which leaves people stranded in the middle of a structural
transition, unable to go backwards or forwards, can be a dangerous
5bshtever relief the migration into Modjokuto offered the
population problem in Central Java was, of course, only temporary at
best, for the space cleared was soon filled up by the high natural
increase. For an argument similar to mine concerning the transmigra-
tion of Javanese to Sumatra before the war-i.e., that the Javanese
pattern of land use and social organization was re-created and so the
population problem was re-created too, see Pelzer, J., Pioneer Settle-
ment in the Asiatic Tropics, American Geographical Socit15
thing. The counter-agument is, of course, that tias is just what
happened anyway--it was impossible to "protect" the Javanese entirely
and partial protection merely led to the rigidification and "closing
up" of the peasant system I have traced, thus reducing the capacit, of
the indigenous social structure to respond to another, more stable
stimulus at a later time. The only way really to protect the peasants
against "capitalism" would have been never to have planted any sugar
in the first place. Secondly, development does not have to take place
all at once, and permanent gains may be secured even within fairly
short bursts of expansion, In fact, what is remarkable in the present
case is not how little the Javanese responded to the stimulus of Uestern
enterprise, but, in spite of all the obstacles put in their way, how
much. In short, the dualistic policy seems merely to have gained for
the rural Javanese the worst of two possible worlds: an over-driven
traditional social structure, swollen with partially proletarianized
peasants,
3. The Post-.lantation Economy
The cutback in sugar production in the middle thirties gave
rise, for a short but rather hectic period, to a sharp conflict be-
tween the rentier and the entreprensuri.1.elements within the group of
rural landlords made prosperous by the land-renting system. Having
decided to cut production drastically, the mills were naturally anxious
to cancel the twenty-one and one-half year leases they had contracted
with the peasants. Again, they attempted to do this through the village
chiefs, certain favored members of their pennanent Javanese staffs,
and--although in theory the Govcrnment bureaucracy was supposed to be
neutral in disputes between the mills and the peasants--the Javanese
civil servants. The civil servants and tLose village chiefs -who saw
their increased boom-period income to be a result of their willingness
to act as agents of the mills, attempted to frighten the peasants into
selling their contracts to themselves, the civil servants and the
village chiefs, for very low prices, the contracts then being cancelled
for a slightly lar: er settlement from the mills. As this was shortly
after the time when several nationalist agitators (some, but not all
of them, comunists) had been arrested and shipped to a concentration
camp in New Guinea, this attempted coercion was largely successful,
especially with the smaller peasants. But some of the larger land-
holders who were less in awe of the Government, who did not choose to
identify their own interests with those of the mills, and who saw
their sugar incomes as capital rather than as commissions for services
rendered, fought back, initially trying to force the mill simpl y to
honor the contracts; later, when this was clearl impossible, attempt-
ing to gain larger settlements. 5 9 Some members of this group also
bought up contracts from some of the smaller, more easily intimidated
peasants and the struggle between the civil servants and (some) v.lage
chiefs trying to push contract settlement prices down and the more
aggressive landholders--some of whom were also village chiefs--attempt-
59Sarekat Islam, the Moslem nationalist organization, seems to
have played a particularly prominent role in opposing the sugar com-
panies, or their aCents, and representing the better-off peasants.
ing to push them up, became quite intense, and gave rise to a bitter-
ness of which traces are still to be found in Modjokuto. But, al-
though in the end some of the more recalcitrant peasants did get some-
what higher settlements, the mills managed, on the whole, to liquidate
their fixed obligations to the peasantry rather cheaply.
This urief period of contract liquidations was, in a sense,
the would-be rural middle class' last stand--both in its gentry and
yeomanry aspects; the general weakening of its position which took
place at this period turned out to be a prelude to its more or lees
total eclipse. The closing of the mills removed the main sources
both of agricultural credit and of wage payments to rural workers,
drying up the village money supply, while, at the same time, some-
where between a third and a half of the total subdistrict land was
released from commercial exploitation; a combination of circum-
stances certain to produce almost irresistable pressures toward
intensification of traditional village patterns of economic activity.
The claims of a half-proletarianized peasantry, no longer able to buy
a significant part of its subsistence in the open market, for a more
direct share in village output could hardly be resisted by the larger
landholders in the absence of access either to capital or to export
crop markets. The outcome, aided by the equal inheritance pattern,
by traditional notions of kinship ard neighborhood obligation, and by
the whole complex of values stressing the interdependence of village
members, was a fractionization of land holdings, an increasedly
intensive use of labor and ramification of share tenancy patterns.
The Moslem schools weakened and, with one or two exceptions, disajpeared;
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the independent homesteads in the midst of the rice fields were aban-
doned; and the economic power of the village chiefs began to decline.
The Central Javanese village pattern now became firmly entrenched in
Modjokuto.
The virtual disappearance of sugar as a cash crop sharply in-
tensified the emphasis on dry season crops as sources of money income--
onions, soya, peanuts, corn, cassava--for these not only needed rather
little processing before consumption, but also could be effectively
cultiivated with relatively little capital, on small plots of land with
high labor inputs. What little capital was needed for seeds and simple
farm tools was increasingly provided by the Chinese, many of whom
moved out to the villages to live, usually but one or two to a village,
most of these villagers being but agents of the wealthier town Chinese.
In the villages where Islam was stronger, some of the relatively
wealthy pilgrims who had managed to maintain something of their economic
position continued to compete with the Chinese as dry crop traders for
a while, and a few still do so today; but with their greater know-how,
larger capital supply and more extensive commercial organization the
Chinese ultimately gained a position of semi-monopsonistic control in
the dry crop eco romy, enabling them to press peasant incomes toward
the minimum. Taking advantage of the money scarcity the plantations,
The number of Chinese in the District tripled between 1905 and
1920, grew by 2/3 between 1920 and 1930 (for figures, see below, p.7 8 ).
Before 1915 there were Government restrictions on Chinese travel and
residence which tended to keep them concentrated in the north coast
areas,
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collapse had brought about, the Chinese even gained financial control
over a good part of the rice supplies. Thus the depression not only
destroyed the export sugar economy and stren~thened the village system,
but also delivered the shrunken commercial sector more completely into
the hands of the Chinese. Increased free-hold crop cultivation did
not lead either to development or even to a much higher level of wel-
fare--as some of those who opposed the plantation system and argued for
a reconstruction of a purely peasant economy assumed that it would--
for the rigidification of economic structure prevented the Javanese
from obtaining the full advantages of their own market production.
Where the Dutch had reaped most of the benefits of higher productivity
in sugar, the Chinese now reaped the benefits of higher productivity
in dry season crops:
Finally, it must be noted that the increasing volume of export
crops grown by the Indonesian population during the last decades
of Dutch rule did not mean a proportional increase in the welfare
of the Indonesian peasant. A substantial part of the value of
these exports went to Chinese--and to .a lesser extent to Arab--
entrepreneurs, who absorbed a major share of the prices earned by
these commodities. Because of their credit relationship with the
indebted Indonesian grower, they could purgbase his products at
considerably under the local market price.
This general solidification of rural life continued into the
Japanese period when the almost total absence of imports and tae
occupation Government 's institution of very severe restrictions on
internal trade and travel pushed the village econoror toward the extremes
of self-sufficiency. Having disrupted the normal network of domestic
6 1Kahin, G. McT., Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca,
1952, p. 22.
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trade, the Japanese were obliged to confiscate rice (i.e., to force
the peasants to sell it to them at very low prices) in order to feed
both their own personnel and the Javanese urban population. A cer-
tain amount of forced labor was conscripted and used both to replace
imports (notably textiles and, in other regions, pottery) and for
Japanese "export" (i.e., military) purposes. Children were made to
plant castor oil plants by the sides of the roads; many civil servants,
urban traders and their wives were set to work in the rice fields
near town; a number of young men were taken into the Japanese-controlled
Javanese army or set off to lave labor projects as far away as Thailand;
and village women were obliged to weave clothing at Government looms
set up by the Japanese in the houses of some of the village chiefs. 6 2
To supply the looms there was even something of an effort--not entirely
unsuccessful--to grow cotton, and small home industries in cigarettes
(with Japanese-introduced hand-run machines), cigarette lighters and
other small consumption "necessAry luxuries" were stimulated. There
was even some attempt to introduce sericulture, but most Javanese found
the worms repulsive ,
6 2These looms were Japanese-made and instruction in how to use
them was Eiven by a Japanese official who went from one village chiefIs
to the next to check on the work, give advice, and so forth. The
output of the looms was small and of poor quality, bAt, in light of
the very severe textile shortage, eagerly enough consumed. A few
private weaving industries of the cottage sort were begun, again
evidently by the larger, more Moslem, landholders and with Japanese
technical aid. There were also a couple of forced-labor kapok factories
near town in which village women worked.
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In short, Japanese policy was aimed at making the Javanese village
as self-sufficient as possible so that it would not prove any drain
on the Japanese var effort,63 By stimulating handicrafts and restrict-
ing trade the village could be pushed back toward an almost pre-modern
state of autar k y, while food surpluses could be pried from the villages
by political means. A certain amount of unskilled labor could also be
pried loose for direct military p-urposes, but no serious attempts to
invest in the Javanese economy in the hopes of future contributions to
Japanese power seem to have been either made or contemplated. Not only
did th) Japanese not have the cip ital to spare for investment, but
evidently they were obliged even to consume capital in their war
effort: the essential nature of Japanese policy in Rodjokuto seems
to be well symbolized in the fact that they tore up all the railroad
lines (and trolleys) in the area, except for the main one, to use for
scrap. The Japanese aim was not development--even in their own in-
terests-- but in immediate and direct exploitation coupled with as
little civil commotion as possible, and for this a policy of enforced
economic regression was, or seemed to be, most suitable.
Thus, although there were some technical improvements in this
period, it was in general a time of a return to a subsistence economy
and, consequently, of a sharp fall in the standard of living, evidently
some, hat greater in the town than in the villages, for the farmers at
6 3 It should be remarked, too, that the Japanese ruled Indonesia
with a very much smaller staff than the Dutch had. In the town of
Modjokuto, there seems to have been not a single resident Japanese--
they all worked out of the regency capital.
64
least had their own crops to consume. The Japanese "traditionalization"
policy was apparent too in their kreatment of the old Dutch plantation
towns south of town, For a short period thej attempted to run the
plantations, particularly those in coffee and rubber (the cultivation
of the latter in the lodjokuto area having begun, on a small scale,
only just before the war), but in the absence of capital and executive
personnel they soon found this impossible and so uprooted the rubber
trees and coffee bushes and invited the squatters on to the land to
grow corn and csav At first, t sqcuattera seem to have been
taken mostly from the Modjokuto area and holdings were fairly large,
fifteen or twenty acres; but, as time passed, the Japanese brought in
more and more peasants from the hadiun-Ngandjuk-Ponorogo area to the
west until holdings averaged the usual two acres.64 Thus did the
village pattern spread to the plantation lands and just about the last
vestige of the pre-war capital intensive agriculture disappear. (The
Japanese seem to have made almost no effort to do anything with the
sugar mills; later, in the Revolution, the Javanese burned most of them
down as part of their scorched earth policy.,)
The last years of the Japanesc occupation witnessed the appearance
of a tremendous inflation which continued into the Republican period65
As the land is unirrigable and so cultivable for only about seven
months of the year, the smaller holdings are not large enough for a
family to subsist from. As a result, many people in these areas sup-
plement their income in petty trade, wage work or, especially, in ex-
tensive cutting of wood from the forests (much of it illegally), a
practice which has led to a treiendous destruction of tree cover with
consequent flooding in the past few years.
65The Revolution began in 1945, ended in 1949. -For a review of
this period for Indonesia as a whole, see Kahin, op. cit.
providing a barrier to the re-establishment of an effective trading
network. Plodjokuto was in Republican territory up until the second
Dutch "aggression" in July 1947, and attempts were made by the Jogjakarta
-Government to control inflation through Government distribution of
imported goods and certain foodstuffs; but, in general, these elforts
met with only limited success. In the middle of 1947 the Dutch
launched their second attack upon the Republic, They occupied all the
towns of eastern Java, including Mod jokuto, but they never managed to
control the rural areas very effectively At this period a great
exodus from the town occurred as large numbers of urbanites fled to
the countryside. (Most people seem to have had a relgt ive or close
friend who would take them in, it using in any case a period of heighten-
ed solidarity among the Indcresis:ans.) After a while--the Dutch occu-
pation lasted about a year-a few people not directly connected with
the RM volutionary Government drifted back i.ito town, but many remained
in the villages, from which attacks were launched now and then on the
Dutch in the town. As a result, the rural and u;rban sectors of
Modjokuto were, for a time, almost totally segregated from one another
and the village economy was onco again necessarily almost entirely sub-
sistence rather than commercial in its orientation,
After independence and the departure of the Dutch there was a brief
lurry of cooperative economic activity, of one sort or another, sustained
by the enthusiasm the struggle for freedom had stimulated., idoslem groups
organized some cooperative sugar and tobacco growing and set up a large
rice mill; Comunist-dominated peasant unions gained control in the old
plantation areas and orgarized Javanese resistance to the return of these
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areas to the Dutch com1 anies which still held legal claims to them.
6 6
Various organizations set up warehouses and crop credit plans to enable
the peasants to hold their crops off the market more easily and so
avoid debt and stabili~e prices. But most of these attempts at more
ambitious economic organization failed after a time, though many of
the organizations are still present as primarily political institutions
agitating for various sorts of Central Government policies, not limit-
ing themselves particularly to those concerned with agriculture.
In any case, the years since the decline of the sugar industry
have seen a fall in the capitalization of agriculture in the area,
a drop in the cash value of agricultural output, a continuing rise in
population, a steady decline in the marginal productivity of labor,
an increased intensification and diversification of cultivation, and,
perhaps, decreasing fertility of land. 6 7 Sugar as the predominant
commercial element has been replaced by a whole series of crops which
vary in their degree of commercial importance. In general, one can
group the crops Modjokuto peasants grow into three main categories, in
terms of the increasing amount of capital cost involved in their
66 Under the provisions of the armistice agreement, return of these
lands to the Dutch companies was agreed upon, contingent upon the
companies' reaching agreements witu the squatters on compensation for
their displacement, which the companies have not been able to do.
A few of the plantations which were not given over to squatters have
begun to operate again on a smaller scale, but many of the seventy-five
year leases are running out and the Republican Government will not
renew them.
671 am not certain whether this latter is occurring or not, and,
in any case, the great degree of crop rotation, the excellent irrigation,
and the volcanic renewal tend to slow it down.
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cultivation: 1) rice-corn; sweet potato; 2) cassava, soya-beans, pea-
nuts, onions, eLc; 3) sugar, tobacco, etc.68
Rice and corn are the staples, corn playinL, a much jreater role in
6 8The following are the local Ministry of Agriculture figures for
land use in the subdistrict. They must, however, be treated with
extreme caution, not to say skepticism, for not only is the method of
their collection so extraordinarily haphazard as to make serious errors
of estimate almost certain, but certain systematic biases (e.g., the
peasant's deep-grained tendency to under-report the more important
commercial crops for fear of taxation, etc,) distort them as well.
The totals for rice are probably roughly accurate, so that the over-all
per entaEe of land in non-rice crops is also roughly accurate as well;
but the proportions among these latter should not be taken too
seriously. The figures for onions and cassava, especially, seem
dubious, the percentage of the former perhaps being as much as four or
five times as high as reported, the true percentage of the latter
probably being notably smaller than reported. The figures for sugar
and sweet potatoes are, probably, more or less accurate. The total
acreage cropped, with these figures, is about 2 1/2 times the total
acreage of cultivable land and is almost certainly too high (or the
figures for the cultivable land--12,639 acres in 1953, excluding, as
do the figures below, house gardens--too low):
1950 1951 1952
acres % of acres % of acres % of
planted total planted total planted total
rice 7,500 31 9,00) 33 8,750 28
corn 6,325 26 6,750 25 10,600 34.3
cassava 3,325 14 3,925 1.3 4,375 15
peanuts 2,125 9.5 2,250 8.5 1,125 3.6
soya 2,810 n.5 2,870 11 3,560 11.4
sweet
potato 875 4 970 4 1,375 4.4
onions 525 2 650 2.4 400 1.3
sugar 535 2 500 1.8 610 2
24,020 26,915 31,155
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this rather dry climate than it does farther west.69 In general,
about 55-65 per cent of the land seems to be in rice or corn throughout
most of the subdistrict, with rice very dominant in the northwest rice
plain area (see Diagram 2),70 and corn very dominant in the dry southern
and eastern areas. (Intermediate villages probably show a more even
balance, as well as a smaller total percentage of land in these two
crops.) As a result, the northwest is a surplus rice area, the south
and southeast a surplus corn area. Corn also plays a larger role in
the diet than it does in the less dry parts of Java (and its role is
increasing, in line with the enforced shift away from rice noted by
Tergast above), so that northerners replace part of the rice in their
diet with the supplementary corn they grow, while southerners must sell
69Dobby (op. cit., p. 229) divides Java into four land use sones:
a western one in wlih over 55 per cent of the cultivated land is in
rice; a more diversified one, but with still a very large rice element,
in the center and northcenter of the island; an eastern one where over
25 per cent of the land is in corn; and a southeastern one in which
over 20 per cent of the cultivated land is in root crops. The P-odjokuto
area falls just within the limits of the last two sones; it is marginal
both to the more rice-dominated central area and to the root and corn
areas to the south and east. The general relation between the tiodjokuto
pattern of land use and that of Java as a whole can be seen by comr-
paring Hollinger's figures ("Food Crops...", op. cit.); I have cal-
culated 1950-52 percentage averages from his grosiTigures, which come,
incidentally, from the same unreliable source--the Ministry of Agri-
culture--as my own) of rice to non-rice cultivation on the island as
a whole to my figures for Modjokuto:
Java 11djokuto
rice 51% 32%
non-rice 49 68
701n the neighborhood in the very heart of the rice plain area
studied intensively by Jay (op. cit.), about 40 per cent of the land
was in rice, 18 per cent in corn over the year,
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a great part of their corn to buy at least some rice. The result is
that although rice and corn are basic consumption crops, both of them
come into the market in great part--corn grown in the northwest and
rice in the southeast being, to some degree, the exceptions--a tendency
further stimulated by other cash needs of the peasantry. As for sweet
potato, of which rather little is grown in any case, it is, in this
area, almost entirely a subsistence crop, farmers only rarely planting
more than they can consume themselves0
Cassava-perhaps the Javanese* most popular symbol for poverty-
is sometning of a special case, With an ability to grow on very poor
land, a very small need for water, and a high yield (but a low nutritional
content) it tends to be both a subsistence crop and a cash crop. As
a subsistence crop it tends to substitute for corn at the margin on
both the consumption (in a crude, sun-dried but unmilled form) and
production sides, even though it involves somewhat higher capital
costs, As it is a nine month crop, it displaces rice if it is culti-
vated in irrigated terraces; consequently, it is grown almost entirely
on dry land (usually the poorer in fertility) or in house gardens.
But as cassava is also the basis for tapioca, a finely milled flou.r,
it may be grown fairly extensively for export or domestic consumption,
either by small holders or large plantations with attached tapioca
millso
Soya beans, peanuts and onions are more purely cash crops, very
little of the output being directly consumed by the producers0 7 1 In
7 1 Such minor crops as peppers, cucumbers, string beans, etc.,
usually cultivated in very small patches or along the edges of the
terraces, also more or less belonr in this group.
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the dry south they may be grown in the wet monsoon on land not in rice,
corn or cassava; in the more irrigated north they are mostly grown in
the dry season, though peasants with slightly larger landholdings may
plant one or two of thesc crops on part of their land in the wet season
rather than rice.72  In the "intermediate" areas, which have both more
dry land than in the rice bowl villages and better land and more abun-
dant water supplies than the southern dry villages, both practices may
be followed, leading to a somewhat greater role for these crops and
a consequently higher standard of living in these areas. In any
case, these crops are the most purely comrmercial element in the land
use patterns of the great majority of the peasants in the area today
and great interest is shown in them.
Cultivation of sugar, tobacco and other crops demanding notice-
ably higher capital inputs is at the moment fairly quiescent in the
area. Only about sixty acres or so of tobacco is now ,rown in the
subdistrict, matly on an experimental basis in some of the "inter-
mediate" village clusters. Several such experiments have been
attempted, with indifferent success, by cooperative peasant organiza-
tions of one sort or another over the past few years and interest in
such attempts is still lively. Agricultural cooperatives have tended
to fail due to a lack of financial probity on the part of the parti-
cipants, but cooperative planting of both sugar and tobacco has proved
successful in a few places so that revived markets for such efforts
72In the very wet areas rice may be grown in both the wet and dry
seasons, but this monocultural double cropping is limited.
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might strengthen cooperative activities. The five hundred or so acres
of free-hold sugar planted in the subdistrict are not of any great
imp-ortance in the total .icture, in any case. 7 '
One somewhat, but not entirely, positive factor is that the
Chinese hold over the abricultural economy is much lessened since the
war. Almost all the Chinese now live in the town where they fled for
protection during the Revolution, when many rural Chinese were massacred,
and so the, operate in the villages more and more through Javanese
agents, Though tris has had the-i eff-ect of bringing more individual
villagers into the trading network and increasing the peasant's share
in the crop price (the "terms of trade" between town and country have,
in general, shifted heavily in favor of the latter since before the war),
it also means that commercial financing of peasant agriculture tends
to take place on a smaller scale. The absence of the Dutch to enforce
contracts between the two ethnic groups, the disappearance of oppor-
tunities for oppr ssive money lending, and the general political in-
security of tne post-war period have, perhaps, contributed to the same
end as have unstable economic conditions generally.
From one point of view, of course, one can hardly regret that the
Chinese stranglehold on the peasant has been weakened, no more than
one can regret that the Dutch has; but if the Chinese or Dutchman is
73 The large sugar plantation established on land directly rented
from the Government lying at the eastern edge of the subdistrict (see
Diagram 2) has come back into operation since the end of the war, but on
a much reduced scale. Pre-war, about 2,250 acres of sugar were planted
there each year, but leases to all but about 500 acres of this land have
expired (and the last 500 run out in 1957), the Republican Government
refusing to renew them. The mill on this plantation, heavily damaged
during the war, has not been reopened.
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not to provide his admittedly very "expensive" capital, someone else
must or a movement toward subsistence and a lower level of living is
inevitable. The Government has made sume attempts to offer credit to
replace that of the Chinese, but as yet these efforts have been
necessarily rather limited, most of them of.fering very short-term
"seasonal" loans at an interest rate so igh as to make their use for
developmental purposes more or less impossibli. As for private rural
credit, the fractionization of landholdings means it is virtually non-
existent, e:ccept on the same ahort-term, "py-enext-week" basis,
Some of the more aggressive peasants may manage t save a l.Ittle, but
accumulation is painfully slow and one misguess on the market or one
crop misfortune may wipe it all out,
In sum, though the Modjokuto peasantry is probaly somewhat better
off today than before the war, there does not seem, d the moment,, to
be any marked tendency toward a secular increase in pe capita income.
The few peasants who have a little more land--five acreA instead of
two acres--may plant a somewhat higher percentage of the%- land in the
soya-bean group of labor-intensive cash crops. Some of tvi intermediate
villages where the traditiontal system is less strong but ti land still
excellent may also emphasize the more commercial crops to & somewhat
greater degree, as may some of the more puristic Hoslem villges. The
same individuals and -roups also tend to employ wage labor an\ supervise
it carefully, rather than to share-tenant their land, and a fe\ of them
even try some new techniques-more careful planting, fertilizer. etc.
But a continuing increase either in capitalization or scope of maagerial
organization seems unlikely in light of the .reat inflexibility n:
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only in factor inputs but ii. the social structure generally; at least
so long as no new elements Are added to the situation. The cash crops,
the slightly larger landhceidrs, the employment of ware work are dis.
tinct and important eleresnts of flexibility, elowents upon which it
might be possible to bild a groawth economy,; but against the background
of a very high and st:ll growing population, a very labor-intensive
technology and a marls d shortage of capital, they seem wak dynamic
factors, quite easi.y contained, in the absence of outside stimulation,
within a generally static situation.
URBAN DEVFLOPMET
Even as late as 1890, the town was still but little more than
a crossroads in the wildernesso In the Modjokuto area the land
tended, naturally, to be settled from the river outward, so that
the town, lying at the edge of the basin, lagged in development
somewhat behind the villages in the rice plain and there does not,
in fact, seem ever to have been a very large village on the siteo
Sometime before the turn of the century the Colonial Government
established a District Office (the Subdistrict Office came rather
later) and an office of a Dutch official called a Controleur, 7
The Controleur ("inspector") was a sort of "trouble shooter"
for the Dutch wing of the dualistic Colonial bureaucracyo Origin-
ally (from 1818) an overseer of the governmet-nned coffee planta-
tions, he later became the most directly responsible official in
the regulation of forced cultivation under the Culture System0
When the Culture System was abolished, the Controleur became part
of the regular civil service (as its lowest European rank), but
outside the normal administrative hierarchy and charged with little
more than keeping hin ear to the ground and cultivating the "natives"D
"Thus the rough coffee-sergeant of the litch East Indig7 Compazy
became by gradual evolution the pivot on which the Duth adudnistra-
tive system turned, a liason officer between East and West; and this,
despite the growth of office work and other recent changes is still
eo, pre-rW his charactero" Furnivall, op. cito, p, 194o Thejokuto Coroleur had for his territory no oily the Modjokuto
district, htt the next contigwus'one to the northwest as wall.
There was also for a short while an Assistant Resident, the next
official up in the Dutch hierarchy, in Modjokuto; but he seems to
have been mainly concerned with the plantations and played no
important role in the towns a life, except perhaps for the fact that
Javanese driving horse-aarts by his residencie were obliged to dismount
and walk by,
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at the highway intersection, to serve the growing plantation network
which the Dutch were beginning to build up in the area.
The District Office and the Controleur s Office having been
established (along with a depot for the Government opium and salt
monopolies), a few Chinese, encouraged by the assurance of Government
protection opened small stores along the main road, a small Javanese
market-place began to operate, and a bamboo mosque was built0  The
railroad was laid down (from 1897 to 1899),75 a school for Dutch
children living on the plantations erected., as well as one for
Javanese children, and a few village people, stimulated by the Govern.
mentvs offer of free land', began to clear the forest and build rice
terraces (though some were, no doubt, already farming in the general
area bef ore the District Offic e appeared), Even a Government clinic
was set ip. Thus, an old informant drew the following sketch map of
the town as he remembered it from his childhood around 19101
75nccloaedie iro i lEnccloaeie anNederlansc,(,he Indie, OP- cit.., Vol. 4, p, 81.
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From this map, one can see that the maajor elements of the town
were already present around the turn of the century, At the center,
facing the town square and village shrine were the Government offices;
behind the offices lay the village area, already beginning to be
organized in the kampong pattern we have seen to be characteristic
of urban settlement; and to one side of the offices and kampong were
the market and a few Chinese stores. The further growth of the town
has, so far as the Javanese are concerned, consequently been somewhat
dialectical in formi it has consiste6, on the one hand, cf a some-
what independent growth in each of these three basic social structural
element s-bureaucracy, village and market-and, on the other, of their
progressive integration with one another into an over-arching urban
structure in which their distinctiveness has tended to disappear. By
the same token, the Dutch and Chinese have progressively fit less
easily into town life as the Javanese sector of it has grown more solid,
at least vis-a-vis non-Indonesians. In the Dutch case, this problem
was eventually solved by their virtual elimination from the scene;
in the Chinese case, it has led, though there has recently been some
outward migration, simply to increasing tension between themselves
and the Javanese. The population figures for both the district and
the subdistrict (the town not being an official political unit, there
are no separate records for it ) during the period of Mdjokuto s
growth reflect the general pattern of this rather peculiar sort of
76
urbanization:
76 The 1905 figures are froma the Encyclopedie van Nederlandsche Indie,
opl. cit., Vol. 3, p, 3h2, The 192Q : iouras are oMkstellin 19 20,
Javanese
District
Chinese and Other
Foreign Asiatics
total % avg.
annual
increase
1905 115,000
1920 150,381 1.7
1930 184,267 2.0
1953 248,625 1.3
% of
total
total % annual
increase
98.9 800
98.3 1,837
97o9 3,022
98.95 2,548 -.g7
% of
total
total annual
/in-e
crease
.7 450 ---
1.2 722 3.0
1,6 916 2.4
1.0 117 -2.8
Subdistrict
Chinese and Other
Annt8. Foreign Asigtie; Dutch
total % avg. % of total
annual district
increase Javanese
% annual % of
increase district
Chinese
total % annual
increase
% of dis-
trict
Dutch
1920 50,373
1930 59,767 1.8
1953 85,206 1.5
33 1,195
32 1,175
34 2,034
---- 65 334
5 59 380 1.4
.66 80 19 -4.1
Deel III, Batavia, 1922, pp. 110-11 The 1930 figures are from
Volkstelli , 1930, Deel III, Batavia, 1934, p. 114. The 1953 figures
come from the subdistrict office in Modjokuto. The "foreign Asiatics"
are relatively few and include some Arabs, Indiana and, around 1920 and
1930, a few Japanese. Almost all Eurasians are included in the Dutch
totals. The rates, percent of total, and percent of district figures are
calculated. According to figures from the local office of the Ministry of
Health (which include Chinese and Javanese together), the crude birth rate
for the regecy in 1953 was 28 per 1000, the crude death rate 15.2 per
1000, giving a rate of natural increase of 12.8 per 1000. The figures forbirths are, most likely, somewhat low, the actual rate being perhaps as
high as 30. Crude rates are, of course, poor measures; but the data are
not good enough for the calculation of more refined ones. Overall average
crude rates for Java and Madura for the decade 1931-41 were: births, 27.4;deaths, 18.1; natural increase 9.3. Metcalf, J., The Agricultural Economyof Indonesia, Agricultural Monograph, 15, U.S. Depaitment of Agri-uiture,Washington, D. C., p. 98o
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The relatively even growth of Javanese population, slowing
down slightly in recent years but still managing to double in a
little less than half a century, reflects the pre-war importance of
migration to the area.7 If we take the percentage of district
population lying within the subdistrict as rather vaguely indicative
of urbanization-because there are, with one or two small exceptions,
no towns in the other subdistricts, while the town of Modjokuto has
about a quarter of the subdistrict population-there is very little
sign of a markedly more rapid increase in urban than rural Javanese
population, for subdistrict population runs constant around a third
of district. It is possible, of course, that rural-urban proportions
within the subdistrict have markedly changed (say, becoming more urban),,
while the other subdistricts have remained constant, or changed in
the opposite direction, in proportion to the whole district, But this
conjecture assumed a differential susceptibility to urbanization within
and without the subdistrict for which there seeis to be little evidence;
though a small percentage change toward greater subdistrict urbaniza-
tion has probably occurred, particularly since the war.
If this admittedly rather weak argument for the constancy of the
rural/urban ratio be accepted,, It strengthens two othcr hypotheses which
seem to me valid on "intuitive" grounds. First, what urban migration
has occurred has not been so much from the Modjekuto countryside to
Modjokuto town, as from both towrn and countryside to the larger citiess
Jogjakarta, Surakarta, Surabaja, Malang, Semarang, Bandung, Djakarta,
177From 1905 to 1930 Modjokuto district population (Javanese) was
growing at the rate of 18% per year, Jav widY population at the rate
of 1.3% (the latter figure ccJuated frm urnivall, op0 cit.o, p, 317),
Second, the plantations' policy of minimizing proletarianization also
minimized dislocation of the population distribution: most sugar workers
and plantation laborers were not removed from their predominantly rural
residential context by their participation in commercial agriculture,,
It is impossible, of course, to be certain, but it seems likely that
this pattern is more or less general for Java: population growth in
this century has led not to a markedly greater percentage of the
population in the toris and smualler cities, but to a more or less eqaal
distension of both village and town social struc tures to hold the large
increase, the absolutely unabsorbable surplus from both draining off
to the larger cities, which have had a spectacularly disproportionate
growth. In any case, this seems to have been the pattern in Modjokutoo
For the Chinese it has been clearly otherwise. Not only has
their "urban-subdistrict" population proportion been consistently much
higher -between 60% and 80%-but its changes indicate something of
their vicissitudes: the decrease in 1930 evidently reflects the greater
movement into the villages; the sharp post-war riseb their return to
the town after the terrors of the Revolution. The overall rapid in-
crease of the Chinese in the pre -war period, reaching a peak in the
Wertheim notes conce-ning the 1920-1930 period in Java that
"the smaller the town, the slower the rate of growth," towns with a
population above 100,000 increasing particularly rapidly, the total
number of inhabitants of sucA toivs doubling ithin a period of 10 to
20 yearso "This development in the size of towns continued after 1930-.
very probably at a considerably incraased paceo" Wertheim, W,. F0
EffeCts of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society, New York, 1950,
Do For the disproportionate grwc th of cities throughout Southeast
Asia, see Gins-burg, M-, "The Great City in Southeast Asia," American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 60, N , 1955 Po 55'462
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twenties, and the almost total cessation of that growth in the post-
war period speaks for itself. in commercial terms the town seems to
have reached a plateau; perhaps, as the Chinese high rate of natural
increase has presumably not changed, even a decline0
As for the Dutch population, the interesting thing, aside from
their rapid (but not so rapid as the Chinese) increase pre-war and
their rapid post-war decline, is how "rural" they have been--though,
of course, they lived not in the villages but in segregated compounds
on the plantations and around the mills. The plantations and mills
were, neither of them, even administratively centered in the town,
but rather in the countryside surrounding it, so that the town was
not, for the fnitch, a place either of residence or of work, but a
temporary meeting point for intermittent political, commercial or
recreational purposeso
In fact, in the earliest phases of tle town's development this
"hollowness" was a characteristic feature of its social topography,
not only so far as the Dhitch were concerned, but from the point of
view of the bureaucratic and market elements as well0  Most civil
servants were (and the hi gher ones still are) shifted quite frequently
from one post to anothr-usually about once every two or three years.
Their ties with any one town were thus likely to be weak and transient.
Similarly, in this early period many of the most important Javanese
traders were not actual residents of Modjokuto but were travelling
peddle.rs moving from one market to another, their home bases commonly
being in the north coast area or the principalities. A trader would
journey to the Mcdjokuto area,, remain a few days, weeks or months,
32
79
travelling around the local market cycle, and then he would return
to his home for a while0
Thus both the trading group and the civil servant group tended,
in large part, to be regional,, inter-.urban" communities rather than
local, "intra-urban" crmunities, their members often having closer
ties with people in other nearby towns in the same group as themselves
than with people in other groups in their towno Both had, too, quite
separate and distinctive styles-of-l3if e, more or less homogeneous over
most of the Javanese culture area, cc that individuals could move
from one town to another and easily find a place in the new (sub-)
community; something quite a bit more difficult for a peasant with
inherited land rights in a single village. In addition, the Chinese
were also rather more horizontally than vertically integrated0  Though
they were more or lass stable in residence, their relations with
Chinese in other towns-especially the regional capital and in Surabaja-,
were much closer than with the local non-Chinese population As for
the "lower class" Javanese living around the highway intersection or
in the kampong area, most of them were, in this earlier period, still
peasants-Modjokuto, a town for the Dutch, the Chinese, the traders and
the bureaucrats, was still largely a village for them, proletarianiza-
tion having only barely begun, Modjokuto at this time was a true cross.
roads-a Government service station, a market place., and a peasant
79 Many Javanese towns, particularly smaller ones, join with
other towns in the same area in a market cycle, each of the towns hold.
ing a market on a different day of the five-day market week. This
pattern is much less prevalent now than it once was, all but the smallest
towns now holding a market every day, as does iodjokuto,
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settlement; but as yet no true community0
Departing from this point, the process of urbanization as it
took place around the Modjokuto highway intersection involved, on the
one hand, the expansion of the Javanese bureaucracy and increased
Dutch influence on the members of it; the at least temporary emergence
of a Javanese middle class, and intensified Chinese commercial activity;
and a transformation of the peasantry settled there into townsmen, of
village d-wellers into kampong dwellers, On the other hand, it involved-
but ,nly for the Jarane e-more intimate relationships among these
various elements and a movecent towrd locally based, "vertical," rather
than regionally based, "horizontal" forms of social integration,. a
dissolution of the semisegregated inter-urban community into a more
unified intra-urban community. The process was one, in a sense, of
"filling up" the originally "lhollow" town,,
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In other terms-those made popular by Furnivall--the urbanization
process was one of replacing an essentially "plural" society (one made
up of a set of socially segregated subgroups sharing only the narrowest
and most provisional of cultural consensuses) by a rather more unitary
one, The Dutch and Chinese,, too diverse and too foreign to be in.
cluded in the new integraticn (both from their own point of view and
from that of the Indonesians) were in the one case ejected and in the
other increasingly more grudgingly tolerated as a discriminate minor-
ity. But in casting off the Dutch and constricting the Chinese, the
Indonesians necessarily also rid themselves of tho economically dynamic
80
Opo cito
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influences these groups provided--on whatever unjust terms-their
economy and society, leading to a slowing down, at least in Modjokuto,
of the process of urban development itself, a tendency toward econoric
stagnationo As a result, the primary post-war economic problem has
turned out to be that of developing within the Indonesian population
itself the kind of dynamism provided by Dutch managerial talent and
Chinese commercial skill in the pre-war period.
l The BraracySector: TheDe of the Civil Servant Elite
The traditional culture of the bureaucracy derives from the
Hinduistic. court cul mre of the inland Javanese kingdoms, When the
Dutch, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, established
sovereignty over the East Indies, they detached the administrative
staffs of these kingdoms from royal control and transformed them into
a unified, appointive civil service. This civil service became, then,
the chosen instrument of a dualistic form of Colonial administration
Asserting the principle of "'like over like," the Dutch ruled the mass
of the people through the medium of a small class of Javanese bureau.
crats who were, at the same time, the representatives of the indigene
ous, literate aristocracy, This aristocracy, or literati, was, in
addition, almost entirely urban-or, as I have said, inter-urban-and,
particularly after 1750, largely unlanded, its members depending for
their support almost entirely upon their salaries. Their culture,
following that of the courts at Jogjakarta and Surakarta in Central
Java, was built around a very intense concern for status; for smooth,
constrained, hyperopolite behavior, for a rather Buddhistic rsticism;
and for a refined art., especially of rusic, dance and (puppet show) drama.
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It was more or less uniform throughout the whole Central Javanese
culture area, the main variations within it being not so much areally
linked as hierarchically: people lower down in the bureaucracy
following a less refined version of it than those higher up.
The establishment of a District Office at Modjokuto thus meant
an establishment there of this aristocracy and culture as well, In
this Office and in all the local Government offices before about 1915,
the influence of the literati culture was all pervasive: it was a
small replica of the court, with the District Officer as king. Status
differences were subtly but firmly marked by dress, speech style,
deference gesture-4by a refired and explicit code of mannerso Relation-
ships between superior and inferior were paternalistic and personalistic,
and the staff as a whole held thaiaselves aloof from the masses they were
nominally governing, dealing with the peasantry largely through the
village chiefs. Similarly, the staff had relatively little contact
with the Dutch at this period, for at most only the District Officer
had much to do with them, and he often only through the agency of the
Regent, the highest Javanese official, stationed fifteen miles away.
As a general group, the civil servants were highly endogamous,
marriages tending to follow status lines rather closely even: *ithin
the group, so that Modjokuto literati families usually would have kin
ties with families of comparable status in several other towns. They
resided in large houses set, amid gardens or orchards, along the main
roads and streets of the town, and they were usually surrounded by a
retinue of servants and dependents, many of whom often lived in small
houses in an attached kamiong to the rear U Add the cultivation of
the dance and the shadow play, and the interest in mystical literature
and practice, and the picture of this essentially gentry style of
life is fairly complete. The traditional Javanese name for this
group, and for the individual gentlemen who make it up, is 'prijai
and it is still used for them, though, as we shall see, much about
them has changed since the beginning of this century.
These changes had their beginnings in the period of plantation
prosperity from about 1915 to about 1930, when the Dutch influence
on the town in general, and on the prijaji in particular, grew very
much stronger, and when the economic life of the' town became much
more active. The most immediate effect on the town of the r ather sudden
growth of the Dutch population in the Modjokuto area was the appearance
of a large number of "service" organizations specifically designed
to dater to European trade, many of them run by Dutchmen or Eurasianst
individual Dutchmen set up a hotel, a dairy, a slaughterhouse, and a
drugstore, all directly oriented to the European market; while various
Chinese started bakeries, set up taxi services and increased their
imports of beer and Dutch gin. In 1920 the railroad moved it Ixhad-
quarters to I4odjokuto, bringing with it a Dutch staff of twenty-two
(seventeen of them Eurasians); around the same time, HVA built its
hospital--still one of the finest in East Java--which, though headed
by an Indonesian doctor, had a large staff of Dutch nurses; and, of
course, the Dutch elementary school, taught by Dutch teachers, expanded,
Finally, and perhaps most typically, there was the kamar bQla,
or "ballroom" The kamar bola, which was owned by HVA, was a large,
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High Javanese officials, such as the District Officer, the Assistant~
District officer, and the Pawnshop Director (the latter two later arrivals
lived, then as now, in houses attached to their offices. Dutch officia>s
such as the Controleur, and later, the railroad Director, followed th1
same patterno
87
wooden frame building, in which each Saturday night a dance was held.
Evidently, the great majority of Dutch in the area attended this dance
almost every week, and it seems to have been one of those social
affairs typical of Europeans in the tropics in the years before the
wart an elaborate, boistesaus and pathetically deliberate attempt to
recreate the pleasures of home-country "high society" in an environ-
ment in which almost all of the normal correlates of such " society"
save wealth, were absent* What the Javanese seem to remember most about
it today, outside of the fact that only the DuAch (or, in a few instances,
the very highest prijajis--the two doctors and the District Officer)
could attend, is the drunken exuberance of it all, something not
characteristic of Javanese celebrationswhich are rather restrained0
In any case, the kamar bola, like the hospital, the school, the dairy
and the drugstore, is symbolic of the role of the Dutch in the town
during this period of rapidly rising profits: they moved in and out
of it fairly regularly for medical, education or recreational purposes,
but the major concern of most of them lay on the plantations and the
mills and their contact with the indigenous urban community was minimal
Nevertheless, the influence of the Dutch group on the aristocracy
increased steadily, eventually shattering its unity and partially trans-
forming its culture. In the first place, some of the highest officials
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The railroad, hospital, etc., did, of course, increase the
number of Dutch people resident in the town, but these mainly lived in
special compounds of whitewashed stone bungalows which were set up
around the railroad station (the head of the line built a particularly
commanding house in the middle of the town square, which was later
burned down in the Revolution), behind the hospital, and at the Western
edge of town, the latter mainly occupied by retired Dutch officials and
plantation managers.
had partial entree into Dutch social life, particularly as some of
the Dutch also began to paron U'1ndiar? art, cooking, dress and
: forth; and those officia ih did rnot have such antr ce neverthe~,
less began to -riitate the eDternals er Dutch life -replaced their
porticoed houses with concrete bungalows, hing bad romantic land-
scapes on their walls, and subscribed to Dutch magazineso In the
second place, and even more important, I think., the expanding Dutch
enterprises, particullTrly the mill, create new set of occupations-
accountants sugar tehn iians record clerks, draughtamen,etc,-
the holders of which challenged the exclueive status perquisites of
the civil servants. These new white collar workers, it is true, were
also predominantly chosen from the pijaji class, but because these
jobs demanded more traininc in rather narrower technical skills than
the more diffuse bureaucratic occupations, they tended necessarily to
be rather more open to talentso in rbdjokuto, in any case, a sharp
distinction and a good deal of animosity soon developed between the
two groups, and a young pj aji increasingly found himself forced to
hose between much higher statu 0 much lcuvr pey In the. bureaucracy
and much lower status and ntuch higher pay in the mills. And, though
the bureaucrats resisted the claims of the mill technicians to equal
status quite vigorously, the tendency for the bureaucracy itself to
become something of an appendage of the mills rubbed a good deal of
the traditional cultural shine off them as well1
Thus, as the mills had an anti-traditional effect on the rural
social structure, so too they had one on the urban, and most directly
(but, as we shall see, far from exclusively) on the customary elite.
The effect they had can best be summarized by saying that they tended
to change the grija group from a literati to an intelligentaia.
According to Redfield, who has systematized these terms the literati
of whom the Chinese Mandarin are good example, are characterized
by a high concern for the preservat.i.Jon of the indigenous sophisticate
tradition; they are the protectors and interpreters of the a rt,
religion and manners of the inherited pattern of aristocratic lifeo
The intelligeitsia, of hon the Rin intellectuals of the 1.9th n
are an example, are, on the other, hand, primarily the mediators of an
intrusive civilization to their own society., They are culttural middle-
men,, marginal to both their own cul ture and to a foreign one they
interpret to their fellows, and, as such, they play a crucial role
in cultural change, The emergence of an intelligenteia in Modjokuto
meant, then, the emergence of a group who were increasingly skilled
in following Dutch patterns ot' behavior and who increasingly based
their claim to political and social aScendary on this achieved skill
rather than on their inharited clss position, Different groups within
the prijaji elite travelled further along the road to. intelligensia
than did others, lower bureaurat and ill technicians generally going
rather further toward the adoption of European patterns than'did the
middle and upper bureaucrats, who tended to cling imore to the old ways.
Even among the most "1modernist" groupe, hoever, t he t rAditional prijaji
style-of-life continued as a strong component in their culture; and
even among the most "conservative" ,roups something of the new less
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Redfield, R0 , The Primi tre World and Its Transforations,
Ithaca, 1953o
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traditional orientation appeared,,
That the sugar boom stimulated the growth of the intelligentsia
or "modernist" element in the elite at the expense of the literati
or "conservative" element is, therefore, clearo The expansion of
the mills--as well as of the railrcad,, the (at that time privately
owned) electric company, etc 0 -not only increased the number of
Javanese technicians, clerks and accountants employed in non-bureau-
cratic posts, but it also stimulated the growth of the bureaucracy
and thus of the number of lower civil servants. Around the original
District Office (supplemented now by the Subdistrict Office), which
was still the center of court-like traditionalism, grew up the
secondary, and generally more technical, Government offices-irriga-
tion, public works and the like. The diffuse, almost paternalistic,
administrative functions of the District and Subdistrict Offices
became increasingly supplemnted by the technically specific functions
of the secondary "public utilities" offices, so that even within t he
bureaucracy itself the literati-intell.igentsia spli t occurred. As
both the mill technicians and the lower civil servants tended to be
more permanent in. residence than t he higher bureaucrats,, this trans-.
formation of the homogeneous elite into one with a "conservative"
and Mbodernist" wing represents at the same time the appearance of a
dominant urban class which could at last genuinely be said to be a
For a discussion of the specificity-diffuseness distinction
,
as well as of the achievement-ascription distinction mentioned above,
see Parsons, To, The Social System, Glencoe, Ill, 1951, pp. 63-66.
locally-based one, Ambitious, but their amitions limited by racial
barriers to advancement; Western educated, but their educational
opportunities carefully rationed by the Dutch, highly articulate, but
their freedom to agitate progressively eur tailed by the nervous
Colonial Administration, the members of the modernist wing came to
play an increasingly important role in Modjokuto life, emerging
finally into almost undisputed pre-eidnence in the revolutionary and
post-revolutionary periods,
All through the period of rising nationalism in the twenties
and thirties, this split between conservatives and modernists intensified.,
becoming increasingly political in character, in terms of a distinction
between those who wished to gain self-=government through cooperation
with the Colonial Government and those who wished to rain it through
more or less open opposition -to that Government, the two camps
generally being called "co-" (ioe 0e cooperator) and "nonwo-" In
the depression, the antagoni smi between the two groups became quite
heated, as the suddenly unemployed intelligentia became even rore
dissatisfied with the status quo0  Unlike the unskilled seasonal
workers, this small group of technic ians had been fully drawn into the
orbit of the "1capitalist" side of the "dual econ.my, and, with their
high wages (for a Javanese), they prospered with it. With the des-
truction of this relatively privileged economic position, the rest.
lessness already induced in then by the racial, bar to advancement to
managerial positions within the capu'alist sector was further intensified.
Cut off, both from the traditional o-pportunitie s within the government
bureaucracy 85and from the new opportunities which had appeared in
the capitalist sector of the economy during the boom, their attitude
toward the entire colonial structure grew definitely ugly.
The Dutch attempted-in the short run, more or less successfully-
to counter this increasing explicit criticism of their right to rule
by a sharp repression of radical intelligentsia nationalism and, sub-
sequent to this, by a discreet stimulation of conservative literati
nationalism, so strengthening the hand of the more traditional, less
dissatisfied element (. After the Communist disturbances of 1925 and
1926, which did not spread to Modjokuto, the Dutch arrested not only
the local Communist leaders (most of whom were railroad workers), but
several non,-cooperating nationalists as well, exiling them to New
Guinea, an act which, particularly as several of these men were arrested
while attending a large public meeting in the motion picture theatre,
impressed the local population that the Dutch meant business and
dampened the radical. fervor, or at least drove it underground. After
the depression brought the welfare party to the fore within the
Colonial Government--that is those Dutch officials who urged a more
85 hzwaWhich was, of course, itself contractingo Salaries fell 25%
from 1929 to 193A, total G-rrrment expenditures from fl. 515,,7
million to fl. 337 million, almost all hiring of new officials ceased
and many older ones were pensioned off. Furnivall, 2p. cit., p, 4.3
It would be incorrect, however, to make nationli-sm a simple result
of the depression: on the contrary, it Eot its primary. stimulus in
the boom, which also helped to finance it, The movement itself began
on the national scene around 1912, the first serious disturbances
coming with a series of Communist strikes and uprisings in 1925-26,
while the founding, by Ir. Sukarno, present President of the Republic,,
of Partai Nasionalis Indonesia in 1927 marks the appearance of non-
cooperative intelligentsda nationalism in a definitive form. There was
no chapter of this last organization in pre=war Modjokuto (or of the
Communist Party either), but, up until it was banned in 1930, several
prominent local prijaji were members of the branch in the regony
capital. For the"Tsry of the nationalist movement, see Kahin, 2p cite1
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"ethical" policy, as they termed it, toward the Indonesian population
-- the other aspect of the policy, the encouragemnt of moderate,
evolutionary nationalism, became more prominento In Modjokuto,
this partial shift in policy was reflected in the florescence of t he
prijaji benevolent organization called Parindrao
Parindra, which was formed in 1925 as a fusion between two
earlier moderate nationalist organizations, Budi Utomo and Partai
Bangsa Indonesia, was a cooperative political organization, having
representatives in the East Indies Parliament the Dutch had set up in
Batavia, but its main activities wecre of a more broadly philanthropic
nature,, The organization was divided into two sub-sections, Parindra
proper, consisting entirely of grija (with a merbership of about
fifty Modjokuto) and a peasant organization, consisting of villagers
but administered by members of Parindra proper. The tone of this
organization was one of self-uplift and noblesse oblige, but evidently
it was quite effective. Parindra proper set up savings and consumer
cooperatives among its members, founded a private junior high school
(thee wre o pulichif 14 86(there were no public high schools in Modjokuto), and attempted to
ameliorate such growing urban evils as prostitution, gambling and
Chinese money lending. The peasant section built lar,.e warehouses
to store peasant rice under the "padi bank" plan, disseminated
agricultural information, sold seeds cheaply, and so forth. Dutch
officials evidently gave a good deal of guidance to this group, pro-
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This school, still oresent in Modjokuto, was actually set up by
a separate, entirely local organiation, also still extant, but its
membership was more or less idoItical with Parindral s.
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viding it with plans for the co-operatives and peasant programs,
"gently" suggesting new activities and the like, In any case, it
is clear that by this time the whole center of gravity had shifted
toward the intelligentsia pole, and even the more traditionalistic
found it necessary to adopt more Western formso
The destruction of Dutch power in the Japanese occupation and
Japanese support, particularly toward the end of their period of rule,
of the intelligen-Edals revolutionary aims, changed the split between
the "co-" and "non-c-" groups into a chasm, a chasm between those
who remained loyal to the Dutch as they attempted to re:-impose their
rule on Indonesia, and those who joined, and led, the Republic in L-us
successful effort to prevent the return of the Dutch to power. During
the year the Dutch occupied Modjokuto, they maintained a staff of
native civil servants, largelyr drawn from the conservative element of
the prijaji group; while in the villages, scattered staffs of Republican
intelligenta directed the guerilla warfare of the rebels against the
Dutch positions in the towns . In light of this direct opposition, it
is remarkable how relatively easily relations between the two wings
of the elite were re-cestablished after the war; but we shall deal with
the postwar period below,
2. The Market Sector: The Development of the Trading Groups
Speaking generally, four different groups have played a role in
the growth of Modjokuto's mark et-taking "market" in the broad sense
to include the whole network of trade relations. In order of ascending
importance, they are: 1) a small group of luxury textile traders
selling the wrld-famous bati cloth; 2) a group of originally semi.
professional village or very small-scale town traders, many of them
women, selling almost entirely intra-locally; 3) a group of fully
professionali ed, originally itinerant, traders selling cheaper
textiles, cigarettes, hardware, leather goods, prepared foods, etc.,
imported into the area from other parts of Java, and 4) the Chinese,
selling all these sorts of goods plus those imported from abroad.
The process of development has consisted, on the one hand, of a
consolidation of the three originally more or less separate Javanese
groups into a single, somewhat over-complex distributive network; and,
on the other hand, of an increasing tension between all of these groups
and the Chinese, whom the Javanese, now become Indonesians, would like
to exclude from comme-cial life altogether.
The earliest batik traders were almost all from the principalities
of Central Java where this industry has always boen concentrated.
Because of the close historical connection between batik-making and the
high culture of the courts, the style-of-life of these traders, of whom
there were only a few in any case, tended to approach that of the civil
servant prijajis. Often, in fact, the batik traders were wives of civil
servants who supplemented their husbandsl meagre salaries in the one
sort of business the gentry ethic regarded as at least marginally per-
missible. In the days before the sugar prosperity, the larger court-
city traders travelled periodically to Modjokuto and other towns in
the area, distributing stocks of batik (which was, at that time, worn
only by upper class, urban womien) to local agents in the prijaji group,
who, for the most part, sold the.m privately and discretely in their
About 5o% of the whole batik industry before the war was
located in Jogjakarta, SurokrI't eI Pekalongan (the last actually a
north coast town). Sitsen, P dusraDevelopient in the
homes. After the beginning of the sugar prosperity period, batik
trading became more professionalized, moved more and more into the
market, and--block printing replacing hand work and an increasing
number of non-rijaji coming to wear batik--the court-culture element
in this trade weakenede Today, though clear traces of its aristocratic
origins remain, batik is, for the most part, but one slightly more
refined trade-good among others, and the luxury textile traders have
become more closely integrated into the over-all market network.
The second group, the Petty intra-local trers, were also
often woment wrives of peasearts., of part-time small craftsmen, manu-
facturers and so forth. They dealt in locally produced handicrafts,
cottage-industry goods, small foodstuffs, products from house gardens
and the like, which they sold locally, mostly in the villages. In the
earlier period such traders were both mostly part timc, and, relatively
speaking, few in number. They deelt on a very small scale, often
travelling several miles te sell a few cents worth of fruit, a con-
tainer of coconut oil, or a single woven basket, barter no doubt
playing a much greater role than it does today, This was, thus, a
trade which was fairly closely tied in with the traditional village
economy, being more or less supplement ary to agriculture. As. the
more coimmercial aspects of that cconory-.-cottage industry and intensive
Netherlands Indies, Bulletin 2 of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (nedo), p. 21o Batik is
a resist-dye method of textile manufacturs erloing wax as thesist;
originally all done by hand it is now almost wiholly manufactured by a
semi-mechanized block-print ing rethod,0
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compound cultivation--were perhaps not so highly developed in the
Modjokuto areas as in some others (whether there was ever a significant
degree of village specialization is unclear), due to the relatively
light land pressure, this trade was probably never very large. In any
case, the growth of the sugar economy tended to weaken it severely,
turning the villages toward a wider, urban-centered economy (from which
they had never been wholly isolated), and replacing local handicrafts
with foreign imports and with dComestic goods produced on a larger
scale in central and northern Java.
But, up until the depreJion and the war, the most important
and most highly developed group of Javanse traors was neither the
semi-daristocratic batik dealers rr the small-scale local peddlers,
but the itinerant, inter-local traders who travelled to Modjokuto from
other parts of Java, from whence they brought Javanese-made goods into
the area, The great majority of these peripatetic traders came from
the north coast regions---Kudus, Denk Tuban, Gresik and Surabaja, as
well as from Madura and Bawean (the latter a small island in the Java
Sea, about 75 miles due north of Gresik), where a fuli-r professional-
ized native commercial tradition had been in existence since the
period of Islamization in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and
88
probably before, - and where growth of Javanese-controlled small
industries--in dried fish, hand -rolled cigarettes, leather tanning,
cheaper textiles, soap and so forTh--had taken place in the first
8 8 For a general review of the histcry of trade in Indonesia,
see van Leur, Jc. C., indonesin Trae and SEty, The Hague and Bandung,,
19550~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~
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decades of this century, Stimulated by this Javanese commercial and
industrial development on the one end, and by the increasing Javanese
purchasing power on the other, this group slowly built up an effective
Javanese-controlled inter-regional trade network that linked Modjokuto
to the island's more economically advanced north coast 0 It was this
group which, along with the Chinese, first tied the Modjokuto market
firmly into the Java-wide market,
From the cultural point of view, almost all of these early
inter-regional traders were strong, pious Moslems whose ascetic,
restless style of life differed sharply in tone from that of both the
settled peasants and the refined literati civil servants who were
their contemporaries. Frugal, tireless, shrewdly calculating, they
moved out from their home base s-wher, commonly, their father or older
brother owned a store or a small factory-with stocks of cigarettes,
textiles, leather goods, small hardware or dried fish (they tended to
be specialised as to area: the cigaette trade centered in Kudus, the
fish trade in Gresik, etc.), paddling them bit by bit through the
various interior townso As they generally modeled their behavior after
that of the Arabs, who were also small itinerant trade's, as well as
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highly Islamicised, their whole culture had a sort of Levantine ting-e
to it, and this attachment to Islam earned them the name of Sentri
89
Almost all the Arabs in Indonesia are from the Hadramaut,
immigration increasing particularly rapidly after 1860. They are,
nearly without exception, all small scale retail traders or :money lenders
and are entirely confined to thoy ci tics and towns, Their pre-war influ-
ence on the profess:onal n3i ;e trading class was extraordinarily strong,
but it has lessened greatly since the rise of Indonesian nationalism
which has tended to exclude thmir as the Chinese and Dutch are excluded,,
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properly, Moslem koranic student, a name also applied to the more Moslem
element in the rural population mentioned earlier.
But, whatever the cultural contrasts between trader, peasant and civil
servant, the urban santri style of life was basically as traditionalistic as
that of either of these other two groups. Focused around the daily prayers
and the mass prayer on Friday in the nosque, and amund the pilgrimage, the
Islamic law and the koranic scholar (and including a good deal of Sufistic
mysticism as well), it was a kind of self-contained minority culture
particularly well adapted to a mobile, conmmercial existence. The sort of
trading pattern it supported and regulated, however, was, as I have said,
one which had been present in Java in about the same form for hundreds of
years and which was as constrained by a crystallized tradition as the
customary modes of agriculture or of political administration. There was
a distinct difference in ethos between the santris and the rest of the
Javanese community-fromi whoi they tended to remain spatially and socially
isolated--but it was not one of a less stabilized pattern of life in the
former than in the latter: for the santri, the Javanese variant of Islamic
culture contained his commercial activities withi a ralatively static form
in the same way as the literati status etiqette contained the prijaji's
administrative methods, aid as the village tradition of the peasantry con-
tained the settled cultivator!s agricultural practices.
The fourth iarket group, the Chinese, was at this time still small,
and it too was fairly traditionali cl. Mostly it was composed of Chinese
born in the Netherlands Indies rather than in China, usually for several
generations back--i
.
e., they were peranakans rather thcn recently rigrant
singkshs. The peranakans ran small retail stores, leased certain monopolies
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from the Government (e.g., the Government pawnshop was in the early days of
Modjokuto leased to a Chinese), lent money, sold opium, managed gambling
dens and built rice mills and warehouses. In contrast to the singkkhl,
who began to come in increasing strength to Modjokuto in the boom period,
the peranakans were a static group, with a well-defined--though not
necessarily wholly secure--position in the "plural" society, a position
which had developed over the course of several centuries from the days
when Chinese rented whole villages to rule and exploit from the East
India Company, or when they leased a whole range of functional monopolies--
salt and opium distribution, toll ronds, slaughter houses, Javanese markets--
from the Company's Culture System successors. Their economic activity,
like that of the , thus lay along well-developed, stabilized lines,
and their culture was a curious amalgam of Javanese aristocratic patterns
with Chinese Mandarin patterns, so that they have often been said to be
both more Javanese than the sinrgkehs and more Chinese, Meijer has well
described the ethos of this group:
Through their intensive contact with the population, tf.:.
Peranakan Chinese learned everything about the society of
their customers. They behaved, as a whole, as expected
from well-to-do members of that society and took on the
social obligations accruing from such a position, includ-
ing presents at ceremonies, etc. Still, though living in
that society, they already remained observers and never
actually became members. This was a mutual reaction; the
Javanese did not want th.m, nor did they on the whole wish
to merge into the mass of the Javanese0  The fact that there
was much Javanese blood in their veins and that they lived
among the people made them thoroughly acquainted with all
the customs and sentimenats, but their Javanese women became
Chinese and were loosened from their om milieu . . It is
true they were different froi the Singkbhs and did not feel
like a foreign element in Inonesia, but they did not feel
part of the native populition either , They felt themselves
a different element, but definitely belonging to the country.
They looked down on the coarse Singkehs as much as the latter
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looked down on the effeminate peranakans who took life
easy and became comfortably well off, Peranakan somen
dressed in Javanese clothes, even though the men later
took Chinese wives (when there became more of them).
But the Chinese-Javanese clothes are only Javanese in
style; the colors are loud and the patterns are those of
Chinese pottery. The peranakans made Indonesian music on
Chinese instruments with the Chinese gamma, they imitated
the flavanese shadow playf with Chinese puppets, and even
their food was a synthesis of Javanese and Chinese dishes.
Still, their attitude up to and around 1900 towards China
was mostly one of piety and aesthetic appreciation. Their
attitude towards the Javanese was one of subdued superiority.
They avoided the arrogance of the Europeans, were smooth and
courteous with the wealthy and influential, while in their
ways with their inferiors they de'veloped the same manners as
the native aristocracy. In this way they croted a form of
life in harmony with their curious position.
Again, the rise and fall of the plantations brought on a period
of detraditionalization of the market groups, or, more accurately, of
a transformation of their traditions, The increased purchasing power
created both by the population rise and the Dutch enterprises led to
a rapid increase in the permanent population of both groups. More
singkhs began to come into the Chinese community, leading to a more
energetic development there, while the santri traeers began to return
less and less often to their home bases in the north, settling down
as Modjokuto residents, though in neighborhoods which still were
segregated as to place of origin, Although some of the batik traders
also eventually settled permanently in Modjokuto, and some of the village-
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Meijer, M. J,, "The Chinese in Indonesia," unpublished manu-
script at The Center for International Studies, MI.T. The difference
between peranakan and singkkh, it should be clear, is not simply the
difference between -Javanese-born and Chinese-born Chinese in the nar-
rowest sense. Real peranakans almost always have lines going back
within Java several generations, often much further, while a man may have
been born in Indonesia and still be accounted a singkh if his father was
an immigrant: "Naturally all peraiakans were originally singkhs. but
formerly communications between China and Indonesia were not so well
developed, hence their alienation from their home country. The
modern immigrant consequently is a different man and remains more
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type peddlers (especially those living around the developing town),
whose position had in great part been undermined by the increasing
volume of imported trade goods, managed to make the transition and
become local appendages of the inter-regional network the larger
traders were building up, the santri group nevertheless maintained
clear commercial leadership through the whole of the boom period.
In such a manner, a Javanese market, with a primary tie to Java's
north coast region and secondary ties to the principalities and
throughout the local area was formed, became increasingly consoli-
dated and, until the depression, was remarkably successful in defendc
ing a significant share of the trade sector against Chinese encroach-
mento
The a groups, as I have said, remained, even after they
became permanently based in Modjokuto, spatially (ioe.,by neighborhood)
and socially segregated as to region of origin, each group tending to
specialize in certain kinds of trade0 The Kudus and Bawean groups
were the most active, selling mostly cigarettes and textiles, while
the traders from Gresik and Madura played secondary- roles as peddlers
of spices and certain kinds of prepared foods used as "side ditihes"
in the Javanese diet (shrimp chi.e, soya cke, otco.), as well as sall
hardware of various sorts0 The Bavean group was focused in a very
large store, set up during the first world war in the western end of
the Kauman (the almost purely santri neighborhood surrounding the
Chinese than his predecessor by a few decades, and the same is true
for his childrenj the process of alienation from China and of assimila-
tion to Indonesia is blower and less intensive than beforec" Q
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mosque) by two brothers; while the Kudus group, which also boasted
several fairly large stores, was centered in a very tightly organised
trade association, also founded in the war period0
The Bawean store had a clerical staff of four-like the great
majority of traders, the two brothers were illiterate except for an
ability to chant the Koran firm Arabic characters-as well as over
thirty santri traders tied to it on a semi-permanent basis0 The
brothers bought their cloth directly from the Surabaja Chinese,
paying their bills there, it is said, but twice a yearo The cloth
was then wholesaled on credit to the sub-contracting traders who
carried it, usually by means of ox-carts and oxen provided by the
brothers, to various markets lying within a thirty mile radius of
Modjokuto. The clerical staff collected the store a share of the
proceeds from the traders, being caretul not to allow any single trader
to fall too far into debto Tlhe two brothers were thus the ranking
merchants in the Bawean groups, and to an extent, in the urban santri
community generally0  In 1929, at the height of their success, they
sought to symbolize both their business leadership ;nd their Moslem
piety (both hod elready made the pilgrimage to Mecca) by financing
the replacement of the towns old, rawmhackled bambeo mosque by a
spacious new concrete and tile building; which building still stands
in Modjokuto as a, by now somewhat ironic, monument to their mercantile
achievements0
The Kudus group operated in a similar manner, but on a slightly
smaller scale. Though there were several Kudus stores of the Baweari
sort, one of which was highly developed enough to employ a Chinese
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bookkeeper, the usual method followed by Kudus traders was for any-
where from three to a half dozen of them to rent a cart or two
together each day to carry their produce to market, The trade
organization, which included a select forty of the hundred or so Kudus
traders (non-Kudus people could not belong), provided strong commercial
leadership for the whole sub-community, and its head, also a pilgrim,
was the sub-communityls most important leader politically and
religiously as well as economicoaUyo Rather than selling only bulk
cloth as the Bawean people, Kudus people tended to prefer to put out
cloth to semi-independent tailors-also from Kudus-who produced ready.
made pants, shirts, underwear and so forth, which the larger traders
then hawked in the various markets0 Cigarettes were either imported
from Kudus or, as time went on, contracted for locally on a putting out
basis as well0 The Madurese and Gresik communities followed a pattern
similar to that of the Bawean and Kudus groups, but, in their case,
the scale was much reduced, Between all the various groups there was
a good deal of acrimonious competition, commercial jealousy and mutual
disrespect based on regional pride, at the same time as there was an
over-arching religious unity which set them all off from the r est of
the Modjokuto community.
Thus there developed in the prosperity period a fairly highly
organized, yet simply patterned, regional distributive network center-
91They bought their goods, sometimes cooperatively, sometimes
through another middleman trader, in Surabaja, the regecy capital, or
from local Chinese. The expansion of the transport network, particu-
larly the railroad, of couraN played a central enabling role in this
whole commercial florescence.
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ing on the town of Modjokuto. The goods# paid for ultimately with
sugar, came into the area through a relatively small number of outlets,
both Javanese and Chinese,* From there they were distributed to the
different small town markets in the area (including, of course, that
of Modjokuto itself), by means of the medium-siued traders moving
around the various circuits0 Though the medium-sized traders commonly
had a few satellite traders of their own in each market, most of them
local people, the number of these was limited and consequently the
number of sellers in each market was, relatively speaking, small0  Nor
was there very much travelling to the villages themselves to sell-the
peasants, usually somewhat awed by the traders and so fairly easily
deceived, had to come into town on market day to buy their textiles
and small luxuries. This was a set, then, of fully pr6fessionalized
traders (the whole pattern was, of course, copletIy monaetied),
operat;Lng on a scale sufficient to allow them to accumulate capital,
which, giveri, their highly developed "thisa-worldly asceticism," they
rather rapidly did*
Further, capital came into this group from another direction:
the larger rural landlords, many of them themselves santris, only of
the rural variety Bawean, Kudus, Gresik and Madurese immigrants, a
great number of whom had come into the town without wives, began to
marry daughters of local santri peasants; the same peasants, anxious
to keep their holdings intact in face of the equal inheritance custom,
sent some of their excess sons into trade,' either setting them up
independently or offering them as satellites to established traders;
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and, as some of them began to buy goods in the market for resale to
their less self-confident, and less wealthy, villagers, they became
part-time traders themselves* Thus, the two wings of the santri
community, the rural and urban, began to draw closer together, and,
in part, the second began to be financed by the first* In part, too,
it was financed by the Chinese, but increasingly by the more aggressive
4singkhs rather than the more conservative peranakans, and increasingly
by Chinese in larger towns than Modjokuto, the local Chinese population
being, to a decree short-oircuitedo
The first phases of this "middle class" expansion were predominantly
commercial, rather than industrial; or, insofar as they were industrial,
the industry of the trader-centered, putting-out cottage industry pattern
in which village handicraft skills were brought, often under rather
extreme conditions of worker exploitation, into the inter-regional
marketo Further, within the comercial sector, the expansion was con-
cerned with those less risky commodities-atextiles, cigarettes and
leather--which, relatively speaking, show a continuous input curve so
far as capital investment is concerned, rather than those--hardware,
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For a discussion of the relations between handicraft, cottage
industry and small factory manufacture in Indonesia, see Sitsen, op. cit.,
and the same authorqs "De Kleine Nijverheid in Inheemsche Sfeer en Hare
Lcpansie-mogelijkheden op Java," JAWA, Jaargang XVII, 1937, pp. 137-200.
Sitsen indicated the better position of the worker in the small, usually
town-located, factories, at least from an economic point of view, by
stating that wages in the latter were about three times those in the
former ("Kleine Nijverheid.."), per year, in 1934. Boeke (op. cito,
po 186) reports that before the war 70 per cent of the final price in
the village weaving industry, and 50 per cent of that in the village
furniture industry remained in the hands of the wholesale collectors.
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furniture, processed foods and, increasingly at this time, dry season
cash crops--in which the curve is somewhat discontinuous or "lumpy."
One can increase (or decrease) one's inventory, and one's sales volume,
of cloth or handmade cigarettes almost piece by piece; which means both
that market changes are relatively easier to adjust to and that the
difference between a small textile seller and a large one is merely one
of degree0 This is not true for such an item as hardwareo The differ-
ence between small sellers and large ones in this sort of trade is one
of kind: one is either a fairly large scale operator with a very
diverse inventory to start with or a small tin-pot and lantern peddler
forevero It is both harder to adjust to market changes and extremely
difficult to go step by step from the small scale peddler roles to the
large scale nretailer" roles, because there is more of a quantum "jump"
involved0  This is at least one reason why the Gresik and Madurese food
and hardware peddlers stayed so much smaller than the Bawean and KXudus
textile and cigarette sellers (a few of the Gresik fish dealers did,
in fact grow fairly large) despite their equal energy and commercial
skillso Th3 traditional santri mode of businessa-as well as thoir
resources-was much more adapted to the latter than to the former -
Nevertheless, toward the end of the prosperity period--after
about 1925-there was a beginning of a turn toward santri investment
both in small factory industry centered in the town and the more
"difficult" retail sectors. The Kudus people began to organize their
semi-independent tailors into small garment industries: instead of
working in their homes, on their own machines (if they had machines;
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more often they worked by hand), and by their own individual methods,
they worked in the entrepreneur's home, on his machines and followed
patterns he laid out for them. A similar shift occurred in cigarette
manufacture, where the putting out system began to give way to the
manufacturer pattern and "imports" from the Kudus area decreased0
Small food processing industries, small sugar mdlls, small furniture
shops and lumber mills, small charcoal and cloth dye manufacturers
increased in number-even a small cooperative textile mill appeared.
One or two hardware "general stores," rivalling those of the Chinese,
sprung up, and Javanese trading in the increasingly important dry
crops was expanding in scale. At this period, though the Chinese were
still quite clearly the stronger group, the santris were beginning to
give them a run for their money, and it seomed as though they were
beginning to make the transition from their traditionalised cloth and
cigarettes petty-trade and cottage-industry econoagr toward a more
diversified and capitalised commercial and small-scale industrial
econonwo As the rise of the sugar plantations gave birth to an embryonic,
if ultimately stillborn, rural gentry (or yeomanry), and to a new urban
intelligentia political elite, so too it stimulated the appearance of a
more entrepreneurial middle class-still weak, but showing important
signs of vigor.
As in the prijaji, it was at this point that nationalism begin
to grow strong among the santris, and again 'the movement tended to split
along the lines of the literatiintelligeniia distinction. The literati
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element, commonly called the "conservative" or "old-fashioned" wing,
was led by a coalition of the rural koranic teachers and larger Moslem
landholders mentioned earlier, and the more traditionalized traders
in cloth, cigarettes, etco; while the intelligentsia element, called by
the Javanese the "modern" wing, was led by a coalition of the leaders
of the santri bureaucracy-the mosque official famiies9 -some (but not
all) of the "new entrepreneurs" just described and, in the earlier stages,
certain elements among the highly urbanized Arabs. The latter group
w as heavily influenced by the ideas of the reformist scholars in the
intellectual centers of the Moslem world-Cairo and Mecca-and tended
to be almost entirely urban, while the former group had a very large
rural followingo
The main organizations involved were Sarekat Islam, Muhammadijah
and Nahdatul Ulamac Sarekat Islam, a political party, was set up in
Modjokuto in 1914, after having been founded nationally two years
earlier in Jogjakarta, partly as a response to Chinese competition, partly
as a response to the growing dissatisfaction with Dutch ruleo In its
earliest phases, though it was dominantly satri, Sarekat Islam included
people from other groups, because it was the only mass nationalist
organization then operating. But folloing a narrowly unsuccessful
attempt by the Communists to capture control of the orgniton
in 1921, almost all of the non-santris left and the party
94
The staff of the mosques, Moslem courts, and marriage and divorce
offices tended to occupy a somewhat marginal position between the civil
bureaucracy and the santri trading community, for they were Government
officials dealing wihlargely I7lamic concerns0  They tended to be
intermarried throughout the whole regency, and formed a kind
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was much weakened and reduced in size. When Dutch pressure on non-
cooperative groups such as Sarekat Islam increased, Muhammadijah, a
charitable organization rather than a political party, grew stronger0
But its vigorous Islamic reform doctrines, stressing hard work, educa-
tion and piorality, and opposing ritualism, syncretism and scholasticism,
stimulated great antagonism among the more conservative rural koranic
teachers and the old fashioned traders, mary of whom banded together
into Nahdatul Ulama, an anti--modernist, non-political organization with
a very large membership, especially in the countryside (Muhammadijah
remained small and wholly urban)0  Thus by about 1930 three santri
nationalist organizations had appeared on the scene: a non-coopera-
tive political party; an enthusiastically modernist social or.Anization;
and a less dynamic, but larger, conservative groupo
These three groups engaged in various kinds of charitable
activities, agitated for a certain amount of political and economic
reform, and, perhaps most important of all, a et up Western-type schools
in an attempt to readjust Islam to the modern worldo Traditionally, most
santris (the mosque-family group being the major exception) avoided the
Dutch and court-culture influenced "native schools" set up by the Govern-
ment like the plague.only children of civil servants (including higher
of santri aristocracy, though they were not always accepted as such by
by the other santri groups0  With their half-civil-servant, half-trader
outlook, their greater education, and their self-conscious Islamic piety,
they played an especially important role in the development of Indonesian
nationalism among the santrise
11
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mosque officials) and, in those days, Chinese, attended them-prefer-
ring to send their children to the rural Moslem semi-monastic schools
spotted around the countryside, where they learned to chant Arabic
but not to comprehend ito The introduction of Western-type schools
(originally by the "modernists") with classes in science, history,
business arithmetic, etc., was thus both a clear symptom and a crucial
support of the increasing importance of the santri intelligentsia, Once
again the expanding Dutch plantations were capitalising, if entirely
involuntarily, the rise of Indonesian nationalism.9
All during the period of high sugar prices, then, the. process
of development and consolidation of the market sector continued, so that
by the end of the period, around 1930, the previously "hollow" town had
taken on a fairly defined form, as sketchily and somewhat over-simply
outlined in the following diagrama
Except in the larger cities, Chinese in the earlier part of the
century attended Javanese or Dutch schools. With the increasing importance
of the less Javanised singkbhs, the increasing influence of Chinese
nationalism after the Kuomintang revolution in 1911, and the increasing
solidarity of the Indonesian community vis non-Indonesians, all
stimulated the growth of a Chinese school movement 0  Todoy all Modjokuto
Chinese attend privately-run Chinese schools0
96 For a detailed history of the development of scntri nationalism
and Islamic reform in Modjokuto, see Geerts, Ca, "Religionin Modjokuto, t
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.Comparing this diagram with diagram four showing the town around
1910, it will be seen that the market has been moved about an eighth
of a mile southward, tending to pull the town with it somewhat in
that direction. Around it are grouped most of the predominantly
trader neighborhoods, including the Chinese, the one exception being
the Bawean settlement which is located in the western end of the
Kauman, where most of'the Arabs also lived (although a few also had
their homes up in the Gresik-Madura area). In the eastern end of the
Kauman resided the mosque administrator, his family, and several
dependents. The original urban settlement and what I have called the
"secondary""'though oinly in time-urban neighborhood were main centers
of settlement from the emerging proletariat, including the smaller local
traders, of whom more later* The Government offices were expanding,
the area so designated actually also including the railroad headquarters
and the homes of some of the mcre important Dutch railroad managers
as well as of the controleur, as earlier0 The other. centers of Dutch
and prijaji population are shown on the peripheries: the town's
fanciest neighborhood of retired Dutch officials and higher civil servants-
also often retired-on the west, which has been meltioned several times
before; and the group of Dutch nurses and Javanese clerks, pharmacists,
midwives, etc*-many of them Christians-surrounding the HVA hospital
(some lower-class employees of the hospital-gardeners, launderers, etco-
also lived in this area)., All these areas were in no way bounded quarters
and, except for the Kauman, were not so pure in composition as the
diagram might lead one to think, But they were distinct, the Javanese
had names for most of them (which they sometimes still apply), and they
were much more definite in their outlines than they are today when the
bases of urban organization have somewhat shifted.
The growth of santri business life was, as might be expected,
badly, almost mortally, damaged by the depression (though, as among the
prijaji. political activity was, if arything, intensified). Although
the Bawean store carried on until the war (it has now disappeared
altogether, as has the Kudus trade organization) and many of the other
Javanese enterprises managed tp hang on as well, the back of the whole
Javanese mercantile development was broken in the crash. The Chinese
now took over for fair-not only the more capitalized trades such as
hardware and passenger transport, but even such traditional santri
commercial strongholds as cigarettes and textiles fell in large part
into Chinese hands. But the Chinese hands involved were not, for the
most part, those of the traditional eranakang, .but of the aggressive
singkbha who had been steadily increasing in number and strength through-
out the whole prosperity period and who now took the commanding position
within the commercial community they still maintain, squeezing out the
traditional element among both the Ohinese and the Javanese. As the
singkbhs took over the buying of dry season crops in the rural sector,
so they also took over the greater part a the retail, wholesale and
small factory sector of urban life; where there had previously been
several groups, of whom the Chinese were admittedly clearly the strongest,
competing for income shares within the market sector, now the sighs
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began to loom over all the others.
Another depression-induced occurrence undermined the santri
commercial position Those of the plantation workers, Dutch servants
and others released from European employment who did not wish, or were
not able, to return to the villages, moved into the market economy as
marginal, semi-professional traders, squeezing the bigger traders and
cutting in on their profit margins. Petty traders travelling to the
villages increased in number, the larger stores weakened and disappeared
(a few of the bigger traders moved back in despair to Kudus or Bawean),
and the social and cultural (and residential) distinctions between the
trading group and the rest of the population blurred. The Modjokuto
market, as most other markets in the area, became a daily affair with
hundreds of small sellers passing goods from hand to hand, each taking
a small share of the returns to the distribution function. Three
Japanese stores, selling cheap Japan-made "five-and-dime" type goods
appeared, and the selling of such goods by the Javanese, on a very
small scale, increased. It was about this time, too, that the Colonial
Government built the new, imuch larger mai'ket at the north Qnd of tnown.
Not only mprket A l but n cople- of erl
Of course, the sinkehs, were affected by the depression too, but
with more resources and more resourcefulness, they could ride it out
better. As "foreign" rather than "native" orientals, they had certain
legal advantages in addition: old Modjokuto traders still speak with
extreme bitterness of the fact that the Chinese stores could declare
bankruptcy where the Javanese could not. As a result, in the generally
declining economy the Chinese in general, and the singkehs in particular,
improved their relative position, even though their absolute position
was, as that of everyone else, worsening.
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surrounding the market were built as a kind of "WPA project" to provide
employment and to support the Javanese market as a refuge for the
destitute (the Chinese occupied most of the shops however)0 Similarly,
a return to a certain amount of cottage industry, and even handicraft,
appeared, and the small factories tended to shatter once more into the
putting out pattern, often, now, with the Chinese as engrosser (total
production of such items as hand-rolled cigarettes and, in other parts
of Java, textiles and pottery actually tended to increase due to the
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decline in imports)0  Thus, the whole pattern altered markedly, and
in place of a relatively simple distributive network there now appeared
an extraordinarily complex one. The market, like the village, was
forced to complicate and distend its structure to absorb some of t he
excess labor force released by the plantations; the slack left by the
decline of the "capitalist" side of the dual econon was taken up by
an involution of the 'pre-capitalist" sideo
9 8 The Dutch Government increased its activities in the stimulation
of small industry during this period, but evidently more as a "dualistic"
relief measure than a developmental one. Though they evidently had a
certain amount of success in certain parts of Java, their program does
not seem to have been of much importance in the Modjokuto area, perhaps
due to the severity of the depression in the sugar areas0 Sitsen ("Kleine
Nijverheid 0.t", op. cita) reports in a rather approximate survey that the
re c in which Modjokuto exists had about 13% of its population spend-
least part of its time in small factories, cottage industries, -
or handicrafts against an average for the whole island of about 245%. For
a rather positively biased description of the Dutch efforts in small
industries, see Sitsen, Industrial Development, op. cit.
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This general trend continued into the Javanese period. Selling
within the market itself was much restricted, for the Japanese would
confiscate almost arything of value sold openly. Thus, what little
textile existed, what little rice slipped on to the free market, what
little leather was available, tended to get traded surreptitiously by
individual tracers--i.e., any townsman who could get his hands on some
goods by means of which he could pry food out of the peasants.-travelling
to the villages. In fact, the role of women in the market increased-
though, as noted, they had always been of importance--because the
Japanese were less likely to disturb them than men were, and because
in the straightened economic conditions women had to contribute more
than housekeeping to the family fortunes. Also, as the peasant was
comparatively in the strong position, so far as the Javanese commnity
was concerned, his skill in trading increased markedly, cutting middlemen
margins to the bone.
99
The Dutch Government left Modjokuto on- a Saturday evening. The
Japanese arrived the following Sunday morning, but merely marched through
on their way to the regency capital, hailed by the population which at
that time regarded them as liberators. On Sunday afternoon, during the
interregnum, a great ransacking of the Chinese stores took place, in
which both townsmen and villagers participated. Though there were rumors
that a Chinese-Javanese race riot was about to start, it never material-
ised and the violence was limited to a rather thorough looting. For a
few hours there was widespread social disorganisaticn, but the Japanese
soon returned and stabilised the situation, even managing to get the
Javanese to return at least part of the stolen merchandise.
U
118
The Japanese restriction of larger scale trading activities aided,
somewhat paradoxically, the same development. The Chinese being almost
entirely forbidden to travel, a Javanese who could wheedle a travel
permit and a requisition to transport a certain amount of trade goods
was, relatively speaking, in an excellent position As such people
were commonly not traders by occupation, but civil servants, policemen,
Japanese agents of one sort or another, or such specially placed people
as railroad workers, the market apparatus became even less profession-
ally staffed. Thus, though the Japanese reduced trade to a minimum,
they still, obviously enough, increased the spread of the "trading
spirit," of the concept of making a profit through commerce, through
the whole urban society. All townsmen, their standard of living much
depressed, seem to have spent most of their time thinking of how they
might get hold of a few bolts of cloth or a trade permit, by means of
which they could improve their lot.
The inflation at the end of the Japanese period and the beginning
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of the Republican period had the same effect, only more so. 0  Trade
101
became freer and goods somewhat more plentiful, but prices skyrocketed8
100During the Dutch occupation of the town, Modjokuto's market
disappeared almost completely, and a market was set up to replaos 1t in
the northernmost villageacluster of the subwdistrict (number nirm in
diagram two). Most of the santri political leaders were, like the
riaLi political leaders, Iing in the villages during this time, direct-
ig heRepublican struggle.
101 Theprice of rice in the chief market-centers of Republican-
controlled Java averaged 1.66 rupiah per kilogram in August, 1947; 17.50
in August, 1948. Kahin, op. cit., p. 252.
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Living on a fixed wage as a worker or a civil servant became, conse-
quently, almost impossible; and for a brief period it seemed as if the
whole urban society had become one large, high velocity market, every-
one from Regent to coolie trying to earn a living out of speculative
trade* Government controls and monetary policies moderated the infla-
tion somewhat after a while, and most of the non-traders returned to
their normal occupations. But the changes the depression, the occupa-
tion and the revolutionary period had induced were not completely
reversedo Compared to the twenties ~ad' early thirties there are now
many more Javanese traders in the market (and many more of them are women);
very few of these traders operate on even a moderately large scale (and
none on a really large one); a lot more selling goes on outside the
market proper, and the traveling nrarket circuit pattern has nearly
disappeared; the traders are not io predominantly at and almost
all of them are local residents; and the village people are much cleverer
buyers on the average so that, competition having increased, profit margins
for traders are much smaller.
3. The Kmon Sector: The Develoment of a Landless Working Class
The growth of a genuine proletariat in Modjokuto has been a
process of transforming village dwellers into kampong dwellers, kampongs
being the offtothea:street neibhborhoods described earlier, This trans-
formation has had three major aspects0  In the first place there has
been the emergence of a new occupational structure which allowed and
encouraged people to move off the land and into non-agricultural work0
Second, there has been the atomisation of the traditional forms of village
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social life within the kampongs as the agricultural basis of community
integration disappeared, and, coincident with this atomization, the
emergence of new forms of social organization to combat it Third,
there has been a dissolution of village political struc ture and a re-
orientation toward urban political leadership which is as yet incomplete0
In brief, it has been a period of re-adaptation, not simply of disinte-
gration-as urbanization is so often described. That the transition
to urbanism seems, for the moment, to be stuck halfway, with resulting
social disorganization is, as we shall see, not because there has been
too much urbanization, but too little; because the collapse of the sugar
and plantation industry arrested 'in midpassage, or at least markedly
slowed, the building of a truly urbanized society*
As I have indicated earlier, at least two major cultural traditions
are discernible among the peasants living on the land around Modjokuto:
one which tends to emphasize the more Islamic elements in the native
Javanese religious syncresis of animism, Hinduism and Islam; the seoond
of which tends to have a more balanced emphasis on all three elements,
and in fact to somewhat play down the Islamic element. Essentially, the
two traditions are very similar to .one another: both rest on the
territorial organization of nuclear families in terms of customary land
and labor relationships I described earlier; both are connected with
the same sort of political, class and kinship organization; both, as a
matter of fact, tend to have more animism in their religious beliefs
than either Hinduism or Islam and in both the ritual feast of neighbors
plays a central role. Yet they do represent variant traditions, are thought
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of as such, and are given nams by the peasants themselves: santri
and abangan.
Santri is, again, the Islamic variant, but there are great
differences, even today when they have drawn somewhat closer together,
between rural and urban santris; and many of the former are, in world
outlook and general temper, more like their abangan opposite numbers
than like urban santeis These are two rural traditions: the Islamic
one mainly derivative from the north Java rice growing areas where
Islam has always been stronger atzee its original spread through the
archipelago as part of a great trade expansion in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries; the latter, abangani, one being mainly derivative
from the Central Javanese "principality" rice growing areas, where
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Hinduism was stronger, Islam weaker. The fact that Modjokuto received
migrants from both these areas led to the rural population having a large
number of both santris and abangans, though even today there is a strong
tendency for them to be segregated from one another as to village, or
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at least as to neighborhood 0  In any case, it was from these two
variant rural traditions that the urbanization of a small part of the
Modjokuto peasantry departed, and the distinctions between the two kinds
of men, the santri and the abangan, has persisted, though in a somewhat
different form, in the town contexto
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For a description of the growth of the santri and abangan
traditions in Java, see Geerts, C., "The Development..", op0 cito
103For a discussion of the central importance and emotional intensity
of the abangan-santri split in Modjokuto villages today, see Jay, R.,
"Local Govemment..", op. cit.
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In the early, pre-expansion period, then, the peasants living on
the land in the immediate area of the town may be presumed to hive
been following one or the other (or both) of these two variant traditions.
The earliest development of the urban bureaucracy and of the market of
itinerant traders growing up around them most likely left them fairly
undisturbed, though we have seen that by 1910 a genuine kampong form
of settlement had appeared. However that may be, the prosperity period
brought with it important changes, perhaps the most notable of which
was the production of new occupations which neither the larger traders
nor the bureaucrats would be likely to wish to fill. Actually not all
of the occupations were really new0 Some--like carpenter, bricklayer
or blacksmith-were old crafts, well lodged as part-time specialities
in the village tradition; but their transformation into full urban
occupations was new. Others.-such as chauffeur, bicycle repairman or
railroad machinist-were simple additions. With the appearance and
growth of such non-agrarian occupationsi, the proletarianisation of the
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local peasantry began.
These new and remodeled occupations ranged from the more or less
completely unskilled to the relatively highly skilled. At the un-
skilled end of the continuum were servants to the Dutch (cooks, gardeners,
launderers, etc.), plantation workers (though, as we have seen, rather
10hActually, the Modjokuto proletariat was partly, perhaps even
predominantly, formed not by proletarianisation of local peasants, but
by migration of partially urbanised "lower class" people from older towns
to the immediate south and west* This is in part a result of Modjokuto's
late development, in part a result of the fact I mentioned earlier, that
small town and countryside tend to grow in population at about the same rate0
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few of these actually lived in the town),V and coolies for the Chinese,
the railroad -or the more technical Government offices (such as public
works,' irrigation, etc.)., Under semi-kIlled could be included
chauffeurs, coffee-shop and restaurant -operators, entertainers, railroad
conductors, track workers and ticket sellers, and the few, but increaa-
ing number, of small, fully professionalised, local traders. As for
the skilled workers tailors, carpenters, bricklayers, barbers, butchers,
blacksmiths and railroad machinists could be mentioned, and, somewhat
later, bicycle: repairmen nd watchmakers.. All these people formed an
emerging class of working men,, increasingly free of any direct tie to
agriculture and increasingly coming to see themselves no longer as
villagers but as townsmen.
The railroad workers, who were the most proletarianised, formed
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something of the elits of this g.#oup Salaried, more or less
permanently employed, commonly technically skilled, they had come, as
working men, further into the capitalist side of the Odual" economic
system than had most of the other groups.. At the upper edges, they
merged into the bottom of the group of sugar accountants, draughtamen
and technicians I discussed in connection with the development of the
intelligentsia, but in general the mass of them tended to fall on the
"blue collar" rather than the "white collar" side of the line. As a
result, it was among the railroad workers that both trade unionism and
Communism arose (together) as important social movements. The un-
1 0 5The total number of people employed around 1925 on the railroad
was about 500, according to the estimate of the present chief of the
repair section.
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skilled workers' interest in trade unionism was dampened by their
tendency to remain half-peasant, that of the artisans by their individual-
ism and their lack of permanent salaried status; but among the rail
workers, it flourished0 Or it did up until 1926, when a general strike
on the central trunk railroad (which failed but narrowly to spread to the
Modjokuto line), instigated by the Communists as a prelude to a nation-
wide armed insurrection which never quite came off, led to a sharp
crackdown by the Dutch on union activities. The local Communist rail
union leader, a machinist, was arrested and exiled to a concentration
camp in New Guinea, and the back of the local trade union movement was
broken. Unlike the civil servant and trader cases, no moderate group
arose to replace the suppressed radical one (the Indonesian trade union
movement is still heavily Communist-dominated), with the result that the
still small working class f aced the depression without much in the way
of leadership or organization.
Parallel with the growth in the number of workers, artisans ard
small traders fully disengaged from the agricultural sector, came a change
in the form of social relationships among families living in the kampongso
On the one hand, with the need f or flexible mobilization of land and labor
in connection with wet rice farming removed# the basis for the village
pattern of famnilistic interdependence was removed also. The ritual feast,
or slametan, now became not so much a symbol of obligations to engage in
land or labor exchanges, but of a more general, less specific "neighbor-
linesse" The secular elements which tend to be associated with it-gambling
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in particular-became rather mcre important than the religious elements,
and the atmosphere became more onc of a party than a ceremornyo
On the other hand, as the sense of economic unity within the
k lessened due to the fact that each man made his own living in
his own way more or less indeperxlantly from how his neighbors made theirs,
ideological facters, stimulated by the rise of nationalism, began to
play a more important role in social organisation than territorial oneso
Especially the distinction between santri and abangan came to play a
central role. No longer was it merely a matter. of more or less tolerable
emphases within a generally similar religious system, within which the two
variants tended, in any case, to be spatially separated from one another:
now it was a matter of deep-going differences in political, social and
ethical orientation*
The "working class* santris followed the leadership of the santri
traders, the abangans either that of the intelligentsia or of the labor
union leaders, and an ideological gulf grew up between the two. Where
in the village system a set of neighbors formed a solidary group as over
and against another set of neighbors, a village over and against another
village, there was in the town a shift in the basis of social integration
from geographical to ideological0  Now, the solid ary unit was not a set of
contiguous families, but a set of people with similar religio-political
viewpoints0  Thus, a territorially oriented ritual such as the neighbor-
hood feast tended more and more to act in a disintegrative rather than
an integrative fashion, to exacerbate rather than moderate interpersonal
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and inter-group conflicts, because it forced together people who were
territorially contiguous but ideologically heterogeneous, and so lent
a symbolic heightening to conflict0  Slametans now came to be often
marked by anxious discussions about different interpretations and the
legitimacy of the various Islamic and non-Islamic symbols, by a tendency
to invite farther neighbors of the same politico-religious position at
the expense of nearer ones of different position, and even by conflicts
over the importance, value and correct manner of performance of the
ritual itself* The terms abaganMand santri had now come to stand for
two alternative adaptations to urban society, and rituals originally
designed to integrate rural society now were hastening its fdiao
As the general rural social structure disintegrated in the kampongs,
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so did the village political structure in the town0  Originally,
Modjokuto as a village (or, rather, a village-cluster) had a form of
government similar to that of nearly every other village-cluster in Java.
Headed by a village-cluster chief, who was assisted by a clerk and various
other petty functionaries '(offices were for life, and had a tendency to
be semi-hereditary thouh nor ally elective), it was tightly tied in,
through the bengkok officials'fields described earlier, with the land-
labor based organization of rural life* As population rose and urban
society differentiated, pulling, ultimately, even the local "village"
population into it, the village governmental structure became progressively
106
For a thorough description of the decline and present state of
village organisation in Modjokuto, see Fagg, D.,, "The Sociography of
Modjokuto," (forthcoming report)0
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outmoded and unable to cope with the emerging problems of political
order, until today it is but a shell of its former self:
The /village-clusterF administration of the town of Modjokuto
was obviously degenerate--inadequate first without expansion
and a revised remuneration system in ary case to handle the
problem of sheer magnitudes, number of people, but also in a
more fund amental qualitative sense inadequate not only to
fulfill the "normal" functions of the traditional Village-
clusterj, but to cope with the much more evolved and complex
phenomena of the town-village. In a sense, of course, and a
very real existential sensej the form had been adapted to
changed and changing- conditions, but the adaptation was in a
regressive direction, avoig :pr au x and demands of greater
competence, shrinking in services, and withdrawing from
participation in or control over the scope of the whole
pluralistic community, of which it was theoretically at least
the territorial custodian and the most immediate ring of
protection 107
This degeneracy is the outcome of the general urbanisation process
I have been tracing. In the first traditionalistic stages of the townis
growth (i.e 0 , before about 1915), when the three major groups-villagers,
itinerant traders and civil servants--were still fairly segregated from
one another, there were also three different forms of political organiza-
tion extant, side by side, with only vague and sporadic relations among
them0 The prijaji looked, naturally, to the District Officer for local
leadership, in broadly cultural as well as narrowly political terms, and
beyond him to the Regent for regional leadership. For the prijaji, the
political order was hierarchical: it consisted of a set of ranked
bureaucrats; and to this political order the peasants and traders were
largely residual. Village government was something to be dealt with
paternalistically and at arms length through periodic formalised meetings
with its leaders; while the market sector -needed only very general govern:-
107
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ing at best, for it was largely self-regulated. For their part, the
Javanese itinerant traders (and the Chinese sedentary ones) provided
their own leadership and attempted to avoid intimate dealings with the
Central Government as much as possible. The urban santris tended to be
apolitical in that their own internal "ethnic," commercial and religious
organisation also acted as their (rather weak) political organisation,
so that, for example, the most prosperous Kudus or Bawean merchants
would treat with the bureaucracy on behalf of the Kudus and Bawean
sub-community in the few unavoidable situations where that proved
necessary, Politia4 leadership was thus rathr a sceondary outcome,
".wost an afterthought, of commercial and religious leadership, rather
than a primary factor in itself. In short, the local political community
was fragmented: the peasants followed, 'as peasants in the more rural
villages, their local village government; the prijajis looked toward the
upper levels of their self-contained sat us hierarchy for leadership;
and the urban sartris (and Chinese) looked to their richer and more
important members to take over whatever political functions needed to
be fulfilled, as rather secondary responsibilities attendant upon their
generally ascendant role in the tanb-community6
After the sugar boom got underway, the *hollow" town began to
fill up and this loose and ill-defined political arrangement became
steadily inadequate; with the growth of a "vertically" organised local
urban society, the need for a new sort of political structure grew also.
The village structure, the one genuinely locally based political apparatus,
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could not readJust to meet this raw need far several reasons. In the
first place, the bengkok official-lands method of payment was entirely
inadequate to finance the kind ot government a developed town demands0
108
The underpaid village officials were, 'consequently, progressively
forced to depend either on embesslement and various forms of the squeeze
or on acting as agents for unpopular Dutch policios in order to gain a
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livelihood. In the second place; the town boundaries progressively
failed to coincide with the boundaries of the village-cluster within
which it grew up. Thus, the village-clusters contiguous with the town,
those I have referred to as sub-urban, contain among them probably a
quarter of the genuinely urban population. In these villages the
degeneration of village structure has riot gone so far. Rather what
appears is the tendency for the village-cluster to be split between its
rural and urban ends with the actual governmental apparatus tending to
remain in the more rural hands, simply'because the urban element has
relatively little interest in it.
The third reason for the decline of the village political structure
is simply that the changing pattern of social life has made it technically
obsolete. Public works, police functions and the like can no longer be
carried out simply on a communal basis, by rotating the work among the
village members in turn, for such a system rests on the broad identity
of interest which inevitably exists in a community where almost everyone
is a peasant. Not only are the tasks of government more demanding--
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Faggs ibid., estimates that in 1953 the income from official land
provided at besT about 3% of, the c annual income needed by the village
clerk to support his slightlyt larger than averaged amily.
10 9In the midatwenties, for example, the village chief took over the
job of conscripting workers to work on the -Dutch tobacco plantations in
Sumatra0 Though the commission was strictly speaking a private one and
130
the roads must be -better kept, the policing more efficient-but the
number of tasks increase: sewage, vehicle registration and business
licensing have little importance in a rural context. As the old
government functions grown more complex slip out of the village chief' s
hands, and new ones appear outside of his control, the importance of
village political structure declines and a general apathy towards it
appears, even among the kaMong dwellers. Many of Modjokutols "working
class" would be hard put today to tell you even the name of their
village chief -who symbolically eouigh happens to be an invalido
As a result of the failure of the village structure to re.-adapt to
the changing situation, the role of the town government increasingly
came to be filled by the District and 644district Officers and their
staff. The more settled traders, the greater number of non-agricultural
manual workera, and the expanded white collar class all began to look
upon them as a kind of. 0mayor" and "vice-mayor" of the town, bypassing
the authority of the village chief, Though the District and Subdistrict
Officers maintained, and still maintain, their roles as heads of the
entire district and subdistrict, they spent more and more time acting
as symbolic and administrative heads for the town itself. Thus the
decay of the rural political structure is another measure of t he growth
of a true town; for in place of the three different governments of the
the employment theoretically voluntary on the part of the workers, the
deceptions, extra-legal pressures and other excesses involved in the
whole process soon disgraced the village government in the eyes of the
entire community.
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early days, there has grown up a single over-arching government, in
the form of the District and Subdistrict Offices, to which all classes
of the community can look for leadership. The Chinese, of course,
remain on the outside of this emergent unification looking in, still
maintaining the old pattern of a, selficontained sub-community dealing
with the reigning powers through a few chosen intermediaries.
Nevertheless, even today the transition to a fully urban form of
government is only half completed: the District Officer is still split
between his district and town roles, and the obsolete village chief
continues to function in a very inadequate way0 The same sort of
"incompleteness" is observable also in the kaMpongs where the old rural,
values and patterns of social life exist side by side (and often in
conflict) with a more clearly urban set of values and behaviors. With
the collapse of the boom the immediate possibilities for a continuing
growth and differentiation of the occupational structure collapsed, too0
Certain occupations-those connected most directly with the Dutch-
tended to disappear almost altogether; while those which remained were
flooded, in much the same way as the market was, by the suddenly un-
employed seeking some sort of economic base* Soon there were-and this
pattern persists-twice as many carpenters, tailors, bricklayers and
coffee-shop keepers as the town needed, particularly with the fall in
demand. The few craftsmen who had begun to make s one sort of progress
toward a more stable, larger scale pattern of operation were drowned
in a great sea of price-cutting competitors. The railroad workers were
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mostly kept on through the depression (but at much reduced wages), with
a result that they too became markedly underemployed; though they
remained in a relatively better position than the rest of the working
class0  In place of a rising proletariat-often unconscionably exploited,
it is true, but at least beginning to fight back to resist exploitation-
came a group of semi-idle, semi-urban poor sitting around in the kampongs
(or the coffee shops-which doubled, after dark, as houses of assignation)
looking to catch whatever work tiey cotfld get as opportunities sporadically
appeared.
In the Japanese period urban life, as has already been stressed,
further slowed down; but one important political innovation occurred0
The Japanese introduced a form of political organisation by number of
households, in consonance with their own political tradition, to
supplement the strictly territorial organisation of the Javanese village0
As in Japan, some twenty to thirty households were grouped into the
lowest political unit with an elected head (there were about 100 in town)
and these units were further grouped into a number (in this case, five)
of larger groups, whose heads, elected by the heads of the smaller groups,
acted as a general governing boards along with the traditional village
officials So far as the Japanese were concerned, the purpose of this
re-organisation, aside from demonstrating what they took to be the over-
110For he Japanese pattern, see Embree, Jo, Sao Mra: A Japanese
Village, Landon, 1946; especially Chapter II. Fo tipern in
Modjokuto, see Faggo, op. cite
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whelming superiority of Japanese social institutions to Javanese, was
to make their repressive policies more effective, particularly those
concerned with labor drafting But for the lower class urban Javanese
it fulfilled a more permanent function: it stabilized the half-rural,
half-urban pattern of town life. In the rural villages, where the
territorial form of organization was strong, the household-group
innovation had relatively little importance and has by now virtually
disappeared; but in the town where simple territoriality was much
weakened, and yet a fully corporate municipal form of government had not
yet emerged, it played, and to a degree still does play, a more useful
role0
The twenty-household group system added a new piece of governmental
machinery to the urban village structure which aided it in carrying out
its reduced functions in a somewhat more effective manner 0  When the
Japanese hold on this new apparatus was relaxed, it was, in slightly
different form, incorporated into the village government, which, though
still corrupt, inefficient and inflexible was able to arve a little more
adequately that part of the town community which was still not far enough
along toward a completely urban status to be able to deal directly with
the District or Subdistrict Office0 These marginal urbanites (marginal,
too, to the village pattern), whose number was rapidly increased by the
11
depression and the Japanese occupation, looked to this combined
Again, during the Revolution, most of the people fled to the
villages0  The Dutch appointed a pUppet village chief in t he town, but he
seems to have been largely functionless except as an appendage of the
Dutch military government. After the Revolution he was immediately
displacedo
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Javanese-Japanese governmental structure to provide what few political
112
services they needed. The town political administration, like its
social structure generally, was split in two: those people-civil
servants, better-off traders, more fully employed workers-who found a
firm footing in the new urban sy'stem, depended more and more on the
District- Office for local governmental .eadership, which, as yet, was
still not entirely adequate to give it, for it was still organised to
administer the district as a whole; while those who, so to speak, were
half in the urban system and half in the village system, relied on the
weakened town village government. The progress toward municipalisation,
as the progress toward a more differentiated occupational system and a
less territorially structured kampong pattern seemed, at least for the
moment, somewhat arrested. The town was under-urbanised, its workers
under-employed, and its citizens uider-governed. But, with the post-war
period, new attempts are being made to set the process of socia. and
economic growth going again nda a 4-ore favorable political atmosphere
than colonialim. pm edS; and it is the pootowar period to which we
now turn.
4o The Postwar Period
When the Revolution ended and sovereignty over the archipelago was
transferred from the Netherlands East Indies to the Republic of Indonesia
(on December 27, 1949), almost every road-bridge in the Modjokuto area
For example, though the villages now all elect their village
leaders directly by universal suffrage, the town village officials are
elected by the heads of the twentylhousehold groups (who, of course, are
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had been destroyed, almost all the sugar mills and many other important
buildings had been burned to the ground, there was a very serious
inflationary problem, there was a tremendous shortage of trained
personnel of all kinds, there was a great mass of armed and somewhat
overwrought youth to be demobilised and readjusted to a more normal
pattern of existence, there were feelings of bitterness between
Republicans and Federalists (i 0 4e, those loyal to the Dutch regime)
and between Chinese and Javanese as a result of the events of t he war
period, and almost every family in the area had had their life in some
way deeply and directly disturbed by the Japanese period and the
Revolution. That, in face of problems such as these, a stable pattern
of life and orderly processes of economic and political activity had been
re-established within two years and real beginnings made in attacking
the awesome social problems which face the new Indonesia, is certvidnly
the final argument in the debate as to whether the Indonesians are
capable of self-government, and dramatic evidence of what a sense of
being free and self-determined can mean to a people,, what role the
feeling of self-respect and the conviction of the existence of real
possibilities for progress can play in social and cultural change0 Since
themselves elected, though rather haphazardly)o Fagg, opo cit, reports
that of the 87 heads of household groups now active, only four were civil
servants or teachers, nine were peasants, six were Chinese (who served for
the sake of formality only) and four were larger traders; the other sixty-
four being the sort of "marginal" urbanite to whom I am referringz small
coffee-shop owners, petty artisans, small traders, unemployed, etco
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independence, a somewhat different pattern of socio-cultural organisa-
tion has appeared which is, in essence, an outcome of processes of social
and cultural change initiated in the Colonial period which were sharply
accelerated after the political barriers to their expression, barriers
they themselves helped to undermine, were removed0 Among these processes
can be included s 1) the replacement of geographical bases of social
integration by ideological ones; 2) the disol.4uIon of "horizontaln in
local ties into "vertical" intra-local ones; Z.) a nwkedly increased
emphasis on the school as a central social irctitution; 4) a great increase
in the importance of political parties and private sodalities loosely
associated with them as forms of social organization; and, 5) the growth
of an involuted, over-complex social structure. There has been on the
one hand the development of social institutions and cultural orientation
more suitable to balanced growth. At exactly the point at which sustained,
progressive social change, undistorted by Colonial exploitation and
adapted to the Indonesian culture and environment, seems at long last
possible, the danger of economic stagnation has become a real threat to
the success of the Indonesian effort after national renascenceo
The development of a highly generalized ideology as the basis of
social organization is, of course, of the essence of nationalism; in
pathological forms the intensity of belief seems to increase with the
abstractness of expression to the point where maximum emotional commit-
ment is fused with minimum specificity of meaningful content0 But the
excesses of nationalism need not blind one to the role it may play in less
137
destructive forms of social change, for by freeing cultural patterns
from overly concrete, narrowly specified social contexts it may universal-
ise them to the point where they are better able to meet the demands of
a less stable, less predictable, more rapidly changing social sitrationo
Though it cannot be denied that for some Indonesians nationalism seems
to consist of passionate commitments to empty slogans borrowed from
foreign sources, it has for many, certainly for the great majority of
Modjokuto residents, a definite content which derives from their own
cultural traditions, a content which is a re-adaptation and generalisa-
tion of beliefs and values from their own past to fit a more fluid
present. This process of widening out older cultural patterns to include
broader ranges of social experience has been, and will no doubt continue
to be, crucial in the organization and direction of social change in
Modjokuto. The transformation of the santri, ab!an and prijaji
tra~it~io into. %oded unim-s.tic ideologies has provided the
symbolic framework within which social reorganization is taking place0
As I have tried to show, in the ,'q"l*At phasem of Modjokuto's develop
ment, abanan, rural santri, urban santri and prijaji were four at least
somewhat different world-views, value.orientations and styles-of-life-
cultural traditions institutionalized in certain specific and relatively
readily discri inable social groupso There was a close and intimate
connection between socially inherited patterns of belief, expression and
e-alvation on the one hand, and forms of social behavior--occupational,
Political; status--n the othwr 0 Both means and ends were, to a fairly
high degree, fixed by prescriptions from the past, a pattern we commonly
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call traditionalistico I have also tried to show how after 1910 or
1915 this traditionalism began to dissolves goals were more generally
defined, means were more freely chosen in terms of their intrinsic
suitability in gaining the ends sought. The various cultural patterns
(particularly, but not exclusively, in the town) less narrowly concrete
and carefully detailed rules for behavior and more general, vaguely
formulated "way-of-life" guides to social action0
I use "way-of-life,"11 taking my cue from phrases such as "The
American Way of Life," "The Catholic Way of Life," "The Southern Way
of Life)' rather than simply "ideology" or "religion" for these patterns
in order to indicate their comprehensivenesss they are broadly inclusive,
but loosely and abstractly stated notions of the desirable way to behave,
feel and think, including within them religious, political and even
economic ideologieso In post-revolutionary Modjokuto, the se "way-of-
life" patterns are the primary lines of cultural demarcation within the
societya they determine the individual'a major social reference groups
on the next level down after the nation At 2t A man is an Indonesian
(or a Javanese) first, but secondly he is a santri, an abangan or a
prijajio And though santris still show a tendency to be businessmen
or richk peasants, abangans to be peasant s or "blue collar" workers,
and pria"i to be "white collar" employees, and so consequently to vary
somewhat in their outlooks in these terms, the social structural lines
are not nearly so sharp as they once were--mobility within the stratifica-
tion system has progressively blurred the neat correlation between social
position and cultural orientation. Today, the individual Modjokuto
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citizen' a status is determined by a set of factors--occupation, wealth,
family, place of residence, religion, education, taste-which are no
longer so highly inter-correlated; and to tie such discrete social
statuses together into larger "secondary group" units, ideological
wa l!" affilatione have prewed +-e of increasing importanceo
To be more specific, the following diagram shows, in a rather
summary way, how wayof-life affiliations have adapted themselves to
the growth of the locally focused urbanization I have been tracing:
URBaNIZATInN
Fully Urban(elite) Semi-urban Rural
-intelligentsia -abangan village -village
elite abangan
abangan -literati
Y
-prijajized -kemnong abangan
0 abanpans
F
L -traditional -santri village
santri elite -village
santri
s prijajized kamponr santri
F santri
Diagram 5
This diagram shows the basic internal line of cultural cleavage
to be that between santri and abangan, between those who take as their
main pattern of way-of-life arientation, a set of beliefs, values and
expressive symbols based nritarily on Islamic doctrine and law and
those who take the ro re liinduistic (i e ,, Indian) element in Javanese
tradition (along with ore-Islanic, nre-Hindu ani-mistic elements), a
nattern some tines called "Javaneseism" (kedjawen) because of its
emphasis on supnosedly indigenous, pre-Islamic traditions. I have
included the old nrijaji groups - the literati and the intelli-
gentsia-among the elite of the abangan group, but have noted also,
through barbarismis such as "prijajized abangan" and "prijajized santri"l
how their world;view, ethic and style-of-life shows a strong tendency
to snread, albeit somewhat diluted, among the leadership groups generally,
mainly because this pattern is the one traditional to the ruling class
in Java, The elites, of which I have listed five, and which I will
I110
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describe shortly, then bid against one another for supnort among the
rank and file in their own generalized ideological camp, but not out-
side of it: for all intents and nuroses, no kampong or village
santris follow urban abangan leadership, and vice versa, Consequently,
the intelligensia, the prijajized abanas and the literati tend to
bid against one another for abangan followership; the nrijajized
and traditional santris for the santri followership, which are, evi-
dently, more or less equal in size.
But to understand the present pattern of social integration in
vitodjokuto, another emergent phenomienon must be understood: the alirano
ailiran, an Indonesian generally) consists of a oolitical party surrounded
by a set of sodalities formally or informally linked to it. The four
parties are: the Nationalist Party (Parti Nasionalis Indonesia, or
PNI), the Communist Party (Partai Kommunis Indonesia, or PKI), the
"modernist" Moslem Party (Masjumi), and the "conservative" hloslem
Party, sometimes rather loosely translated as the loslem Teachers'
league (Nadahtul Ulama or NU),011 With the parties as a nucleus,
the aliran then is a cluster of nationalist organizations--women's
clubs, youth groups, boy scouts, charitable societies, cooperatives,
lending societies, private schools, athletic clubs, religious
organizations, labor and Deasant unions, art groups, trade organ.
izations etc ,--sharing a simnilar ideological "'direction"- or stand-
point,, ms such, the political party with organizational anoendages
is not the functionally specific sort of social organization the American
political narty tends to be,. but a broadly diffuse structure chich
acts to group large masses of people into a generalised social
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In the general election, held in of 1955, PNI and Easjumi
each gained seats, -NU gained , and PKI i'All other Darties
turned out to be dinor.
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category, "s the shift from a territorial basis of social integration
to an ideological, way-of-life one orogresses, the nolitical oarties-
the aliran--become the major groups both of reference and membe:rshin
for an increasing number of neonle: after a lodjokuto citizen says
he is an Indonesian and a santri, he next is quite likely to say that
he belongs to, or favors, Kasjumi or NU.
Ats should be fairly anparent, two of the four 3arties--PNI and
PKI--are on the abangan side of the way-of-life distinction, two--
Masjumi and NU-on the santri. In fact, the correlation between the
various alirans and the eites is fairly, though not entirely, clear cut,
PNI, the Nationalist narty, tends naturally to be intelligentsia
dominated, the intelligentsia being, it will be remembered, the group
of civil servants, teachers and higher technicians heavily influenced
by Dutch culture, but still maintaining something of the old gentry
nrijaji style-of-life and world--view, The general emnhases in this
group are on a vigorous nationalism and anti-colonialism, the construction
of a new "white-collar" culture based on a fusion of Western techniques
and modes of organization and traditional Javanese values, narticularly
those centering around etiquette, art and Tysticism, and a rather loose
and Javanized interpretation of the requirements of Islam.
The -Tiore conservative literAti tend either to belong to PNI as a.
right-wing element, to splinter narties emphasizing old Javanese court-
culture, or to withdraw from modern politics entirely as uncouth and
under the control of illbred elements, Here the emphasis is, as before
the war, noblesse oblige, the right man in the right place, and a
strong interest in maintaining the cultural traditions of the principalities,
often combined with a rather dim view of the nresent state of society
as compared to the oast. PKI, the Cormunist party, is led by a
coalition of (mostly lower level) intelligentsia, many of them quite
young, and what I have called "prijajized abangans," by which I mean
the more fully employed workers--in the railroad, the hospital, in the
public works department, etc,--who hAve ascended into leadershiD
nositions and consequently tended, to a degree, to adopt the culture
natterns of the elite. The general color of this group is well-known
from elsewhere: intense marxist radicalism and anti4Jesternism plus
an unshakeable affection for the Soviet Union and the New China; a
high degree of secularism and, in this case, vigorous anti-Islamism,
and a single minded devotion to the interests of the party.
On the santri side, the more traditional santris--mainly traders
and businessmen, olus larger neasants and koranic scholars from the
countryside--tend to be in NU, the conservative group, which has
shifted since the war from a charitable organization to a oolitical
party; the mcre modernist, "prijajized" reform santris tend to be in
hasjumi (led, in Lodjokuto, by the leaders of Muharmadijah, which still
exists as a theoretically separate "non-nolitical" organization)--
thorgh there are excentions in both directions. NU is largely, at
least in the "odjokuto area, a party of the conservative k-oslem
"literati" or "clerical" element--the rural scholars, teachers and
pilgrims w ao still -lay an im-ortant role in santri village life -as
a result, they are largely concerned with the maintenance of Islamic
law, at least among their own group, and hooefully throughout the whole
society. Like the nrijai literati, they are not entirely un-ambivalent
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about the odernizing trends in contem vorary Indonesia, ar.d tend to
be suspicious of what they take to be secularist influences. Finally,
Masjumi is led by the old reformist leaders, moslem intellectuals and
the like, who tend to be both mrore urbanized and more adanted to the
new patterns of elite culture than the NU leaders. Again, they are
interested in construction of a "wt ite collar" style of life fusing
Western techniques and Eastern values, though in this case the values
are not Hinduistic, but Islamico "ith their trading and small
business background they tend to olace more emphasis on inde'endence
and le-s on authority than groups which arc more intimately connected
with the bureaucracy, such as the PNI intelligentsia. dith NU they
share a bitter anti-communism.
The manner and extent to which the narties and their linked
sadalites penetrate into various carts of the social structure of
course varies widely: only among the ful.ly urban elites is direct
participation very highly developed. aumong them, however, the intensity
and degree of participation is quite astounding; the number of committee
meetings, conventions, deronstrations, darity drives, celebrations and
other such "modern" activities seems too great as to take up ,:ost of
this group's free time. If there is not a school board meeting, there
is a holiday celebration to be organized; if the women's club is not
holding a charity bazaar, the labor union is meeting to discuss the
latest Government nolicies concernin railroad nensions. The velocity
of activity is extraordinarly high, and as this group is, relatively
speaking, small, the burden on them is rather great.
From diagram five, it will e- see da t the leader-ollower
relationshipis radiating from the uban elites are two pronged, and that
the village elites rlay a central connecting role in the matrix,
Perhaps this is more generally and simply diagramed as follows, for
a given aliran:
urban elite
kampong village elite
mass
village mass
Diagram 6
'The kan group, the half -urbanized grouo I discussed in the
section on proletarianization, form Lhe body of the town chapters of
the various narties and sodalities, but, with a few exceptions, they
do ot occupy leadership positions (to a degree, this statement is
tautological, for one of the indices suggesting full urbanization
is rembersnip in an elite)., The semi-urbanism of the villa.-e elite
is somewhat differents rather than a vubmewrged group, this is, within
its owri context, a dominant one-its contact with urban patterns comes
from its role as intem.sdiary between town and village. The conposition
of this groun differs sonewhat between the two ideological camos: for
the santris it tends to consist of koranic scholars, local religious
officials, traders end. village chiefs who ha nen to be santri (as
noted earlier, the tendency for residential segregation of santri
and abangan in the .ore rural regions is rather mariked); for the
abangan group it is comoosed of non-santri village chiefs and traders,
local nasant leaders, mrstical religious teachers or curers, and so
fortho Thus, the village elite, which increasingly attempts to copy
town styles of life, is the crucial link between urban leadership and
rural followerehip, and as about three-quarters of Modjokuto sub-
district population is in the villages, theirs is an altogether crucial
role, as for the mass of the peasants, their understanding of the
details of political life is necessarily rather limited, but perhaps
a majority consider themselves--especially now that they have exper-
ienced a general election--at least "sympathetic" to one or another of
the four major aliran: PNI, PKI, Masjumi, or NU. Some unreconstructed
peasants (as well as some kampong dwellers) remain uninterested,
clinging to traditional forms of existence, and are slightingly referred
to by the more "progressive" as masa bo , roughly: "I leave it to
you" (ioe., to a leader: "I donut care; do what you will with me," etc.)
Thus the continuum from rural to urban is in part also a continuum
from a more territorial basis of social organization to a more ideological,
from an apolitical, traditionalistic, localist type of outlook to an
hyper-political, rationalistic, nationalist type of outlook, and the
tendency is toward a greater and greater penetration of the ideological
aliran element into the village town structureo One of the chief
mechanisms for this penetration is universal education; the school not
only aids individuals to move into the more urbanized, ideologized
ranks, but moves the whole society in that direction. The school is
the primary socializing mechanism for the new Indonesian society,l0
llhThe number of students in the Government schools in Indonesia
went from about 2 million in 1939/40 to slightly over 6 million in 1954/5,
about 98% of the students being in the elementary schools in the first period,
about 95% in the second0  Meek, 0p, cit,, In todjokuto town the number
of Government uchools increased from three in 1940 to nine in 1954,
and elementary schools have been founded in most villages. Inclusion of
LgLures for the orivate schools, C 'acurate ones wre available, oa
make thmi- cng even more ,t kin
147
the major means of recruitment for social and political leadership,
and for intelligent, literate followership as well0 The more generalised,
universalized way-of-life orinetations, the political party-sodality
alirans within them, and the school are, consequently, all of a piece-
they represent a new form of socio-cultural organization toward which
."odjokuto has been moving for mst of this century and toward which it
is continuing to move at a very accelerated rate.
And this n';'-w form af socio-cultural organization is locally
centered: the town, once a conglomerate of separate communities in
but transient contact with one another, a comot - of self-contained
racial, religious, and occupational groups-Chinese, Dutch, orijaji
bureaucrats, santri traders and local peasants--come together bit
tangentially for comnerical or governmntal purposes, has now begun
to take on a defInite form, begun to become a civic unit rather than
a way-station, a local capital rather than a mere outpost of central
government, The aliran comprise, now, a set of social structures through
which local leadership over the rural-urban community as a whole
(ignoring for the moment, the Chinese) can be exerted, Increasingly,
the District (and Subdistrict* office has become less of a simAple agency
for centralized control ai d rmore of a nivot around which the various
party elites compete for Nower 9  The town, and to a lesser but
increasing extent the villages around it, are coming to be governed
through a rrocess of shifting coalitions between local political
leaders, serving as rembers of varioas srts of c ommittees, governing
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boards and informal nlanning groups. The District Officer (and, to a
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For a description of this sart of political activity in
Modjokuto, see Fagg, op. cite
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degree, the village chiefs) becom' les i "little king" governing his
own special territory, but Wore a skillesdt, and often sorely pressed,
broker between the various articu3ate-highlry articulate-elitea,
Modjokuto, town and country, is coming to L ;overned by a set of
competing pressure groups, no one of whico-at least for the moment--
can be called clearly dominant, no one of which-at least for the
moment--be ignoredll 6
Yet, as already stressed, this process of social reconstruction is
somewhat incomplete. The homogenization of the society which has
necessitated the removal of the Dutchll7 and an increbaingly tense and
untrusting relation between Indonesians and Chinese, has also brought
on a serious threat of economic stagnation-there are same positive
counter-signs--with an attendant waste of human energy and natural
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This growth of a "vertical," locally-based pattern of political
organization should not be taken to mean that Modjokuto has become a
self-sufficient, autarkic unit, separated from the society generally.
On the contrary, the construction of a local political unit has meant
not a weakening of ties to the larger cities, and, particularly, to
Djakarta the capital, but a transformation of them. The alirans are,
after all, Indonesia-wide organizations and follow policies determined
by their central governing boards, inevitably located in Djakarta0
Further, representatives from local Modjokuto alirans attend national
conventions, serve on regency governing counciTiTie so-called Dewan
Perkawkilan Rakjat, "The People's Representative Council") and may even
move up in the party hierarchy, in fact, the te.ndeny is still i over-
centralize, to reserve all important policy decioLons, both within the
Government proper and within all the parties, to D jakarta, leaving in-
sufficient room for local autonomy. Overcentralixation is often con-
sidered to be a cry of Sumatran and Maccassarese minorities against
Javanese domination from Djakarta; but it is a regional Javanese
complaint too,
1etween 1946 and 1954, net 140,000 )Dutch lert Z.donesia
leaving 63,000 at the end of 19 iMekL, i pe4 it
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resources in a whole range of over-corinlicated and inefficient adminis-
trative, commercial and a-,ricultural activities. I have already
traced the develoament of what I have called an "involuted" social
structure in the rural and commercial sectors: a great flood of
neoole on the land and in the market in the absence of any structural
reform in the nroductive or distributive orocess making for increased
per canita output ar increased efficiency, as a !-ind of iarking time
in a situation where time, given the oonulation growth, is nerhaps
the greatest shortage. a similar process could be shown for the bureau-
cracy which has at least quadrupled in size since the )re-war neriod,
to say nothing of the tremiendous increase in the number of unoroductive
students. As the other ore-war trends, this one too, a less optim-
istic one, hias intensified in the period of independency: the danger
of the Indonesian economiy-judging from i.odjokuto--becoming one vast
feather-bed supoorting an increasin- nunlr of under-employed workers
at a declining level of living is a real one,, 119 In the ore-war
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flow big- the bureaucracy is deoends on whom you are going to
count as belonging to it. If you just take emnloyees in the Central
Government apoaratus, the change is from about 150,000 in 1940 to
about 570,000 in 1953, If the army and temporary workers are included,
the shift is from about 250,000 to nearly a million. If village officials
are included, the Goernment staff is 2,00,000 against 600,000 pre-war,
lieek, op. cit, Of course, the students are really a caital investment
in literacy, intelligence and anti-traditionalism, and so nresumably
a nositive factor from a develoomental point of view. Yet the fact that
the number of students in non-technical junior high-schools has increased
nine-fold, the number in technical ones six; that in senior highs, the
pronortions ire ten and two -and-one-half; and the contrast would again
be even sharper if irivate schools were included (ibid), leads to at
least a question as to the marginal oroductivity of this investment,
1 1 9 1he director of the railroad in hodjokuto-now an Indonesiaa-
complained to me in 1953 that while his volume of activity was dorni
3/5 over the ore-war period, his staff was down less than 1/5, so that
he had just about twice as many neople than he figured he needed, He
was, however, unable to fire anyone due to labor union pressures,
As a result morale is low (workers also complained to me about the
under-ernployment), operation inefficent, ani costs highc,
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period, the Dutch provided managerial leadership and the Chinese pro-
vided commercial skills, and both provided capitall if the first are
to be excluded and the second to be limited in their influence, the
functions they fullfilled, being crucial ones, must now be fulfilled
in some alternative manner if the popular dynanism released by the
Revolution is not to be dissipated in rhetoric, oolitical machinations
and paper planning.
Stagnation is not a new experience to Indonesia, but what is now
is that the mass of the vopulation having joined the "revolution of
rising expectations" will no longer put up with it-if the present
pluralistic system of competing political parties, or alirans, in a
republican context cannot produce a rising standard of living for the
people as a whole, it is almost a certainty that some highly author-
itarian group will be given an opportunity to see what it can doo
Further, the possibilities, at least for Java, for "static expansion"
are now all usedup-it is no longer possible for the country s elite
to grow in wealth while its mass gromsin number,120 at least in the
absence of a police state, The Dutch used up just about all the
possibilities of skimin the cream off of Javanese population growth.-
of keeping a growing nass locked out of particiption in the returns
to increasing productivity while using their land and labor essential
elements in the productive process--and the new Indonesian elite is in
the somewhat unfortunate position of finally coming to power almost
exactly at the point where the effects of past distortion of the economic
structure, in fact of the whole society, are finally coming home to roost,
120
For this phrase, see Furnivall, opocito po 404o
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In short, the process of urban reconstruction, like the process of
rural reform, seems to have, for the moment, paused s the economic
stimulus for it has weakened, The growing together of worker, trader
and civil servant into a single community is still only partial--the
town ramainst, to a degree, even in the Javanese sector, a semi-rural,
semi-traditional conglomerate of separate groups whose mutual relations
are tenuous and ill-definedo The volitical reforms, stimulated initially
by the impact of Western society on Indonesia, which came to their
fulfillment in the Revolution need now to be foLlowd by economic
reforms if they are not to disappear into some sort of totalitarianism,
both more efficient and mCre ruthless, a fact may Indonesian leaders
seem to recognize when they say their Revolution is not yet finished.
It has often been noted, to put the problem in another way, that labor
as a factor of production is underemloyed in countries such as Indo-
nesiaj but 'shat has less often been pointed out is that organisation
is too,, The immediate prcblem in Indoneia--or at least in Java-is
not that of creating entreprenurial motivation but ih seeing that
those people -wio for one reason or another already have it get access
to resources in sufficient quantity to allong their economic creativity
some free nlay, and the tendency for the unit of operation to shrink
to lilliputian forms in agriculture, trade, administration, etc. means
that that elerent of the oopulation which might take eonomic leader-
ship, which mi ght risk failure and insecurity for the possibility of
achievement, is hemmed in on all sides by a great mass of people inter-
ested primarily in maintaining their place in the "circular flow*"
Having created a rationalised politico-social apparatus more amenable
to balanced soonomic growth than old traditional forms were, there is
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In short, the process of urban reconstruction, like the process of
rural reform, seems to have, for the moment, paused 4s the economie
stimulus for it has weakened0 The growing together of worker, trader
and civil servant into a single comunity is still only partial-the
toun remains, to a degree, even in the Javanese sector, a semi-rural,
semi-traditional conglomerate of separate groups whose mutual relations
are tenuous and ill-defindo The political reforms, stimulated initially
by the impact of Western society on Indonesia, which came to their
fulfillment in the Revolution need now to be foLlowed by economic
reforms if they are not to disappear into some sort of totalitarianism,
both more efficient and mcre ruthless, a fact many' Indonesian leaders
seem to recognize when they say their Revolution is not yet finished.
It has often been noted, to put the problem in another way, that labor
as a factor of production is underemployed in countries such as Indo-
nesia3 but iihat has less often been pointed out is that organization
is too, The immediate prcblem in Indonesia--or at least in Java-is
not that of creating entreprenurial motivation but in seeing that
those people 1mho for one reason or another already have it get access
to resources in sufficient quantity to allong their economic creativity
some free nlay, and the tendency for the unit of operation to shrink
to lilliputian forms in agriculture, trade, administration, ete means
that that elenent of the population which might take economic leader.
ship, which mi ght risk failure and insecurity for ,the possibility of
achievement, is hemmed in on all sides by a great mass of people inter-
ested primarily in maintaining their place in the "circular flow."
Having created a rationalized politico-social apparatus more amenable
to balanced eaonomic rrrth than old traditional forms were, there is
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now a pressing need to give it sos thing to do besides feed on itself,
to engage it in genuine problems arising in an economically dynamic
society.
In any came, one of the central questions, oerhaps the central
question raised by Indonesian independence seems to be s how can a
more productive pattern of economic activity be introduced into the
social structure in a manner which will both stimulate and sustain
the cultural and political rennaissance already underway in Indonesia
and provide a rising standard of living for Indoresians as a whole.
In a final section, I would lile to connent briefly on this point--
at least so far as concerns hodjokuto--in the light of the pattern of
rural-urban development I have been tracing,
CONCLUSION: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIONAL ECON(IC DEVELOPMEIT
In any die::ussion of the future development of the Modjokuto
region, and of iany other regions of Java as well, the role of
cammercial, "capitalist" agriculture must most certainly be a central
concern* One naturally asks at the outset of such a discussion: how
much of the pre-war result of the contact of plantations agriculture
and village life was inherent in capital-intensive agi alture as
such, and how much was a product of the political context in which
the contact occurted? Is a more beneficent role in the process of social
change for plantation agriculture possible under altered political
conditions, or is plantation agriculture an inherently "native-welfare"
form of economic activity? Is the chasm which yawns between pre..
capitalism and high capitalism"1 2 1 only widened by the penetration of
"high capitalim" into the agricultural sphere, or might the chasm,
real enough be rarrowed by such a penetration? These are difficult
questions, but perhaps some lead toward answering them can be gained
from our review of estate agriculture in pre-war Modjokutoo
We have seen the effect of the plantations, the sugar enterprises,
particularly, to have been ambivalent* On the one hand they tended to
lead to sharp changes in the indigenous social and economic structure,
on the other hani to stereotype that structure in the f ace of a high
and rising populatin. Of the two effects, the former is perhaps
the more interesting, if only because, less obvious, it has been less
emphasised, The sugar enterprises, despite all the attempts to mitigate
their impa et, stimulated changes toward a larger farm unit<, and at
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Boeke, p2cit. , p. 121,
least partly, toward a "yeoman" farm manager; toward an aggressive,
rationalistic, urban "intelligentsia" elite; toward a more highly
developed, professionally staffed, yet simply organised, distributive
system, with even some turn toward small-scale industrialisation; and
toward the formation of a self-reliant "working man" proletariat
Thus, capital-intensive (at least relative to Javanese forms of
organization) enterprise had a kind of "multiplier effect" on the whole
regional economy and social structure--a "rational," using rational
in 1,eber's sense, 1 2 2 form of economic organization tended to rationalize
the traditionalistic Javanese economy too, pulling more and more people
across (or half-way across) the pre-capitalist/capitalist "chasm*"
The contact between "East" and "West" was here not wholly destructive
but in some sense at least partially creative and reconstructive0 1 2 3
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See Weber, M. The Theory of Social and Ecohomic Organisation,
New York, 1947, ppo 158 fa
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Compare a recent anthropological statement on a culturation:
"Acculturation, is, however, neither a passive nor a colorless absorptiono
It is a culture-producing as well as a culture-receiving process. Acoul-
turation, partiularly when not forced, is essentially creative. It is
a productive process even though in consequence there may be a decrease
in the number and variety of pre-existent elements. Abandormuent or vol-
untary loss is oompensated for in some other area of culture; and to
the extent that an introduced element may serve as an alternative to an
indigenous one, there is actually a gain in number and variety....
These considerations suggest that the conjunction of differences in
culture contact provides a kind of catalyst for cultural creativity
Much has been made of the melancholy process of cultural disintegration,
often with the implicit value assumption on the part of the anthropologist
that the older aboriginal patterns are good and what emerges in the
contact situation is bad, Comparative study which is also sensitive to
the generation of new and qualitatively different patterns may add
significantly to our knowledge of cultural transformation and growth."
Broom, L. et al, "Acculturation: An Exploratory Formulation,"
American An ologs1t, Vol. 56, noo 6, 1956, ppo 973-1000
This "multiplier effect" of capital intensive forms of economic
activity is worth more study, The sugar industries seem to have tended
to strengthen those elements within the whole Javanese population
which possessed the "creative urge, the tenacity, the concentration on
the economic result and the power of organization, , 0which character-
ise the true picneer," which Boeke holds, incorrectly, to be almost
absent among Indonesians,, "Ty providing an environment in which
these traits would prove "selective" in the evolutionary sense, it
brought individuals of whom they were, in fact, characteristic, to
the fore, at the expense of the less creative, tenacious and calculating,
This suggests that capital-intensive industry, rather than having an
intrinsically stereotyping or disorganizing effect on traditional life,
may, at least under certain conditions, have an "igniting" effect, my
initiate a chain reaction of rationalizing reform through the whole
society 125 It suggests that there may be a tendency for a capitalist
industry introduced into a traditionalist social structure to ramify
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2p.cit. p. 2120 On the consumption side, Boeke similarly
greatly i erestimates the elasticity of Indonesian wants, ibid, p.40
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See, in this connection, the interesting criticism of the recent
emphasis by economists on the need for capital economizing industries
in under-developed countries by Albert 00 Hirschman, "Economics and
Investment Planning: Reflections Based on Experience in Colombia,"
in Investment Criteria and Economic Growths Millikan, M. (edo),
Cambridge,- (Mass), PP~3554i~
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in its effects throughout that structure so as to stimulate individuals
at various stages of econo ic rationalization in their own terms, to
move them a few ste,s further along the road to less traditionaliWed
economic behavior from whatever point they may already have reached.
&nd it suggest3 that the indigenous oopulation ought not to be seen
as one lump ma3s, simply charactertmed by its absence of dynamism and
its inability t-o throw off the "shackles of tradition, but a comples,
already differentiated aggregate which an external stimulus will not
cause to respond as a simple unity, but which will show a wide range
of reactions depending upon the patterns of social, cultural and
personality traits within it.
A. capital -intensive fori of econoic organization creates, in
short, an internal econoic frontier within which those in the society
with the mentality of a "true pioneer" can gain some opportunity to
exercise their abilitieso But it is not simply an individual matters
though individual variation in tastes and temperatments play an important
part in the whole process, the various socio-cultural groups, as I
have tried to indicate, tend to react differentially in terms of their
historical development and the intrinsic nature of the social position
and cultural crientation. The variation in value standards, world-view,
and style-of-life between the more Moslem and less Moslem elements of
the population, between the transman and the villager, between the elite
and the mass, between the trader, the civil servant, the coolie and
the peasant, may all play a role. Those with the cultural background,
the social status, the psychological motivation and the inherent ability to
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take advantage of the technical and administrative opportunities
offered by the new form of organization will tend to do so; those who
are more ible to take advantage of commercial onportunities it offers
will also tend to do so; more aggressive oeasants "get ahead," so
do the more aggressive among the landless, the first as la-ger-scale
farmers, the latter as workers. Thus, the impact of capital intensive
technology on a traditional soci-cultural structure (there is a
reverse impact too, but that is too complex a problem to treat with
here), tends to press it toward change along the lines set down for it
by its own inte rnal form of organization, to stimulate an intrinsic
pattern of growth away from traditionalism.
But this is not a "hidden hand" doctrine: if the injection of
capitalist organization into traditionalist social structure in a
laisseS faire manner simply rewarded the industrious apprentice and
punished the idle one more or less automatically, the problem of
economic development of underdeveloped countries would certainly be
much simplified, and the prognosis for such countries very optimistic
indeed0 There are, however, not only the problems concerned with intro-
ducing a new technology in a manner so that it becomes directly
engaged in the traditional structure, interlocked with it so that the
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latter cannot simply fail to respond at all; or those concerned with
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For a description of an attempt to introduce a capital intensive
element into a traditional Indonesian social structure which failed
because, among other reasons, the indigenous oopulation more or less
refused to have much to do with it despite its supposelly "obvious"
advantages to them, see Orselinga discussion of the "Sekon Project,"
in Timor, in: Ormeling, F.J 1ke Ti ' oe Djakarta and Groningen,
1955, p. 218 ff!
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the tendency for minority groups-not always managerial ones--with
special power in the capitalist sector to distort the pattern of growth
in their own short-run interest (which it would be highly naive to
expect simply to disappear with the disappearance of colonialism); but
also there are those concerned with the inhibiting and muting tendencies.
within the traditional structures themselves. These inhibiting
tendencies cannot be simply dismissed as "obstructions," for they are
attempts by the population to maintain a meaningful and spiritually
satisfying pattern of human existence in the midst of social change.
Balanced growth is an extraordinarily delicate thing, balancing not
only economic sectors off against one another, but balancing the
material gains of increasing pg ciproductivity off against the
psychological and cultural strains of social change. A smooth pattern
of economic growth which allows the people who are caught up in it
to maintain their personal identities, to shift from peasant 1o
worker, from trader to small industrialist, from aristocrat to modern
administrator and not destroy the spiritual bases of their personal
existence at the same time, is a very difficult thing .to achieve,
one certainly far from having been achieved in the West. Though
the intrusion of capital-intensive industry can provide the "motor,"
the "dynamo" for such a smooth pattern of change, it cannot provide
the regulation, the directive force, for it. That must come from
within the culture itself, and if industrialization deprives the
Indonesia of the power to control their own destinies and live
lives which have meaning for them it will not be worth the candle,
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their contemporary impoverished state to the contrary not- vith--
standing. All of which means that the r eally crucial factors
in planning for a genUinely balanced growth in which "capitalist"
patterns of economie organization are to play an important propulsive
role are: 1) the strength and specific nature of the intrusive stimulus;
2) the structure and content of the local society; and, 3) the exact
manner in which the former is introduced into the latter.
What, then, does all this mean in terms of the (! hypothetical
or paradimc) problem at hand: the possible role of a revived sugar
industry in Modjokuto? We have seen that the margin for rapid popula-
tion growth without either deep.-going structural change or severe
social strain and disorganization in the peasant sector has been,
more or less, "used up" by the Dutch sugar industries in the pre..war
period, By adding mechanically improved irrigation systems, the Dutch
companies made possible the ba31los-like distention of the traditional
social structure I have traced; but it seems certain that with much mwe
distention the ba])oon, for all its elasticity, will surely burst. 1 2 7
The dualistic policy of enforced stagnation, or "static expansion," for
the peasantry is thus a short range one which has run its course-the
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Improvement of Javanese agriculture in its present state of
organization through agricultural extension programas-better choice of
seeds, more fertilizer, etc-.-as well as through extension of modern
irrigation to drier areas of East Java, could probably, add significantly
to this elasticity in the absence of important structural change, and so
postpone the day of reckoning a little longer Though such a policy my
have its justifications as a time-buying process, it ought to be realised,
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combination of plain living and high tinking on the part of the mass
and high living and plain thinking on the part of the elite is no
longer even possible, at least in Java. The building up of commercial
agriculture in the Modjokuto area, now that the population density
has reached nearly 2,5OO per square mile (in the thickly settled rice
plain area), faces a much more inflexible situation than it did when the
density was lower.
In essence, the problem is this: capital-intensive agriculture
will increase productivity p"r worker, but it will also reduce the
number of workers needed (in some cases, it might even reduce output
per acre, due to its more extensive manner of cultivation, although
with increased experimentation in mechanized tropical agriculture
this would probably cease to be true, at least for many crops). As
a result, the Modjokuto economy seems caught in what seems to be a
widely typical dilemma in underdeveloped countries: a choice between
a pattern yielding (relatively) higher per capita income and higher
unemployment (capital-intensive agriculture) or one yielding (relatively)
lower . capita income and lower unemployment (L illiputain agricultur e).
as such, and it ought to be realised, too, that if the very expensive
time thus purchased is not used with mnaxim efficiency in initiating
development--i.e., changing the ttern of agriculture and of peasant
life, stimulating industry, b a simplified distributive netsork,
eto.--one has only d eepened the problem. Sud improvement, combined
with developmental changes in agricultural organisation, etc., are,
of course, much to be desired, but, in fact, many of them are more
likely t6 follow than to precede such:-Organisational change*
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If commercial agriculture and larger peasant holdings are to be intro-
duced, what is to become of the "excess" population? As Boeke has well
remarked, with half the degree of mechanization of American farms, ten
per cent of Egypt's farmers could do the work now done, but this would
leave ninety cercent of the population starving.128 Along similar
lines, there is the food problem and the business cycle problem:
commercial agriculture, even if of food products such as sugar, as an
adaptation to the principal of compara tive advantage, inevitably means
food imports (at least on a regional basis); similarly, producing for
an export market (even if only regionally), puts one at the mercy of
the business cycle, which in primary production is notoriously wide-
swingingo Thus, the Modjokuto Javanese seem to have their choice of
two equally unpalatable, and in the long run unwtkable, alternatives:
a continuation of the present, unfluctuating, descent of lilliputian
agriculture to the point where the maximum number of people are being
carried, ant-like, on the land, or an increase in productive efficiency
at the cost of instability, dependence on external sources of food,
and the kind of radical maldistribution of income of the type Boeke
postulates for a "developed" Egypt.
The question seems to be, then, can commercial agriculture of a
capital intensive sort be so brought into conjunction with labor-
intensive peasant agriculture, so that the productivity gains of the
former may be had without the severe socio-economic dislocations it
1 2%Boeke, J H , "Population Increase," in Eastern and Western
World, S. Hofstra (ed 0 ), The Hague and Bangdln, 1953, ppO b9-M
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seems to imply. Paradoxically, this is, of course, exactly what we have
been saying the pre-war Dutch concerns did: their irrigation-improving,
land-renting, labor-wasting, race-segregating system of cultivation
combined "capitalist" profits with (relative) rural stability. Is,
then, our persistent criticism of their anti-developmental implications
unwarranted? Is the dualistic policy, after all, the best one? I
think that the problem here is that there are two kinds of "dualism":
a policy which treats the capitalist and pre-capitalist sectors of the
society differentially in order permanently to stabilize their relations
to one another, so that "never the twain shall meet," is quite a'
different thing from a policy which treats the various sectors of the
society differentially in order to insure orderly social and economic
change, which, in fact, attempts to use the anti-traditional elements
in capitalist organization as an instrument of social change, to
effect a steady, continuous and moderately rapid transition to more
efficient patterns of economic organization throughout the whole
society. Where the first policy tries to dampen the chain reaction
toward economic transformation a capital-intensive industry introduced
into a traditional structure necessarily generates, to isolate indigenous
patterns from diffused ones in the name of "native welfare," the second
tries to control this chain reaction, to adjust the impact of capitalism
to the local social structure's capacity to adjust to it creatively.
It is in this second, and far more difficult, sort of "dualistic" or
"pluralistic" policy, one intended not to maintain the dualism or
pluralism, but to abolish it, lies, I think, Modjokuto' s main hopeo
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But the term "plantation agriculture," taken as a simple whole,
conceals several elements which need to be distinguished before one
can talk meaningfully about its possible role in Kodjokuto's future.
Following Pim, we might distinguish three main stages in the supply of
ag agricultural product to a distant consumer: the actual cultivation
of the plant, its processing, and its marketing (including transportatton),
noting that "at each of these stages the rival systems of plantation
and peasant prcduction have relative advantages and disadvantages"129
In the pre-war period, the vertical integration oolicies of the
plantation companies kept these three stages under unified, European
control,13 a policy which, as we have emphasized, maximizes the contrast
between capitalist and are-capitalist spheres of activity Consequently
one might ask whether dissolution of the tight bond between cultivation,
processing and marketing might not make for a more workable relationship
between peasant and commercial agriculture. Particularly in the matter
of cultivation it has long been argued, both by the Indonesians them-
selves, and by the more perceptive of Ditch scholars, 1 31 that a
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Pim, A, Colonial Arieni.toral Production London, hew York
and Toronto, 19A6, p, 9,
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The Jgvanese sugar industry has proceeded through three main
stages of marketing consolidation. From a system of independent
planters, it changed,. around 1900, to a system of large holding-companies
(of which HVA originally but an import-export trading concern, is good
example), and in the depression of the thirties a central sales organi-
zation--NIVAS-for the whole industry was set up and continued to function.
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van der Kolff, opocit.
division of labor in which o easant organizations-cooperatives, unions
and so forth--were mainly responsible for cultivation and sugar
companies for procersing would lead to a healthier situation.
The question involved in such a re-organization, is, of courses
how far must production and efficiency fall? If free-hold cane culti-
vations is comained with highly capitalized milling will the low out-
putd poor quality of the former make the latter unable to justify
its high fixed costs ? Largely, this depends on whether the technical
skills of cultivation heretofore associated with the mills can be
transferred to the peasantry, or, in the short run, that a mode of
cooperation between mills and peasants organized in surpa-familial
cooperatives, unions, and the like can be worked out which will allow
the skills and capital of the sugar technicians to be effectively
applied to the land of the peasants without reducing the latter to
simply passive pawns in the wrocess., If democratic peasant unions can
gain control arer larger tracts of land and work out relations with the
sugar industry which are mutually profitable to both groups, it is
possible that the cost-cutting advantages of scimtific management and
capital intensification might be effectively combined with present
freedom and progress, Perhaps even ih the best of cases, however, some
loss of productive efficiency over the ore-war situAtion is inevitable,
but that situation was an abnormal one Ln the sense that it permitted
a rather greater domination of economic interests over social ones
than is oossible in a free society; and in the balance against a more
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active "yeoman-like" role of the peasant in the sugar producing process,
the loss is small enough:
Any application of a system of farmer-factory division of labor
will make necessary a less inensive method of cultivation- than
that used under the old plantations system. To many who have put
the dogma of intensification on a pedestal as an ideal to be
worshipped, this is a disagreeable though. But the dogma of inten-
sification must be recognised as notming more than a dogma, The
pre-war aim of the sugar industry was a maximum of return on
investments, and even the social environment could be moulded to
this aim0 In such a situation intensive cultivation seemed to be
the best solution, But today all is changed, If the sugar
industry is to survive at all, it must be based on a dual principle,
the financial interest of the share holders and the social
interests of the people. It must fit itself to the social environ-
ment rather than moulding that to its own will; it must recognize
the people as an end in themselves, rather than a means of greater
productivity, and, fos er their productive energy as a national
Indonesian interetl 1)2
That all-this is not mere utopian fantasy, is evidenced by the
fact that just this sort of development has begun to occur, as yet not
to any important degree in Modjokuto itself, but in the next two or
three subdistricts to the northwest of it-ieo, those lying along
either side of the river0 It was in this area, the heatt of the
river basin, that the plantations9 pre-war land renting was concentrated;
here, the peasants were even further pulled into the capitalist side
of the dual economy than they were in Modjokuto, which, given its
geogrpphical position, was actually somewhat marginal to the development.
Not only were land holdings larger and contracts maintained longer in
the face of the crash (and the partial recovery in the later thirties
more tignificant), but the embryonic larger landholders class of this
area was able to go fabther along the road toward the freehold sugar
132
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alternative than in Modjokutoo Here, then, is proof of Van der Kolff's
dictum that those oeasanis who were most closely involved in the capi-
talist sector were best able to ride out the depression because ther
could take advantage of what income earning oossibilities continued
to exist. In any case, the post-war reconstruction of several Dutch
sugar factories in this area under markedly changed political conditions
has led to a small florescence of freehold commercial agriculture.
At least three sorts of program, of varying degrees of conservatism
in terms of the prewar pattern, are in operation in t hese river-side
vilages. In the most conservative case, a Moslem peasant organization
rents land from its members which it then rents in turn (for single
growing period leases) to the sugar millso Thus, the organization
acts as a go-between for the peasants, the actual oeasant participation
is only slightly greater than before the war. In a somewhat less con-
servative case, the sugar is grown by the richer peasants, a few of
whom have as much as a hundred and fifty acres of land, under the
supervision of the mills working through a Government sponsored (and
regulated) peasant cooperative. The cperative makes the price con-
tract with the mills, gets an advance, is responsible for delivery
and attempts to insure quality, partly by permitting the sugar managers
to advise the peasants, inspect the cane in the fields and so forth.
The third pattern represents something of an atypical case 3 3  Before
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I am indebted to hro Jay for the details of this case,
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the war a Chinese owned a larger tract of land in this riverine area
which, after the war, was divided uo (ie., was squatted on, the
squatting later being legitimized by the Government which comoensated
the Chinese) among a number of landless sugar workers from the one
"waste-land" sugar plantation in the area, alre4dy mentioned as
bordering Ilodjokuto subdistrict on the east, These proletarianised
squatters, most of them young men, were tightly organized by a
Communist dominated peasant union and so were able to farm the land
collectively in large units in sugar. Each man contributed a portion
of his land to a larger collective sugar farm (if a man's plot lay
within the sugar farm area and he didn't wish to contribute he was
given land elsewhere in exchange)o The peasants then worked the land
and received wages (ioe 0,a share of the sugar output) according to
land plus labor they contributed to the common pool. as, for
obvious political reasons, relations between the mils and this group
were rather poor, the sugar managers had almost no role here except
as purchasers of the cane (if they did not wish to buy it they were
obligated by Government edict to mill it for the peasants at a fixed
commission, the latter then marketing the refined sugar themselves),
As the first sugar crop in this plan was just coming in as we left
the field, it was not clear how this program would work outo In any
case, there is no need to pronounce one of these plans to be necessarily
"better" in absolute terms than the other: the three plans are, in
fact, attuned to three different types of adjustment of the peasantry
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to commercial operation. What is important is the direction in which
they are moving: toward a collective bargaining type of relation
between peasant and sugar manager.134
Of course, the possibility of such a collective bargaining relation
betweon the factory and the peasant being workable depends on changes
in the traditional patterns of "doing business" on both sides which
are radical enough so as not to encourage undue optimism0 On the
factory side, it entails an abandonment of the "spectroscopic" labor
policy, a progressive modification of the dominant role of the Dutch
in the enterprises, and a much restricted sphere of arbitrary action
134
The increase of free hold cane is evidently fairly general,
thoagh still small by pre-war standards: "the very rapid increase
in rlanted area of indigenous cane has been a phenomenon of the period
under discussion. In 1952 this covered an area roughly 20,000 hectares-
16,500 of them being in East Java, 3,000 in Central Java and 500 in
West Java. The indigenous mills have inadequate capacIty for such
plar-ted area. Consequently, indigenous producers increasingly disposed
of their cane to the sugar company factories. In 1951 the sugar factoass
re-inbursed the small holder sugar producer by giving him half the sugar
procsssed from his cane. In 1952 this was replaced by a straight money
payn~ant. The gross proceeds thus obtained by the small holder amounted
to more than would have been obtained had the cane been worked by the
inditenous mill or had paddy been grown on the land devoted to indigenous
cane production. Aboxt 140,000 tons of sugar was processed from the
cane raised by small holders in indigenous mills, while about 22,000
tons of the sugar produced from factories by small holders, Hollinger,W.
"The Indonesian Economy: The Export Crops Sector," ,uantlative Studies
7, Irdonesia, unpublished. Center for International Studies, MIT.
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on the part of management generally. On the Indonesian side it demands
not only at least a partial dampening of the more xenophobic aspects of
nationalism, but also--and even more important-the emergence of honest
and skilled local leadership. Cooperatives--of which Modjokuto peasants
tend to be rather wary due to unhaopy experiences with embezzling
treasurers in the past-can obviously rather easily become mere fronts
for the old pattern of operation whose main purpose is to enrich their
heads as agents of the sugar companies, much as many village chiefs
were enriched before the war, The emergence of a new pattern also
rests on the possibility of self-restraint both on the part of peasant
organizations and on the part of labor unions representing the necessarily
more permanent work force of the mills, a redization that ultimately
worker and peasant sugar income rests on the productivity of the
industry, and not simply on how far management can be squeezedl35
Aside from the problem of keeping wages and rents low enough to be able
to pay for capital and managerial direction, if sugar proceeds are to
be used for developmental purposes, all profits must not be allowed
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Kraal (opcit reports that post var wage, rent and capital
costs have risen o the point where profitable operation of the mills
is imperiled, the high costs in part being due to unrealistic labor and
peasant union policies, But he notes the situation is improving and
remarks in conclusion: "If the industry, the authorities and the
trado unions, conscious of their common interests in the continued
existence of the sugar industry, could achieve a cooperation which
will give the industry a chance, there are many important improvements
to be obtained, and there can be a possibility of new factories being
established, which operate so efficiently as to ensure a return on the
capital invested by exporting all production," He also notes the poss-
ibility of a significant extension of domestic sales, even at present
prices.
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to fall entirely knto the hands of the minority of the population
directly engaged in the industry. The contemnorary dominance of leaders
with ulterior political motivations in Indonesian labor unions, of course
threatens to block development of ary sort under the present, "petty
social democrat" regime.
Despite the admittedly great obstacles in the face of a revival
of the sugar industry,, howrver, there are also some new positive
factr s which did not exist before the war in anything like their
present strength, The ideology-political party sort of social organ-
ization I have noted as becoming stronger in Modjokuto obiously
permits more flexible relations between the more "developed" and "under-
developed" sectors of the society than the traditional, rather compart-
mentalized, system did--allows educated, urban Indonesians to provide
more effective leadership for the peasantry and the workers, As such
it reduces the gap between the two sides of the dual economy, allowing
a more even transition between themo The tendency for the political
parties, labor unions, women's groups and the like to abandon their
nominally specific functions for a diffuse "syndicalist" type of
general agitation is perhaps their major weakness, but in a more dynamic
economy they might come to fulfill more important,, if more circum-
scribed,, regulatory functions, Also, the eagerness for constructive
social change awakened by nationalisia which now tends to get expended
in speeches, resolutions and political intrigue might find a more
specific and concrete application if a growth economy appeared as a
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reality rather than continuing to exist but as an ideal, In contemporary
Indonesia the immediate need is for projects which are actually on the
ground and in operation, rather than for broadly sketched plans for the
development of the entire economy, so that the intrinsic ability of the
society and its people to develop if given half a chance will be provided
with some opportunity to operate, And for this the sugar industry,
though less glamorous than new dams or steel plants, seems, if only
because it already exists, ct some valueel36
Nevertheless, this is not a brief for the sugar industry. Whether
or not, and how far, the sugar industry can or ought to be revived
depends on a whole host of economic and other factors--demand, market
organiszation, comparative costs,, possibilities and political practica-
bilities of food imports, etco-=which I do not wish to prejudge here,
It is possible that Indonesians are better aff without sugar industry
than thqrwould be with it, even under ideal conditions0 I have used it
merely as a paradigmatic example of a type of industry processing pri-
mary products which seems to me to have an important role to play in
136
In this connection see the comments on "overaIlvs, sector
planning" and "biases in the determination of high-priority areas" in
Hirschman, opo cit. It is also difficult, idiatever its effects, to
glibly write off as hopeless an industry which between 1928 and 1931
absorbed a capital investment of $318 and provided, even at oppressive
rates, 10 percent of the total income of the Javanese population through
rents and waves. Metaalf, opo cit, p, 630
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the development of the Indonesian economy Like generals planning
for the last war, "underdeveloped economists" have a tendency to plan
for the last industrial revolution, Sugar is not, by far, the only
processing industry which can be developed on the basis of crops
cultivable in Javanese terraces and gardens: soya beans, co'rmtA,
palm oil, icapoc, tobacco, coffee, cacao fibres of various sorts, and
marw other crops offer possibilities (not all of them, of course, in
the Modjokuto environment) for- such industries, particularly if more
capital can be invested in scientific studies of tropical agrianlture
and 6f technological methods to process the output. Whether it be
soft drinks (the development of this industry, largely by tie Chinese,
which is something of a natural in tropical environment, is providing
one of the expanding post-war domestic markets for sugar) candy bars,
cigarettes, soapN soya-bean calm or kapok-stuffed pillows, a non-
exploitative integration between an advanced technology and Javanese
primary production in agriculture is not without possible significance
for future growth of the Indonesian economyl 3 7
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A good exampleoand mrely an example-of the possibilities in
a combination of improved processing and cultivation is in copra.
An untended tree yields barely 20 nuts a year, a well-fertilized,
well-selected tree planted at regular intervals can produce up to 100
nuts. Further, drying in the sun takes five days, and depends on near
continuous sunshine for this periodo Kiln drying takes only 24 hours,
but leaves a smoky odor on the copra which reduces its value (Metcalf,
opacito, p, 68). Thus an improvement of both cconut tree cultivation,
perhaps in cooperatively organized house gardens, plus improved
technology for kiln drying could, assuming decent market conditions, add
a good deal to Indonesian national income.
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The general model being offered, to summarize in more abstract
terms, is one in which an at least relatively capital intensive industry
is introduced into a relatively traditionalist (but changing) social
structure to provide a "motor" for development, For such a capitalist
"motor" an industry resting on the processing and scientifically
managed cultivation of tropical plants seems well suited. It can be
light, small and decentralized; it can be fitted carefully to local
condition; and it provides less of a discontinuity in living patterns
for the Indonesians who participate in it, while still capable of offering
a genuine "entering wedge" in the process of industrialization. 1 ven
more important, perhaps, is the effect such an industry may have on
independent small industry and trade and on the pattern of Jand use
and agriculture in'the region* By providing a market for local produce,
such, an industry can reward those who prove capable of responding to
it, either collectively or individually: a viable cooperative movement
in Java, for example, will never be based, as has so often been suggested,
simply on the supposedly (and in great part mythical) "communal"
character of the Javanese village, but only on the fact that coops
prove to pay in actual operation. Similar considerations apply to the
growth of larger landholders and yeoman farmers0
Hirschman has, in fact, argued that such industries have such
potential stimulative powers in respect to local agricultural enterprise,
that is sometimes even wise to initiate them on the basis of imported
raw materialsl 38 In the earliest stages manufacture in an underdeveloped
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country starts out as an isolated, daring venture in what is held to
be a hostile environment, even, I might add, if the entrepreneur
involved is the Go rernmento Because the local agricultural product
is likely to lack the quality and kuniformity necessary for industrial
operations and its supply is likely to be unreliable or insufficient,
the-usual tendency is to engage in the kind of vertical integration
we have traced in sugar cultivation in order to regulate the supply
of raw materials, If a dependable fore' ,,n source of supply is
available, Hirshman points out, it offers an alternative solution to
the problem which avoids the difficulties involved in adapting and
expanding donstic primary production for industrial operations
simultaneously with the setting up of the industry. Whether Hirshman"s
pessimism concerning raising the quality of local agricultural raw
materials at the same time as their processing and marketing is
entirely justified or not--and was his experience with Javanese rather
than Colombiare peasants, perhaps he would be more optimistic-his
argument about the stimulating effects of the sort of secondary industry
which can afford a market for agricultural oroduction on a *'ural ecanotir
is well takens the leverage effect of such an industry upon a pre.
capitalist economy and a traditionalist society has been quite marked,
as we have seen in the case of the rre-war Javanesc sugar industry
in Modjokuto, Secondary production which is closely related to
primary production can serve as an excellent point of access for
transferred capital to the whole economy.
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Similarly, such an industry can indirectly stimulate local trade
and small, shop-type industry, It does this not only by increasing
local purchasing power but by providing capital in the form of wages
(of more specialised workers) and the prices of the crops it buys, as
well as by offoring sub-contracting markets to smaller, less capitalized
industries, The largest industry in Modjokuto today is a slightly
mechanized box factory which sells its entire output to a Dutch beer
concern in Surabaja, employs a hundred or more workers, and has
attached to it a half dozen or so smaller sub-contractors making boxes
by hand in shops or evena putting.out basis0 Thus, although aid
(foreign, governmental or whatever) sprea4 things among many small
industries in an "industrial extension" fashion, can be useful, the
concentration of capital, at least to a degree, in one fairly capital-
intensive shop may ultimately have a more stimulative effect by
providing external ertonomies to small-scale, spontaneously established,
local industry, Many of the ecolomists concerned with developing a
labor-absorbing technology, a legitimate concern insofar as it would
lead to improvements in small-shop manufacture as a transitional
measure, often seem to ignore the fact that such a technology largely
exists for a whole range of handicraft or improved handicraft processes--
from cigarettes to textiles to building materials--even in such a
country as Java where small scale manufacturing seems never to have
been as lively as Japan, China or other countries of Southeast asia
such as Indo-China; a technology which will be increasingly applied
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if it becomes profitable to do so. A well-planned capital-intensive
industry which provides remunerative markets for a wide variety of
local talents can lead, if properly planned, to a stimulation of
secondary small-industry labor intensive activities with known
techniques or home designed improvements on known techniques, as well
as better orgarized distributive activities, on the part of the local
population.* 9
If such a complex of medium industry processing locally grown
crops, local small factories and stores of various degrees of capitali-
zation and complexity of org anisation, peasant cooperatives and/or
larger peasant holdings can be brought into existence, the problem of
the discontinuity of production coefficients--the fact that capital-.
intensive industrialization raised output at the cost of employment--
will at least partly be solved, because there will be, much as in Japan,
a whole range of productive process with coefficients at various
points along a near-continuous scale: the mechanized crop-processing
industry at one end, with relatively high capital and low labor inputs;
the remaining Lilliputian farms at the other, with the reverse pattern.
As the industrialization of Indonesia proceeds one would expect
. input a for the larger industries these labor-intensive shops
may also provide compmentary economies for it, a factor evidently of
central importance in Japanese economic development: "...large enterprises
were necessary to full-scale industrialization...But these enterprises
were made possible and derived much of their utility, from less dramatic
but more pervasive changes in traditional Javanese economic life...
These small firms employed comparatively simple techniques of production
and amall investments of capital, but were integraed increasingly within
a framiework of large-scale marketing, transportation, and finance..,
e"' progress in industrialization owes much to her comparative successin co nfl g and small enterprise in intricate patterns of cooperation. 09 "
Uhckood $Will.am, The Economic Developmcnt of Japan Grbith and Structural,
%91938 (rcton, 195U, pp. 192,193; quoted in Levine, oon "
"ranagement and Industrical Relations in Postwar Japan, FAR EaSTERN QUARTERLYVol,)MY o, 1o 1955, pp, 57-76.
to see a shift of the whole continuum slowly, and so far as possible
smoothly, toward the more capital-intensive end. Thus the crop-
processing industry is seen as the point of leverage around which the
whole development of an area such as Modjokuto, in its first phases
at least can revolve; a concrete mechanism for turning the local
economy away from a self-defeating pattern of a slow "descent" into
ever increased labor intensification toward a slow "ascent" into an
ever increased capital intensification. Wiat is needed, or envisioned
as needed, is not a "take-off point" from which the economy will leap
suddenly into the modern world, but rather a reversal of the direction
of economic change so that time will be working with, rather than
against, the Indonesians,
again, all of this will nct happen aut6matically and without planning,
nor does it imply that all attention must be given to the dynamic capital
intensive elzaents in the pattern at the expense of aid to the less
dynamic small industries or to "subsistence" agriculture, nor at the
expense of welfare aids to protect those suffering from the effects
of social change. If anything, planning such a pattern of change
needs to be even more detailed, for it demands not only a careful
and concrete assesmant of specifically proposed industries from the
technological and economic point of view--so that factories are not
built which have no markets or technological processes introduced which
1-77
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will not work or are overly refined h'0--but 4n equally detailed assess=
ment of the specific local situation in order to determine how a proposed
project might best be fitted into the given, on-going socio-cultural
system, and what specific effects it seems likely to have there.
Further, it would be idle-worse than idle., fraudulent-to pretend
that a developing economy will not raise social, ethical and economic
problems as serious as those the Javanese now face, that the distortions
and injustices industrialization has brought elsewhere can be entirely
avoided in Java. The oossibilities of unemployment and social disorgan-
ization due to people being ejected from tradttional structures before
new ones can absorb them; the dangers of indebtedness, labor sweating
and urban slums; the impoverishment of cuahural life by economic forces--
all the ills industrialism is heir to--will need to be faced and, it is
to be hoped, dealt with, Development will not mean an escape from
problems and will not bring utopia any more than it has in the west,
but will merely replace old problems with new ones supposedly less
overwhelming. Indonesia has, in any case, little choice--the movement
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"The term 'poor planning.4 so often heard in Columbia, is never
us-d in reference to the apportionment of total investment funds among
the principal sectors of the economy; it rather designates a highway that
has been built where there is no traffic, an irrigation scheme in an area
with adequate rainfall, etc., etc,, Good plannirt means simply to have
studied and prepared thoroughly a given project, ioe , to have ascertained
whether it corresponds to a real need, where proper engineering and
market studies have been made, whether full financing has been assured
so that it will not remain half comnleted for years, and whether alterna-
tive ways of fulfilling the sa need have been explored and rejected
for good reasons," Hirschman, op cit0 The problem of the organization
of demand, a central problem in the economic development of underdeveloped
areas has purposely not been treated in this paper, which has concentrated
on the productive side.
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away from traditional forms of life has' been proceeding for at least
most of this century, and having begun the transition to industrialism,
or having it begun for them, the -'ndonesiarm must simply go through with
it and hope that the second half of this century, now thAt they are
free, will prove better than the first, when they were not. They
cannot turn back.
